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Abstract and keywords 
 
 
Abstract: Initially outside of its scope of application, international investment arbitration is 
increasingly facing human rights protection issues. The development of investments dealing with 
public services has led to violations of socio-economic rights for host States’ populations. When 
States tried to adopt regulations to protect those rights, they were brought to arbitration for 
breaching their Bilateral Investment Treaty obligations. The human rights case law in investment 
arbitration is developing and quickly evolving. Nevertheless, its analysis enables to highlight 
important legal certainty issues, rendering difficult the protection of economic, social, and cultural 
rights. Facing this, the legitimacy of the system is disputed and the protection of the rule of law by 
international investment arbitration is seriously challenged. 
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Résumé et mots-clefs 
 
 
Résumé : L’arbitrage international d’investissement se voit de plus en plus confronté à des enjeux 
originellement hermétiques à l’arbitrage : la protection des droits de l’homme. En effet, le 
développement d’investissements ayant le monopole de certains services publics offense parfois 
les droits économiques et sociaux des populations des États hôtes. Si ces mêmes États tentent 
d’adopter des réglementations protectrices de ces droits, ils se voient opposer l’arbitrage 
d’investissement pour violations d’un traité bilatéral d’investissement. La jurisprudence en la 
matière est en pleine évolution, mais son étude permet de souligner d’importants problèmes de 
sécurité juridique dans les sentences arbitrales, ne permettant pas de garantir ces droits 
fondamentaux. L’accumulation de ces deux problématiques soulève alors la question de la 
protection de l’état de droit par l’arbitrage d’investissement, mettant à mal la légitimité de ce 
mécanisme alternatif de règlement des différends. 
 
Mots-clefs : arbitrage international d’investissement ; jurisprudence ; sécurité juridique ; droit de 
l’homme ; droit économiques, sociaux et culturels ; état de droit. 
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Introduction 
  
“Arbitration is not simply compatible with the key features of the rule of law, but has an 
increasingly important role to play in upholding those key features, both nationally and 
internationally.”1 
 The rule of law is an international concept especially promoted after war times2 that aims 
at ensuring peace, good governance and democracy throughout the world3. The honorable Chief 
Justice Geoffrey Ma recently said that “the importance of the rule of law cannot be emphasised 
enough”4. Any legal system is supposed to ensure that its core elements are implemented within 
society, and adjudication mechanisms play a key role in safeguarding them5. Therefore, investor-
state dispute settlement (ISDS)6 must uphold the rule of law to ensure its legitimacy and future7.  
 
International investment arbitration can be defined as “a public/administrative law mechanism 
[but] removed from the democratic constitutional realm. It aims at solving investment disputes that 
oppose a state and its (supposedly) public-interest policies to the commercial interests of a private
 
1 David Neuberger, “Keynote Speech: Arbitration and the Rule of Law” (2015) 17:4 Asian Dispute Review 180 at 
190. 
2 Robert McCorquodale, “Business, the International Rule of Law and Human Rights” in Robert McCorquodale, ed, 
The rule of law in international and comparative context (London: British Institute of International and Comparative 
Law, 2010) at 32; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 217 A (III) 1948. 
3 Thomas Henry Bingham of Cornhill, The rule of law (London: Penguin, 2011) at 9; “What is the Rule of Law?”, 
online: World Justice Project <https://worldjusticeproject.org/about-us/overview/what-rule-law>. 
4 Geoffrey Ma, Understanding the Importance of the Rule of Law in Society (School of Law of the Seoul National 
University, 2019) at para 3; Joseph Hon Mr Justice Fok, The Importance of the Rule of Law (2016) at para 2. 
5 Geoffrey Ma, Global Economy and the Rule of Law (London, 2015) at 3–4. 
6 Investor-State Dispute Settlement - Public Consultation, by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development Investment Division (Paris: OECD, 2012) at 8: “ISDS is a fundamental element of States‘ efforts to 
reinforce the credibility of the commitments they make in their international investment agreements [… ] If a State 
is found to be in breach of its treaty obligations, the harmed investor can receive monetary compensation or perhaps 
other forms of redress […] Thus, ISDS is both an enforcement mechanism that promotes compliance and a means of 
compensating victims of harm caused by breaches of investment treaty provisions […] ISDS is an unusual – or even 
unique – system for adjudication”. 
7 Ma, supra note 4 at para 18: “And where the rule of law does exist, it is undoubtedly a strength and becomes an 
institution that will have a long term future”. 
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 investor”8. It is necessary that an international investment be realised in a legally sound 
framework9. In this sense, it is recognised that “the protection of foreign investment by way of 
treaties is one of the great international legal success stories”10.  
Nevertheless, because of their adjudicating powers, arbitrators of investor-state dispute settlement 
must also work on the realization of the rule of law within the system11.  
 
The task is arduous as investment arbitration is often confronted with a multitude of 
challenges and interests that undermine the rule of law.  
 
 It is necessary to write a few words on the context that surrounds the rule of law question 
in investment arbitration. The globalisation favours international economy and there has been a 
sizable increase of international foreign direct investments (FDI)12.  
FDI can have negative impacts on a host state and its population13. Investors seek the best 
environment for their investment but also the most profitable14. The regulations in force in a 
particular country play a decisive role in its willingness to invest15. Indeed, most of the policies 
adopted by a government, from taxation, company law, to labour, safety and socio-economic 
regulations, can impact an investment16.  
 
8 Nicolas Hachez & Jan Wouters, “International investment dispute settlement in the twenty-first century: does the 
preservation of the public interest require an alternative to the arbitral model?” in Freya Baetens, ed, Investment Law 
within International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 417 at 424. 
9 Ma, supra note 5 at 3. 
10 Bruno Simma, “Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights?” (2011) 60 ICLQ 573 at 574. 
11 Susan D Franck, “Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and the Rule of Law” (2006) 19:2 
Pacific McGeorge Global Bus & Development LJ 337 at 340; Julián Bordacahar, “The Rule of Law As Created by 
Arbitrators – An Update on the Discussions At The Recent IBA Arbitration Day in Buenos Aires”, (Avril 2018), 
online: Kluwer Arbitration Blog <http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/04/08/iba-buenos-aires-report/>. 
12 Franck, supra note 11 at 338; Rémi Bachand, Martin Gallié & Stéphanie Rousseau, “Droit de l’investissement et 
droits humains dans les Amériques” (2003) 49 Annuaire français de droit international 575; For a definition of FDI, 
see OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment (Paris: OECD, 2008) at 48: “Foreign direct 
investment reflects the objective of establishing a lasting interest by a resident enterprise in one economy (direct 
investor) in an enterprise (direct investment enterprise ) that is resident in an economy other than that of the direct 
investor. The lasting interest implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the 
direct investment enterprise and a significant degree of influence on the management of the enterprise”. 
13 Hon. Mr Justice Fok, supra note 4 at para 11: “International investment occurs in countries with poor human 
rights records”. 
14 Franck, supra note 11 at 339. 
15 Hon. Mr Justice Fok, supra note 4 at para 11. 
16 Joachim Karl, “International Investment Arbitration: A Threat to State Sovereignty?” in Wenhua Shan, Penelope 
Simons & Dalvinder Singh, eds, Redefining Sovereignty in International Economic Law (Portland: Hart Publishing, 
2008) at 231. 
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Those private entities sometimes try to lobby government officers in order to obtain favorable 
investment conditions. It is a situation where host states participate in the lowering of “labour 
standard or promoting toxic products” to attract FDI17.  
 
Some argue that international investment law participates in that, by enabling foreign corporations 
to negatively influence domestic regulations18. States face a threat of going through with a costly 
investment arbitration and end up refraining from adopting regulation that would be better for its 
population19. Consequently, ISDS challenges democracy because unelected investors strongly 
impact the policies of governments elected by the people20.  
 
This phenomenon of softening regulations to favor investors is called the “regulatory chill” and is 
one of the dramatic consequences of FDI. This tends to exist in capital-importing, less-developed 
countries21.   
 
In addition to the “regulatory chill”, FDI can also raise the problem of stabilisation clauses. 
They are contained in BITs and prevent a host state to change its legal and regulatory framework 
as it could affect the investment. These clauses aim at protecting the business undertaken in the 
same terms and conditions that existed at the day of the agreement22. This is particularly dangerous 
in states that seek to improve their environmental and human rights regulations23. Investors, 
 
17 Vivian Kube & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, “Human Rights Law in International Investment Arbitration” (2016) 
11:1 Asian J of WTO & Intl Health L & Policy 65 at 85. 
18 Lee Williams, “Whats Is TTIP? And Six Reasons Why the Answer Should Scare You”, The Independent (6 
October 2015), online: <https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/what-is-ttip-and-six-reasons-why-the-
answer-should-scare-you-9779688.html>. 
19 Ursula Kriebaum, “Is ISDS Beneficial or Dangerous for the Rule of Law Both in the International and the 
National Spheres” (2015) 109 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, published by the American Society of Intl L 203 
at 204: “Regulatory chill is typically seen as a state actor failing to enact or enforce bona fide regulatory measures 
because of a perceived or actual threat of investment arbitration”. 
20 Williams, supra note 18. 
21 Kube & Petersmann, supra note 17 at 85. 
22 McCorquodale, supra note 2 at 37. 
23 Ibid at 43: “stabilization clauses [in BITs] can hinder states that wish to improve human rights, environmental 
and/or labour standards in their own territory, for to do so requires a change to the regulatory environment in that 
state and could have an adverse impact on the investor’s project, which would make the state in breach of its 
contract”. 
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through BITs are gaining power, “dethroning the State from its status as the sole subject of 
international law and this fundamentally alters the international investment landscape”24.   
 
 As a result, international investment is another example of the race-to-the-bottom 
phenomenon that exists in a globalised world25. The situation is characterised by corporations that  
“use their new strength and mobility in the global economy to exert political influence notably by 
playing-off states and communities against one another to leverage optimum investment 
conditions”26. There are multinationals that make even more money than developing countries, 
and use that power to influence specific policies such as environmental and labour regulations (i.e. 
socio-economic rights). 
 
As a consequence, there are investments that badly impact the host state local populations 
and seriously jeopardise human rights27. Indeed, “foreign investors are generally not altruistic 
organizations, and their interests may not always coincide with those of society as a whole”28. 
Breaches of human rights go against one of the rule of law’s core feature which is fundamental 
rights protection29. Guarantee of human rights as an element of the rule of law is subject to 
debates30. However it is our view, following the opinion of Lord Bingham and the EU Venice 
Commission to consider fundamental rights’ protection as a feature rather than “the raison d’être” 
 
24 Yves Fortier, “Investment protection and the rule of law: change or decline ?” in Robert McCorquodale, ed, The 
rule of law in international comparative context (London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 
2010) at 121. 
25 Dale D Murphy, The structure of regulatory competition: corporations and public policies in a global economy, 
International economic law series (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Jim Chen, “Globalization and Its 
Losers” (2000) 9 Minn J Intl L 157 at 167 and following. 
26 Simon Retallack, “Economic Globalization and the Environment” (2000) 4 Transnational Associations 173 at 
176; Todd Weiler, “Balancing Human Rights and Investor Protection: A New Approach for a Different Legal 
Order” (2004) 27:2 Boston College Intl & Comp L Rev 429; Kyla Tienhaara, “Chapter 26: Regulatory chill and the 
threat of arbitration: A view from political science” in Chester Brown & Kate Miles, eds, Evolution in Investment 
Treaty Law and Arbitration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
27 Mavluda Sattorova, “Investor Responsibilities from a Host State Perspective: Qualitative Data and Proposals for 
Treaty Reform” (2019) 113 AJIL Unbound 22–27. 
28 J Hewko, “Foreign Direct Investment in Transitional Economies: Does the Rule of Law Matter?” (2002) 11 
European Constitutional Review 71 at 72. 
29 Bingham of Cornhill, supra note 3 c 7. 
30 Ibid at 66; Jeffrey Jowell, “The Rule of Law: Rhetoric or Universal Principle” (2012) 20:1 Asia Pac L Rev 3 at 
12–14. 
 17 
of the rule of law31. Indeed, if there is no protection of fundamental rights, it is difficult to consider 
that a state is complying with the rule of law32  
 
Consequently, where host states notice the seriousness of the situation, they seek to address 
it by raising environmental and human rights standards. Unfortunately, companies are often 
willing to begin investment arbitration proceedings to challenge those government policies33. The 
threat of arbitration often leads host States to soften their human rights policies instead of going to 
costly dispute settlement system34.  
 
Here, international investment arbitration comes into play where the host state breached its BIT 
obligations to foster its populations’ protection through human rights regulations. More and more, 
investors have recourse to arbitration “to challenge environmental, health, and other social 
regulations regarding waste disposal, tobacco control, and similar social services”35. Therefore, 
arbitrators are confronted with opposite interests. The recent awards highlight that investors’ 
“commercial interests run counter to a pro-human rights agenda”36.  
 
 However, international human rights law is not the field of predilection of investment 
arbitration. It is usually concerned with investments and economic’ interests. Dispute arising from 
investment treaties affect a variety of spheres such as “international relations, implicates 
international legality of domestic government conduct, and puts millions of taxpayer dollars at 
risk”37. In other words, the rights of the investor such as fair and equitable treatment, also called 
 
31 Bingham of Cornhill, supra note 3 at 66 and followings; Report on the Rule of Law, by Venice Commission, 
CDL-AD (2011) 003 rev (2011); note 3. 
32 The Rt Hon Dominic Grieve QC, The rule of law and the prosecutor (Attorney General’s Office, 2013): “Absent 
protection for human rights, courts and legal system may deprive fellow citizens of their freedom, property and 
ultimately their very existence. In such circumstances, the claim that the rule of law is observed is but a mockery of 
the truth”. 
33 Adam H Bradlow, “Human Rights Impact Litigation in ISDS: A Proposal for Enabling Private Parties to Bring 
Human Rights Claims through Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms” (2018) 43:2 Yale J Intl L 355 355 at 
356. 
34 Ibid at 357. 
35 Ibid at 356; Report of the Independent Expert on the Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable International 
Order, by Alfred-Maurice de Zayas, 70th Sess, UN Doc. A/70/285 (2015) at para 6 [de Zayas Report 2015]. 
36 Bradlow, supra note 33 at 368. 
37 Susan D Franck, “Empirically Evaluating Claims about Investment Treaty Arbitration” (2007) 86:1 NCL Rev at 1. 
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“private” rights, confront public interests and the former are often more protected by ISDS38. This 
is why it can be said “these disputes create public problems while enhancing private rights”39. But 
those private actors can only be sued in international investment arbitration as there is no other 
international adjudication mechanism that have the power to judge them. Therefore, there are 
“challenging transitions which require a re-examination of the bedrock principles upon which the 
system was founded. Investment arbitration is now at this critical juncture”40.   
  
Awards involving human rights concerns are expanding and raise serious rule of law 
problems. Arbitrators are confronted with new issues and the legal certainty in the system is not 
always guaranteed. Along with human rights protection, this situation is serious as it undermines 
the core features of the rule of law. This is where the focus of this thesis lies on.  
  
 These recent challenges in investor-state dispute settlement raise a number of enquiries as 
to how arbitrators are protecting local population’s human rights. In other words, it can be 
wondered whether those actors of investment arbitration have developed a coherent and consistent 
method to ensure legal certainty in their decisions. It is necessary to have a look at how those 
adjudicators have dealt with legal certainty in human rights cases, so as to afford them protection.  
All-in-all, does investment arbitration enhance or weaken the rule of law through legal certainty 
in awards involving human rights questions?  
 
This thesis will use, as its basis for analysis, a number of decisions rendered in ISDS that 
involve socio-economic rights. This legal research, based on a thorough review of the available 
investment arbitration case law, aims at providing an explanation of how awards involving human 
rights have been dealt with until recently. International instruments, binding or not, impact 
arbitrators, and those documents will shed some light on understanding how the system is evolving. 
The discussion of the judgments rendered will enable us to show how ISDS stands before socio-
 
38 Markus W Gehring & Dimitrij Euler, “Public interest in investment arbitration” in Dimitrij Euler, Markus W 
Gehring & Maxi Scherer, eds, Transparency in international investment arbitration: a guide to the UNICTRAL 
Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 
at 8–9. 
39 Ibid at 9. 
40 Susan D Franck, “The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law 
Through Inconsistent Decisions” (2004) 73:3 Fordham L Rev 1521 at 1610–1611. 
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economic rights questions and whether the regime has adapted to these developing problems. This 
will enable us to discuss whether legal certainty prevails, to identify the lacunas, and possible 
improvements for ISDS.   
Because international investment arbitration is a transnational mechanism for dispute resolution, 
a transnational approach of the substantive law will be used in order to tackle these issues.  
 
 As rule of law components, legal certainty and human rights are challenging the 
international arbitration regime. This thesis aims at bringing some answers to these questions by, 
first, discussing the interactions between the widespread concept of the rule of law and 
international investment arbitration (Part 1). Then, an analysis of the jurisprudence developed by 




Part 1: The rule of law, legal certainty and its application in 




 Most if not almost all countries on the planet pretend to abide by the rule of law41. Through 
ratified international conventions42, declarations43 or statements and in their organisation of state 
power, they claim to be democratic and respectful of the rule of law component. In the same lines, 
any legal system developed at either a transnational or an international level, be it international 





41 Brian Z Tamanaha, “International Level” in On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, 1st ed (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 127; Bingham of Cornhill, supra note 3 at 6: “Thus there is a strong 
international consensus that the rule of law is a meaningful concept, and a rather important one at that”. 
42 Charter of the United Nations, Can TS 1945 No 7 1945 Preamble; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the 
European Union (entered into force 1 december 2009), 2008/C 115/01 2007 Article 2; European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14 (entered into 
force 3 September 1953), ETS 5 1950 Preamble. 
43 UDHR, supra note 2; United Nations Millennium Declaration, GA Res 55/2, UNGAOR, 55th Sess UN Doc 
A/RES/55/2 (2000) [UN Millennium Declaration 2000]; Strengthening and Coordinating United Nations Rule of 
Law Activities – Addendum, by Secretary General, UNGAOR, 68th Sess, UN Doc A/68/213/Add. 1 (2014) 
[Strengthening and Coordinating United Nations Rule of Law Activities 2014]; Declaration of the High-level 
Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels, GA Res 67/1, 
UNGAOR, 67th Sess, UN Doc A/RES/67/1 (2012) [Declaration of the UNGA on the Rule of Law 2012]. 
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However, one can wonder what this concept, originating from continental Europe44 and known as 
the German doctrine Rechtsstaat45 or French état de droit46, actually covers. The rule of law has 
evolved over time to achieve an elaborated definition today47 but its first components can be traced 
back to Ancient Greek times48. It is made of several features that, if they are not abided by, can 
lead to arbitrariness and dictatorship49. This has serious consequences on human rights as people’s 
liberties, freedoms, rights can be violated (sudden disappearance, random search, seizure or 
imprisonment, torture etc.)50 
Those are the reasons why States, their different organs and especially their judiciaries through 
supreme courts or constitutional courts, seek to protect and implement the rule of law in their daily 
work. The development of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms has not been immune from 
these goals. International investment arbitration, as a legal mean to provide justice, is subject to 
the respect and implement the rule of law and what it entails51.  
 
44 Brian Z Tamanaha, “Classical Origins” in On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, 1st ed (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004) 7 at 7; For a discussion of Chinese and Japanese traditions towards the rule of 
law, see René David & John E C Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today: An Introduction to the 
Comparative Study of Law, 3rd ed (London: Stevens, 1985) at 542: The author explains that Japan puts emphasis on 
the rules of behaviour (giri-ninjo) whereas Chinese traditional doctrine considers law to be “bad policy”; Theo J 
Angeli & Jonathan H Harrison, Working Paper: History and Importance of the Rule of Law (World Justice Project, 
2003) at 4–5: “there are fundamental questions and divided opinions about whether, or to what degree, these 
elements of the rule of law existed or were put into practice in non-Western cultures, much less how they developed 
over time”. 
45 The expression “Rechtsstaat” is owed to C.T. Welcker in the following book. Karl Theodor Welcker, Die letzten 
Gründe von Recht, Staat und Strafe (Giessen: Heyer, 1813); Kant is often considered to be the first great contributor 
to the doctrine of Rechtsstaat without using this expression in his work. To Kant, the german “rule of law” meant the 
“rule by law”, the power of the state being limited by the constitution of Germany: Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of 
the metaphysics of morals, 2nd ed, Mary J. Gregor & Jens Timmermann, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012): The “Rechtsstaat” as described by Kant, has known important evolutions; See especially Rainer Grote, 
“Rule of Law, Rechtsstaat and Etat de droit” in Christian Starck, ed, Constitutionalism, Universalism and 
Democracy – Comparative Analysis (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999) at 286; On this topic, see 
also Michel Rosenfeld, “The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Consti- tutional Democracy” (2001) 74 Southern 
California Law Review 1307 at 1318–1329. 
46 Danilo Zolo, “The Rule of Law: A Critical Reappraisal” in Pietro Costa & Danilo Zolo, eds, The Rule of Law 
History, Theory and Criticism (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2007) 3 at 3. 
47 Bingham of Cornhill, supra note 3; Thomas Henry Bingham of Cornhill, “The Rule of Law” (2007) 66 
Cambridge Law Journal 67. 
48 Aristotle, Politics; Plato, Complete works, John M. Cooper & D. S. Hutchinson, eds. (Indianapolis, Ind: Hackett 
Pub, 1997); Tamanaha, supra note 44. 
49 Bingham of Cornhill, supra note 3 at 9, 83. 
50 Ibid at 9. 
51 Stephan W Schill, “International Investment Law and the Rule of Law” in Jeffrey L Jowell, J C Thomas & Jan 
Van Zyl Smit, eds, Rule of Law Symposium 2014: The Importance of the Rule of Law in Promoting Development 
(Singapore: Academy Publishing, 2015) 81; Kriebaum, supra note 19; Mohamed El Baradei, “International 
Arbitration: The Big Picture’, in Andrea Menaker (ed), International Arbitration and the Rule of Law: Contribution 
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 As it will be briefly discussed in this chapter, perfect obedience to the rule of law seem to 
be an unrealistic goal. Indeed, if the headlines of the rule of law are widely acknowledged, there 
is still a long route before an internationally agreed definition of the concept52 . It can be wondered 
what the international status of the rule of law is and what are its main components. Furthermore, 
its implementation is more than relative in many states and various breaches can be highlighted 
today. International investment arbitration has its own difficulties in abiding by the rule of law. 
This thesis aims at focusing on a few of them, namely the protection of human rights and the 
development of legal certainty in awards. But what do those concepts mean and what do they 
entail? What are the issues that investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) faces regarding the rule of 
law, human rights, and legal certainty?  
 
In order to answer those questions, this part will start by drawing a short history of the 
concept of the rule of law and explain its major components, in order to understand its importance 
domestically and internationally (Chapter 1). Secondly, it will  focus on two of its components that 
will be the core of the discussion of this thesis, which are the notions of legal certainty and 
coherence, and human rights (Chapter 2). The third chapter aims at setting up the relationship 
between international investment arbitration, the rule of law, legal certainty and human rights and 




and Conformity,” in International Arbitration and the Rule of Law: Contribution and Conformity ICCA Congress 
Series, kluwer law international b.v ed (2017) 3 at 4: “It is thus our responsibility to ensure that the major principles 
of the Rule of Law [...] are upheld nationally and internationally. This naturally includes arbitration ...” 
52 Peter Rijpkema, “The Rule of Law Beyond Thick and Thin” (2013) 32:6 Law and Philosophy 793; Edith 
Vanspranghe, “Duality of the Rule of Law in International Organizations’ Practice” in Martin Belov, ed, The Rule of 
law at the beginning of the twenty-first century (The Hague: Eleven International Publishing, 2018). 
 
 
Chapter 1: The rule of law  
 
 The rule of law is a concept that covers various important elements, and all of them could 
be the subject of a discussion. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss all of them but they 
will be mentioned in order to understand the broader meaning of the rule of law. This paper will 
only focus on two of them, namely legal certainty and coherence in human rights fields. 
A preliminary and concise definition is necessary here but will be further detailed in section 3 of 
this chapter. The rule law can be understood in the following way: “all persons and authorities 
within the state, whether public or private, should be bound by and entitled to the benefit of laws 
publicly made, taking effect (generally) in the future and publicly administered in the courts”53. In 
other words, the rule of law exhibits “the need to curb the overwhelming and unbridled strength 
of power”54.  
 
The rule of law as a concept is entrenched in many domestic and international legal 
instruments and it is the same for almost each of its features. A focus will be brought on the 
instruments relevant to this paper.  
As to the history of the rule of law, one can wonder about the relevance of such discussion in this 
piece. It is our view that understanding where this fundamental theory comes from, helps 
demonstrate its importance and explain its relevance and influence in today’s world.  
 
Therefore, section 1 will trace the evolution of the concept through history and the words 
of philosophers (Section 1). Then, the various definitions of the doctrine and the debates 
surrounding its meaning will be discussed (Section 2) and finally some of the most important legal 
instruments entrenching the concept will be mentioned so as to understand the legal basis for 
protecting it (Section 3). 
 
53 Bingham of Cornhill, supra note 3 at 8. 
54 Pietro Costa, “The Rule of Law: a Historical Introduction” in Pietro Costa, Danilo Zolo & Emilio Santoro, eds, 





Section 1: A brief history of the rule of law : from Aristotle to Dicey 
 
 The rule of law has become a cornerstone principle of democracies but it has evolved over 
time55, thanks to civil revolutions, lawyers, judges, and respected philosophers, to turn into the 
concept as it is known today56.   
 
The first elements of the rule of law can be traced back to Antiquity; “Greek ideas with 
respect to the rule of law are therefore best understood as exemplary models, inspiration, and 
authority for later periods”57. It is at that time that the ideas of regulating the power of the rulers 
emerged58. Aristotle was of the opinion that “the rule of law is preferable to that of any 
individual”59.  
Plato agreed with the idea of restraining the power of the government60. He stated: “Where the law 
is subject to some other authority and has none of its own, the collapse of the state, in my view, is 
not far off; but if law is the master of the government and the government is its slave, then the 
situation is full of promise and men enjoy all the blessings that the gods shower on a state” 61. The 
need to constrain the government’s power, which is one of the core features of the rule of law, was 
being acknowledged in Greek society62. Both, Aristotle and Plato, defended the idea that the law 
“should further the good of the community”63. 
 
55 Ibid: “the horizon of meaning of the rule of law is to be found within an extremely wide time span, encompassing 
both ancient and medieval times”. 
56 Bingham of Cornhill, supra note 3 at 10 The author discusses “important historical milestones on the way to the 
rule of law as we know it today”; See especially Aristotle, supra note 48; Plato, supra note 48; Charles de Secondat 
Montesquieu, The spirit of laws (Holmes Beach, Fla.: Gaunt, 2011); Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 
(Paris: C. Gosselin, 1835); Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du Contrat Social (Amsterdam: Marc-Michel Rey, 1762); 
Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the study of the law of the constitution, 10th ed (London: Macmillan, 1959); Paul 
Craig, “‘Formal and Substantive conception of the rule of law: an analytical framework’” (1997) Public Law 470; 
Neuberger, supra note 1; Ma, supra note 4. 
57 Tamanaha, supra note 44 at 7. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Aristotle, supra note 48. 
60 Plato, The Laws, translated by Trevor Saunders (London: Penguin, 1970) at 174. 
61 Plato, supra note 48 at 1402. 
62 Tamanaha, supra note 44 at 10. 
63 Ibid at 9. 
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It is also at that  time and again, through the words of Aristotle, that the concept of equality before 
the law emerged64. It is was an important principle of the Greek system, but it “did not mean that 
the same legal standards were applied to everyone”65, notable exceptions being women, slaves. 
non-citizens).  
 The Roman also contributed in developing the premises of the rule of law, especially 
through Cicero who criticized the King’s disobedience of the law, calling him “a despot”66. Cicero 
is often said to be “an early advocate of the rule of law”67. Nevertheless, as the Republic turn into 
an Empire, the idea of democracy and popular participation as developed by the Greeks, was not 
a prominent feature of the Roman history68. 
 
 These statements are the premises of the concept of the rule of law and highlight that even 
thousands of centuries ago, there existed a need to protect it in order to reach and guarantee 
democracy. The Greeks sought to resist tyranny69 by submitting the government to popular consent 
and limiting the rule by men70.  This is still the major concern of the rule of law; these ideas from 
Ancient times still constitute the core elements of the rule of law that are known today71. The rule 
of law gained in substance72 and was progressively enshrined in various documents during the 
Middle-Ages73.  
 
The rule of law tradition especially settled in the West74. It is in England that we can find 
one of the greatest Middle-Ages document codifying core rule of law’s ideas. The Magna Carta, 
signed by King John of England in 121575, codified some aspects of the rule of law such as the 
submission of the authority to the law, the prime version of the separation of power and the 
 
64 Aristotle, supra note 48 pt 3.16. 
65 Tamanaha, supra note 44 at 7. 
66 Cicero, The Republic and The Laws, translated by Niall Rudd (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
67 Tamanaha, supra note 44 at 11. 
68 Angeli & Harrison, supra note 44 at 8. 
69 Ibid at 7. 
70 Aristotle, The Nicomachean ethics, translated by W. D. Ross & Lesley Brown (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009) bk 5 para 6: “we do not allow a man to rule”. 
71 Bingham of Cornhill, supra note 47. 
72 Brian Z Tamanaha, “Medieval Roots” in On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, 1st ed (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004) 15 at 15. 
73 Ibid: “The rule of law tradition congealed into existence in a slow, unplanned manner that commenced in the 
Middle Ages, with no single source or starting point”. 
74 Ibid at 18. 
75 Ibid at 26. 
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representation of the people by, what was then, a Parliament. At that time, the Barons sought to 
limit the power of the King, recognising the necessity to constrain the power of the government. 
It led to the adoption of the Charter76. It also affirms the recognition of freemen’s liberties77: “[w]e 
have also granted to all freemen of our kingdom, for us and our heirs for ever, all the underwritten 
liberties, to be had and held by them and their heirs, of us and our heirs for ever.”78 Several human 
rights were also codified such as the prohibition against arrest, imprisonment or seizure without a 
trial79; the right to due process80; the principle of legality (nulle crimen sine lege)81; right to 
property and its protection82. The submission of the Crown to due process can be found in several 
chapters83. It can be affirmed that the Great Charter is a landmark in the recognition of human 
rights and the condemnation of arbitrary will.84  
 
The evolution of the rule of law continued, especially thanks to important defenders of democracy 
such as Bracton85 who wrote : “nothing is more fitting for a sovereign than to live by the laws, nor 
is there any greater sovereignty than to govern according to law, and he ought properly to yield to 
the law what the law has bestowed upon him, for the law makes him king”86. Before leaving 
Medieval times, authors have asserted that “the principle foundation on which medieval political 
theory was built was the principle of the supremacy of law”87.  
 
76 Ibid at 25–26. 
77 Ibid at 26. 
78 Magna Carta, (1215) c 1. 
79 Ibid s 39. 
80 Ibid c 40. 
81 Ibid c 38. 
82 Ibid c 39. 
83 Ibid cs 28, 30, 38, 40, 52, 55. 
84 Wilfried Lewis Warren, King John, 2nd ed (London Eyre Methuen, 1978) at 240. 
85 Henry de Bracton, On the Laws and Customs of England: quod Rex non debed esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et 
lege (Harvard University Press, 2020). 
86 Henry de Bracton, On the Laws and Customs of England (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968) at 305–06. 
87 RW Carlyle, Medieval Political Theory in the West (Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons, 1928) at 457; 
Joseph M Snee, “Leviathan at the Bar of Justice” in Arthur E Sutherland, ed, Government Under Law (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956) at 118; Tamanaha, supra note 72 at 27. 
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Until the seventeenth century, sovereign authority “was bolstered by the doctrine of the Divine 
Right of Kings”88. “[K]ings were ‘above the law,’ because they made the laws and were 
responsible for their actions only to God”89. 
  Sir. Edward Coke90 with the help of judges followed this path and increasingly made  
“judges served as the guardians of and spokesman for the law”91, until the important revolution 
that shook the United Kingdom, leading to the adoption of the Bill of Rights in 168992. Again, this 
document aimed at limiting the power of the government, recognising rights and liberties to the 
population for the purpose of establishing a democratic state. The Bill of Rights subjected the King 
to obey the law of Parliament and called itself “[a]n Act for declaring the rights and liberties of the 
subject and settling the succession of the crown”93. It enshrined several rule of law principles: the 
independence of the judiciary, the prohibition against cruel and inhumane treatment, due process 
and other civil liberties94.  
The Habeas Corpus Act adopted ten years earlier in 1679, also had an important impact on the 
development of human rights’ protection by guaranteeing the right to challenge the legality of an 
arrest or detention for those deprived of their liberty95. The writ of Habeas Corpus is still used in 
several countries around the world, especially for the hearing of Guantanamo detainees96. These 
recent cases show the relevance of historical documents in the contemporary world.  
 
 
88 Tamanaha, supra note 72 at 28. 
89 Richard Pipes, Property and Freedom (New York: Vintage, 2000) at 136. 
90 Case of Proclamations, [1610] 77 ER 1352 ; Dr Bonham’s case, [1610] 77 ER 646 . 
91 Tamanaha, supra note 72 at 29. 
92 Bill of Rights (Act) (entered into force 16 December 1689), 1688 c.2 (1 Will and Mar Sess 2) 1689. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Bingham of Cornhill, supra note 3 at 23–25: “The lesson that even the supreme authority in the state is subject to 
the law was painfully learned [...] But the Britain which emerged from the Glorious Revolution was one where the 
rule of law, imperfectly and incompletely, held sway”. 
95 An Act for the better securing the Liberty of the Subject, and for Prevention of Imprisonment beyond the Seas 
(entered into force 27 May 1679), 31 Cha. 2. 2 1679. 
96 Rasul v Bush, [2004] 542 US 466 ; Boumediene v Bush, [2008] 553 US 723 ; Bingham of Cornhill, supra note 3 at 
22–23. 
 30 
The influence of the UK in terms of rule of law features was immense in France97, Canada, 
and the U.S.A98. Indeed, the British Bills of Rights inspired the adoption of the French Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen99 as well as the US Bill of Rights100, ratified in 1791, and 
the drafters of the U.S. Constitution. Those documents contain important provisions regarding 
“human and natural rights”101. The ideas developed in England were spread beside the island and 
reinforced by several philosophers such as Montesquieu102, Tocqueville103, Rousseau104 and 
others. The rule of law continued to develop and improve so as to enhance democracy.  
The discussion of the historical origins of the rule of law and some of its non-exhaustive 
landmarks does not leave much room for academic debate. There seems to be an agreement on 
where core features of the concept come from and how they have evolved. Nevertheless, the path 
from antique principles to the enactment of such documents (charters, bill of rights, legislation) 
highlights the importance of human rights in societies for centuries105.  
This brief historical flashback helps to understand the shaping of today’s societies which aim at 
the promotion, recognition, and protection of human rights and the rule of law. In addition, those 
thoughts and writings, notably the French Declaration106, the US Constitution and Bill of Rights, 
are still of major relevance today107. Not only codified, these ideas have been claimed, affirmed 
 
97 Costa, supra note 54 at 81 and following: “the English experience was deemed by many Enlightenment French 
intellectuals to embody the freedom and tolerance still fiercely opposed in their own country”. 
98 Ibid at 83–85: “the American model could be seen as a ‘third option’ that, whilst largely drawing from the English 
common law, was nonetheless centred around issues and concerns which would later be endemic in the French 
world”; Zolo, supra note 46 at 3. 
99 Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen, 1789. 
100 United States of America: Constitution (ratified 15 december 1791), USA-010 1787. 
101 Costa, supra note 54 at 83–84. 
102 Montesquieu, supra note 56. 
103 Tocqueville, supra note 56. 
104 Rousseau, supra note 56. 
105 For a discussion on the development of individual rights’ protection during the French Revolution, see Costa, 
supra note 54 at 78–80. 
106 Bingham of Cornhill, supra note 3 at 27–28. 
107 Ibid at 30: “The American Bill of Rights was the subject of a protracted struggle, but the rights guaranteed in 
1791 are rights which American citizens continue to enjoy”. 
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and reaffirmed by the Courts108, important political figures such as Eisenhower109,  Thatcher110, 
Obama111 and many others but also by highly valued academics112.   
Albert V. Dicey is among the first who proposed a definition of the rule of law113. In the 
XIXth century, he proposed a tripartite definition of the concept. He firstly recognised the principle 
of legality, which means that no man should be punished without a law adopted properly and by 
the competent authority114 so as to enhance stability of the law115. The principle of nulla poena 
sine lege is strongly linked to the idea that the law should not be retroactive, as it would enable to 
condemn someone on the basis of a law that did not exist at the time of the offence. Secondly, he 
recognised the principles of equality before the law and that no man is above the law, as part of 
the rule of law116. Thirdly, he stated that fundamental rights were to be protected by the judiciary 
rather than by legislation, the latter being more efficient117.   
 Dicey offered the first steps towards a definition of the rule of law but was criticized for 
being too narrow118 and lacking elements regarding the content of the law119 such as the separation 
 
108 R (Alconbury Developments Ltd and Others) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the 
Regions, [2001] UKHL 23 at para 73; Roncarelli v Duplessis, [1959] SCC 121 at para 142; Reference Re Secession 
of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 ; Christie v British Columbia (Attorney-General), [2007] SCC 21 at paras 18–24; 
Papachristou v City of Jacksonville, [1972] 405 US 156 ; Planned parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v 
Casey, [1992] 502 US 833 ; Lady Brenda Hale, The United Kingdom Constitution on the move (The Canadian 
Institute for Advanced Legal Studies’, 2017); Lord David Neuberger, Access to justice (London, 2017) at para 13: 
"The two fundamental functions of any government are the defence of the realm and the maintenance of the rule of 
law”. 
109 William Safire, Safire’s political dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 604. 
110 Margaret Thatcher, Freedom, Economic Liberty and the Rule of Law (Britannia International Hotel London, 
1996). 
111 Barack Obama, Remarks by President Obama and President Pena Nieto of Mexico in Joint Press Conference 
(2016). 
112 Dicey, supra note 56; Bingham of Cornhill, supra note 3; Neuberger, supra note 1; Lon L Fuller, The Morality 
Of Law (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1964); Joseph Raz, “The Rule of Law and its Virtue” 
(1977) 93 LQR 195; Craig, supra note 56; Brian Z Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, 1st ed 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
113 Dicey, supra note 56 at 188. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Hilaire Barnett, Constitutional & administrative law, 11th ed (London: Routledge, 2016) at 50. 
116 Dicey, supra note 56 at 193. 
117 Ibid at 195: “We may say that the constitution is pervaded by the rule of law on the ground that the general 
principles of the constitution (as for example the right to personal liberty, or the right of public meeting) are with us 
the result of judicial decisions determining the rights of private persons in particular cases brought before the 
courts”; Bingham of Cornhill, supra note 3 at 3–4. 
118 Sir Ivor Jennings, The Law and the Constitution, 5th ed (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1959) at 312. 
119 Craig, supra note 56 at 472. 
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of power120, accessibility of the law such as intelligibility, coherence, predictability; or the 
protection of fundamental rights and what they encompass121 . The first two elements of his 
definition still form part of the modern conception of the rule of law. But the last one seems to be 
outdated as most of the individual rights that exist today are protected by a variety of legislations, 
constitutions and international instruments. Nonetheless, his definition has been developed and 
extended by practitioners and academics, as it will be discussed later122.  
Thus, the objective of improving democracy has been existing for centuries and still exists 
in the modern world. Of course, there has been considerable evolution since then, but the respect 
of the rule of law is far from being perfect. It does not only belong to domestic parliaments and 
judges to protect the principle but such power has also been granted to arbitrators, lawyers, NGOs, 
international organisations, politics, and others. The rule of law has conquered every form of 
justice mechanism123. It is now the time to have a look at what constitutes the rule of law today.  
 
Section 2: The recent definition of the rule of law and the absence of a 
universal understanding 
The pursuit of the perfect rule of law definition has caused a lot of ink to flow124; papers, 
opinions, judgments, and debates are not lacking on the topic125. In a general way, it can be said 
 
120 Jennings, supra note 118 at 311. 
121 Craig, supra note 56 at 474. 
122 Bingham of Cornhill, supra note 3 at 5: “Dicey’s ideas continued to influence the thinking of judges for a long 
time, and perhaps still do”; See Thesis Thesis Part 1, Chapter 1, Section 2. 
123 The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, by Secretary General, UNSCOR 
UN Doc S/2004/616 (2004) at para 6 [The rule of law and transitional justice 2004]: “The rule of law is a concept at 
the very heart of the Organizations mission. It refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions 
and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, 
equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and 
standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before 
the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in 
decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency”. 
124 Craig, supra note 56 at 467: “There is a voluminous literature on the rule of law which examines the concept 
from almost every conceivable perspective”. 
125 Bingham of Cornhill, supra note 3 at 5: “As the debate broadened, differing concepts of the rule of law were put 
forward until a time came when respected commentators were doubtful whether the expression was meaningful at 
all”; Tamanaha, supra note 112 at 3: the rule of law is giving rise to “rampant divergence of understandings”. 
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that the concept aims at avoiding the rule by power and the rule by law.126 Nevertheless, many 
have attempted to define the rule of law and its core elements, but every attempt had flaws in one 
way or another127. Indeed, the rule of law is a broad notion encompassing vast concepts sometimes 
difficult to define themselves. Furthermore, there are important fluctuations surrounding what it 
means on a horizontal scale, i.e. from one country to another, and on a vertical scale, i.e. from a 
domestic meaning to an international one.  
In order to be concise, a focus will be drawn upon the major authors from the common law 
world who have contributed to defining the rule of law. Continental Europe knows the concept of 
Rechtsstaat and état de droit, but they somewhat differ in their meaning and understanding128 with 
the Anglo-Saxon “rule of law”.  
The Rechtsstaat, as developed by I. Kant means the “rule by law” rather than the rule of law129. In 
other words, the government must abide by the Constitution. It sounded more like a formal 
concept, “detached from any reference to ethical values and political content”130. 
The French état de droit was presented by Carré de Malberg131, who was inspired by the notion of 
Rechtsstaat rather than the English rule of law132. For Carré de Malberg, the état de droit aimed at 
protecting individual rights against government arbitrariness. A fundamental difference which the 
English rule of law is the absence of parliamentary supremacy in the French état de droit133. The 
rule of law, as understood in the common law will be discussed in the following paragraphs.  
A focus is put on the common law perception of the concept as it is the one taken by the United 
Nations and other international instruments. Then, it will be necessary to mention the most recent 
understanding of this theory that was given by Lord Bingham in 2007.134 It will be shown that not 
only has he proposed the most comprehensive definition of the rule of law, but it has influenced 
several decisions and organisations, which also have made some improvements to his statement.  
 
126 McCorquodale, supra note 2 at 29. 
127 Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law, summer 2020 ed (Stanford University, 2016): “Theorists of the Rule of Law 
are fond of producing laundry lists of the principles it comprises. These principles are of disparate kinds”. 
128 Costa, supra note 54. 
129 Kant, supra note 45. 
130 Zolo, supra note 46 at 13. 
131 Raymond Carré de Malberg, Contribution a la théorie général de l’État (Paris: Sirey, 1920). 
132 Zolo, supra note 46 at 13. 
133 Ibid at 15. 
134 Bingham of Cornhill, supra note 47. 
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Authors, such as the famous British constitutionalist P. Craig, have decided to discuss the 
rule of law by operating a division between a formal and a substantive definition of the notion135. 
Those conceptions are also known as the “thin” or “thick” definitions of the rule of law.  
A formal conception of the rule of law does not consider the content of the law. In other words, it 
is about discussing the process of enactment and promulgation of law without analyzing whether 
its content is adequate to the rule of law136. This is a thin definition which only emphasises formal 
and procedural aspects. This formal conception would be supported by the theories of L. Fuller137 
and J. Raz138. Both philosophers give an important credit to the clarity, accessibility of the law, 
and whether it was enacted in a lawful manner with few regards to the substance of the law.  
On the other hand, the substantive conception of the rule of law focuses on the content of the law 
and the main rights that should be protected. Not only are the formal and procedural aspects 
covered by this definition, but the substance of the law which is the guarantee of “moral” rights is 
also covered139. This thick definition is more comprehensive than the former one, as it covers more 
aspects of the rule of law. This definition aims towards protecting human rights and democracy, 
where the thin view would not suffice to protect those concepts.140  
 
Trevor RS Allan is of the opinion that the rule of law should serve the protection of human rights 
against governments’ action141. He was inspired by Dworkin’s philosophy142 which expressed the 
idea that courts should adjudicate in light of the theory of justice143. In other words, there is an 
intrinsic link between political morality and the rule of law. According to Dworkin, citizens have 
“moral rights and duties” as well as political rights, that should be exercised through judicial 
institutions144, i.e. the State.  
 
135 Craig, supra note 56. 
136 Ibid at 467. 
137 Fuller, supra note 112. 
138 Raz, supra note 112. 
139 Craig, supra note 56 at 481; Ronald Dworkin, Law’s empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986). 
140 John Tasioulas, “Symposium: The Rule of Law: Thick, But Not Too Thick?”, (17 May 2016), online: Opinio 
Juris <http://opiniojuris.org/2016/05/17/symposium-the-rule-of-law-thick-but-not-too-thick/>. 
141 Trevor RS Allan, Law, Liberty and Justice, the Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1993). 
142 Dworkin, supra note 139. 
143 Ibid; Craig, supra note 56 at 477. 
144 Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985) at 11–12. 
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However, as it will be highlighted when discussing human rights cases in international investment 
arbitration, there is growing evidence which shows that human rights are more and more violated 
by multinational corporations with States adopting regulations to protect them. This shows that 
this rule of law idea of protecting human rights from State’s actions need to evolve in light of the 
other type of human rights violations that exist today.  
More recently, a well-known judge decided to step aside from this division between 
substantive (thick) and formal (thin) definitions of the rule of law. Indeed, a contemporary 
definition of the rule of law was given by Lord Bingham in 2007145. The UK Supreme Court Judge 
shared his highly valued thoughts, stating that the rule of law means “that all persons and 
authorities within the state, whether public or private, should be bound by and entitled to the benefit 
of laws publicly and prospectively promulgated and publicly administered by the courts”.146  
According to Lord Bingham, any democratic society should abide by eight principles, the first one 
being the existence of clear, predictable, intelligible and accessible law. The principle of 
predictability will, amongst others, be at the core of this work and developed in the second part of 
this chapter. Secondly, he acknowledged that there should be no exercise of discretion from the 
authorities of the state and that public powers should be exercised reasonably. Also, equality before 
the law must be ensured, due process should be respected, a separation of powers should be 
entrenched and officials should exercise their powers carefully and within their limits. Mechanisms 
for resolving disputes should exist and be accessible for the people. Finally, the State should 
comply with its international obligations. This means that “international rule of law may be 
understood as the application of rule of law principles to relations between states and other subjects 
of international law”147.  In the thoughts of Lord Bingham, a society abiding by the rule of law 
should protect fundamental human rights. This last concept will also be the focus of this paper.  
 
145 Bingham of Cornhill, supra note 47. 
146 Ibid at 69. 
147 Thomas Henry Bingham of Cornhill, Rule of Law in the International Order (2008). 
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Along with Lord Bingham, many judges have acknowledged the importance of the rule of 
law throughout the world: “the rule of law is a foundational principle”148; it is “a fundamental 
postulate of our constitutional structure”149; it “lies at the root of our system of government”150.  
The Canadian judge B. McLachlin, stated that “[t]he rule of law is at the heart of our society; 
without it there can be neither peace, nor order nor good government. The rule of law is directly 
dependent on the ability of the courts to enforce their process and maintain their dignity and 
respect.”151 On the same lines, Lord Hoffman of the British Supreme Court judge acknowledged 
that “[t]here is however another relevant principle which must exist in a democratic society. That 
is the rule of law.”152 Of course, those quotes are not exhaustive as many other highly respected 
institutions and judges have taken the same position. In the third part of this chapter, the position 
of arbitrators towards the rule of law will be discussed.  
The United Nations has been very proactive in recognizing the rule of law and participating 
in its promotion. In 2004, the Secretary General of the United Nations proposed a comprehensive 
understanding of the rule of law, that can be read as follow:  
A principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public 
and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly 
promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are 
consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, 
measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before 
the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of 
powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness 
and procedural and legal transparency.153  
It is worth mentioning that the United Nations is doing considerable work towards the protection 
and enforcement of the rule of law, showing the important necessity of protecting the concept.154 
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149 Roncarelli v. Duplessis, supra note 108 at para 142. 
150 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] SCC 217 at para 70. 
151 UNA v Alberta (Attorney General), [1992] 1 SCR 901 at 931. 
152 R (Alconbury Developments Ltd. and Others) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the 
Regions, supra note 108. 
153 The rule of law and transitional justice 2004, Secretary General, supra note 123 at para 6; Strengthening and 
Coordinating United Nations Rule of Law Activities 2014, Secretary General, supra note 43. 
154 Eric Doss, “United Nations and the Rule of Law”, online: United Nations <https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/>. 
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Finally, rigor requires the mention of the World Justice Project’s work on the rule of law.  
This organisation that aims at advancing the rule of law worldwide155, suggests that nine criteria 
should be fulfilled for a State to affirm that it abides by the rule of law. The government should be 
opened, it must be free from corruption, a system of civil and criminal justice must exist, 
alternative dispute mechanisms should be put into place (informal justice),  order and security 
should be ensured, regulatory enforcement  and the protection of fundamental rights should be 
guaranteed and, there must be constraint on government powers.156  
 
Many elements of the rule of law are recurring among the various definitions that have 
been mentioned. But even though a lot has been written, “its exact meaning is widely contested”157. 
As demonstrated, the legal theories that underlie the concept find no agreement158. In addition, the 
protection of human rights raises questions, in particular concerning economic, social and cultural 
rights159. Furthermore, the rule of law can be understood as a principle of governance or the 
minimum standard to achieve for a good law160.  
It can still be affirmed that no agreed definition of this concept exists amongst the various 
governments, which render its implementation and protection complicated. As Vanspranghe puts 
it, “the content of the rule of law, just like its status, remains rather indeterminate in international 
law, including in its domestic dimension.”161 It is therefore difficult for judges and arbitrators to 
enforce a theoretical, sometimes nebulous, concept where clarity and certainty are required.  
The above discussions on the origins, evolution and definitions of the rule of law have 
shown that it is a constantly evolving concept that adapts to the transformation of societies. This 
developing theory it hardly compatible with an enshrined irremovable definition. However, an 
internationally agreed definition would help to practically implement the rule of law. 
 
155 “About Us”, online: World Justice Project <https://worldjusticeproject.org/about-us>. 
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157 Rijpkema, supra note 52 at 793; Waldron, supra note 127: “As well as these debates about the value of the Rule 
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159 See Thesis note 122 Part 1, Chapter 2, Section 2. 
160 Rijpkema, supra note 52 at 795. 
161 Vanspranghe, supra note 52 at 142. 
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Having discussed the origins of the rule of law and how it seems to be understood today, it 
is now time to consider where the concept can be found in legal instruments. Of course, every 
legislature and judiciary have dedicated words to this notion. But the following section will focus 
on international instruments as they are more relevant for arbitrators in international investment 
disputes than any domestic piece of legislation in relation to rule of law features.  
 
 
Section 3: The rule of law in international instruments  
 
After the atrocity of the first world war, the concept of the rule of law was entrenched at 
an international level in several universal instruments. The “international rule of law may be 
understood as the application of rule of law principles to relations between states and other subjects 
of international law”162.  After the war, there was a strong political will to protect peace and 
democracy throughout the world and avoid any further violation of human rights. As 
McCorquodale puts it,  “it is evident that the international rule of law has been identified as a goal 
for the international system”163.  
 
There are a variety of international documents concerning the protection of the rule of law, 
some of them binding, which means that any violation can be sanctioned while others are purely 
declaratory.  
The first document that recognises the concept is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights164, 
adopted in the aftermath of the Second World War by the United Nations General Assembly. In 
its preamble, it is stated that “[w]hereas it is essential […] that human rights should be protected 
by the rule of law”165.   
Along with the UDHR, the United Nations has adopted a variety of resolutions reaffirming the 
necessity to pursue the objective of protecting the rule of law and guarantee human rights to 
 
162 Bingham of Cornhill, supra note 147. 
163 McCorquodale, supra note 2 at 32. 
164 UDHR, supra note 2. 
165 Ibid Preamble. 
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everyone. The Security Council has made famous recommendations in this sense as well as the 
General Assembly166.  
During the World Summit of 2005, it was acknowledged that “good governance and the rule of 
law at the national and international levels are essential for sustained economic growth, sustainable 
development and the eradication of poverty and hunger”167.  
 
Other famous organisations such as the World Bank have recognised the importance of the 
concept. Indeed, the World Bank recognized that obedience to the rule of law would enable people 
to “have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence”168. It can 
be said that the economic sphere was not exempted from rule of law consequences.   
 
 Along with these documents, there exist primary sources of international law that are 
legally binding instruments which impose a duty on State to respect the rule of law. The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights169, the Covenant on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights170, the UN Charter171 etc. Those are legally binding treaties that impose obligations 
upon States parties for the purpose of guaranteeing fundamental rights and, consequently, 
strengthening the rule of law.  
The rule of law is also entrenched in treaties developed at a regional level, as in article 2 of the 
Treaty on the European Union which states that “[t]he Union is founded on the values of respect 
for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights”172. 
The preamble of the European Convention on Human Rights is another example of this 
assertion.173 
 
166 UN Millennium Declaration 2000 note 43; The rule of law and transitional justice 2004 Secretary General, supra 
note 123; Declaration of the UNGA on the Rule of Law 2012 note 43. 
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168 A Decade of Measuring the Quality of Governance, by The World Bank (2006) at 3 [World Bank Report 2006]. 
169 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (entered into force 23 March 1976), United Nations, Treaty 
Series, vol. 999, p. 171 1966. 
170 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (entered into force 3 January 1976), United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, p. 3 1966. 
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The diverse institutions of investment arbitration affirm their respect for the rule of law and 
their ongoing role of protecting and strengthening it. For instance, the China International 
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) acknowledges that the rule of law for 
companies is crucial and that “CIETAC has been always actively participating in the construction 
of the platform for rule of law and the communication with enterprises, actively participating in 
the rule-making of international trade law.”174 This position on the importance of the rule of law 
is also shared by the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC).175 The International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) has affirmed the necessity and its commitment to protect the rule of 
law, especially concerning activities through the Internet176. The Executive Board of the ICC 
recalls that it supports the rule of law and advocates for solutions that ensure its respect177.  
 
 It can be seen that there is a variety of documents enshrining the rule of law an international 
level and that it is an ongoing goal to achieve for the international community. Almost all 
international governments decided to promote, strengthen and implement the rule of law. 
Arbitration has a role to play in helping the promotion and strengthening of the rule of law. This 
thesis emphases on its impact on legal certainty and human rights. Before discussing the problem 
that arises in investment arbitration towards the rule of law, it is necessary to understand what legal 
certainty and human rights actually mean.  
 
174 “Wang Chengjie Attended the Seventh Forum on the Rule of Law for Chinese Enterprises and Delivered a 
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7th-internet-governance-forum/>. 
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Chapter 2: A focus on two rule of law features: legal certainty and the 
protection of human rights  
 
Legal certainty and human rights are important features of the rule of law178. It is often said 
that the requirement of coherence in the law and judicial decisions is important so as to ensure 
legal certainty and predictability of the law179. Furthermore, it is widely recognised that the 
protection of human rights is among the principal goals of the international community and 
states180. Human rights are fundamental rights guaranteed to individuals in order to protect them 
from arbitrariness, detrimental behaviours and ensure them a certain standard of living181.  
Therefore, this section will focus on understanding the meaning of legal certainty and coherence 
(Section 1), what amounts to human rights (Section 2) in light of their nexus with the rule of law. 




Section 1: The element of legal certainty and coherence : definition and 
utility 
 
“The concepts of legal certainty and the rule of law are closely connected”182; as it has been 
explained, legal certainty is one of the core principles of the rule of law.183 
 
178 Reza Banakar, “Reflexive legitimacy in international arbitration” in Volkmar Gessner & Ali Cem Budak, eds, 
Emerging legal certainty: empirical studies on the globalization of law Oñati international series in law and society 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998) 347 at 353 and following. 
179 Hans Gribnau, “Legal certainty: a matter of principle” (2010) 12/2014 EATLP Leuven 69 at 69, 90–91. 
180 Strengthening and Coordinating United Nations Rule of Law Activities 2014, Secretary General, supra note 43. 
181 UDHR, supra note 2 Preamble. 
182 Elina Paunio, Legal Certainty in Multilingual EU Law: Language, Discourse and Reasoning at the European 
Court of Justice, 1st ed (London: Routledge, 2016) at 54. 
183 Julia Motte-Baumvol, “Le comportement de l’investisseur” in Walid Ben Hamida & Frédérique Coulée, eds, 
Convergences et contradictions du droit des investissements et des droits de l’homme: une approche contentieuse = 
Convergences and contradictions between investment law and human rights law: a litigation approach, Publications 
de l’Institut international des droits de l’homme 35 (Paris: Pedone, 2017) at 203. 
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In Fuller’s theory, “the existence of enacted law as an effectively functioning system depends upon 
the establishment of stable interactional expectancies between lawgiver and subject”184. In other 
words, if the lawmaker is always changing the state of the law (or a judge is always changing the 
case law), it is impossible for individual to reach the behavioral expectations set up in the law. 
Legal certainty is said to be among the “fundamental principles”185 or “highest values” of a legal 
system186.  
 
More recently, in her book, Elena Paunio defines legal certainty in the following way: “[f]ormal 
legal certainty implies that laws and adjudication in particular must be predictable: laws must 
satisfy imperatives of clarity, stability, intelligibility, and predictability so that those concerned 
can calculate with relative accuracy the legal consequences of their actions as well as the outcome 
of legal proceedings.”187  
 
Legal certainty is relying on several other principles; stability, predictability and legal clarity (i.e. 
those notions represent “legal clarification”)188. Indeed, coherence and publicity in the law ensure 
its stability and therefore, render it predictable. Predictable law means anyone in the society (be it 
a person, an institution, a company) is able to know how to act or behave. The legal consequences 
of a particular behaviour are predictable.  
 
Judges have acknowledged the importance of preserving legal certainty in a democratic society 
and have recognised its benefit in promoting the rule of law. Indeed, in the case  Canada (Minister 
of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov189, the Supreme Court stated that 
“the rule of law requires courts to provide a greater degree of legal certainty than reasonableness 
 
184 Lon L Fuller, “Human Interaction and the Law” in The Principles of Social Order, k.l. winston ed (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2001) at 254. 
185 Franz Bydlinski, Fundamentale Rechtsgrundsätze: zur rechtsethischen Verfassung der Sozietät (Vienna: 
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Law” in Mark Fenwick & Stefan Wrbka, eds, Legal Certainty in a Contemporary Context (Singapore: Springer 
Singapore, 2016) 9 at 10. 
187 Paunio, supra note 182 at 51; Thomas Schultz & Cédric Dupont, “Investment Arbitration: Promoting the Rule of 
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188 Wrbka, supra note 186 at 13. 
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review allows.”190 Lord Diplock ascertained that “[e]lementary justice or, to use the concept often 
cited by the European Court, the need for legal certainty demands that the rules by which the 
citizen is to be bound should be ascertainable by him (or, more realistically, by a competent lawyer 
advising him) by reference to identifiable sources that are publicly available”191.  
 
Legal certainty is also important for commercial transactions; it has long been recognised as an 
important principle of the business world. Indeed, Lord Mansfield in 1774 said that “[i]n all 
mercantile transactions the great object should be certainty: and therefore, it is of more 
consequence that a rule should be certain, than whether the rule is established one way or the other. 
Because speculators then know what ground to go upon”192. In other words, Lord Bingham justifies 
this reasoning by explaining that no one would do business in a country with unclear and vague 
legal rights and obligations193. Therefore, it is crucial to promote coherence in law order to create 
legal certainty in law. 
 
Coherence in law does not really have a definition; it “is held to be something more than 
mere logical consistency of propositions”194 and it includes “elements such as consistency, 
comprehensiveness and completeness”195. Coherence of judgments and legal reasoning must be 
ensured where the rule of law exists because “contradictions between fundamental rules go at the 
expense of the coherence – and justice – of the system as a whole.”196 
 
The consequences of an absence of coherence in the decisions rendered by tribunals greatly 
impacts legal certainty. As Hobér rightly puts it, “[l]ack of coherence and consistency sooner or 
later results in unpredictability and uncertainty.”197 Taking the case of international arbitration, if 
the behaviour of arbitrators varies greatly in similar cases, even though most investment tribunals 
are ad-hoc, this has considerable impacts on companies, investors, governments and the state of 
the law.  
 
190 Ibid at para 62. 
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Indeed, the absence of legal certainty and coherence can have serious consequences 
especially regarding the realization of an investment as both parties, be it the state or the 
companies, will not be able to know which position to adopt in order not to be sanctioned198. This 
is particularly problematic when it comes to an area of law, such as human rights, that is itself 
facing unclearness and debate about rights’ definitions and protection199. 
 
As it will be explained, the protection of human rights varies from one arbitral tribunal to another. 
Consequently, it is difficult to have clarity on what are the duties and responsibilities for businesses 
regarding their investment in respect of human rights, what are the situations where human rights 
of the local population should prevail over the investment, and what is the actual state of 
international investment law concerning this question. If companies do not know how to behave, 
it does not help to take the required measures to avoid human rights breaches. In terms of 
improvement, this also means that it will keep on being complicated to address the question of the 
corporate social responsibility of businesses.200 
 
Additionally, the absence of coherence in case law and in the law, leading to no legal 
certainty, leaves room for arbitrariness which is the very phenomenon that rule of law wants to 
avoid. The Supreme Court of Canada warned against the drawback of an absence of legal certainty. 
In R v. Ferguson201, the court said that: “ [t]he divergence between the law on the books and the 
law as applied — and the uncertainty and unpredictability that result — exacts a price paid in the 
coin of injustice”.202 The court reaffirmed the importance of legal certainty, Paunio says “[t]he 
imperatives associated with the rule of law […] seem to require that indeterminacy such as 
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vagueness and ambiguity are avoided, otherwise no control of government – or for that matter, 
judicial decision-making – can be guaranteed.”203 
 
If coherence and legal certainty are achieved, then the law is said to be predictable. This 
means that there must be clarity, consistency, and transparency in reasoning and the arguments 
developed, as well as a “use of pre-established interpretive criteria accepted by the legal 
community in question. To that extent, predictable reasoning also contributes to stabilizing 
procedural expectations in the context of judicial adjudication.”204 Predictability of the law ensures 
stability; this means that anyone in society will be able to know (to certain extent) what would be 
the legal outcome of a particular behaviour.205 It can be seen that all the concepts are depending 
on each other because if predictability increases, legal certainty is strengthened. The system is self-
sustainable. 
 
 The necessity to abide by legal certainty must be mitigated. It should not be strictly applied 
in all circumstances as it would mean that the law cannot be changed and that case law cannot be 
overturned. Indeed, “the law never offers absolute legal certainty. Equally, legal certainty is not 
an absolute value or ideal.”206 An immutable law is not desirable. Instead, changes must be made 
in the required forms and sparingly so as to ensure a stable legal environment207.   
  
 Legal certainty is of utmost importance in any democratic society where the rule of law 
prevails. It needs to be guaranteed by every legal institution. In addition, the rule of law requires 
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Section 2: The protection of human rights and the rule of law : definitions 
and connections 
It is affirmed that “the rule of law requires that the law afford adequate protection of 
fundamental human rights.”208 It is because the rule of law exists that fundamental rights are not 
empty shells. Peerenboom explains that the “[r]ule of law is seen as directly integral to the 
implementation of rights. Without rule of law, rights remain lifeless paper promises rather than the 
reality for many throughout the world”209. All those affirmations emphasise the symbiotic 
relationship between human rights and the rule of law210. This intrinsic relationship is 
acknowledged by the international community in its adoption of the UDHR211.  
The thick definition212, as well as international instruments, encompass the protection of 
human rights in the definition of the rule of law.213 It means that every democratic state must 
guarantee certain fundamental rights, such as freedom opinion, the prohibition of torture and 
forced labour, rights to life, due process, etc. for its citizens in order to protect them from 
arbitrariness, abuses, tyranny, and oppression.214.  
The United Nation also asserts that where neither human rights nor the rule of law are respected, 
it is a threat to peace and security215.   
Governments, academics, legal practitioners, international organisations and others have 
recognised the importance of human rights guarantees.216  
 
At an international level, human rights are defined as “the rights of individuals and groups 
that are recognized as such in international treaties and declarations as well by 
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customary customary international law”217. At a national level, they are proclaimed in 
constitutions and “inherent to the human personality”218. 
Human rights encompass both civil and political rights as well as economic, social and cultural. 
Both incur different types of obligations and actions from governments219.  
Civil and political rights are the most common type of rights220; they imply the right to life221, fair 
trial222, freedom of expression223 or prohibition of torture and other cruel and inhuman 
treatments224. They are relatively clear which facilitate their enforcement and international 
acceptance225.  
Economic, social and cultural promote “higher standards of living, employment, health, education, 
cultural cooperation and non-discrimination”.226 
 
Since the Second World War, the protection of human rights has been affirmed by most of the 
governments227. For instance, most democratic states have enshrined their fundamental rights in 
their constitutions, bills of rights, and mechanisms to protect individuals against State violations 
exist.  
The Vienna Declaration of 1995 asserts that “[a]all human rights are universal, indivisible and 
interdependent and interrelated … it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic 
and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and political freedoms”228. This 
declaration has been adopted by 170 States which shows the international consensus on the 
necessary protection of human rights.   
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Regional organisations have adopted conventions, such as the European Convention on Human 
Rights229, the Pact of San Jose230, to ensure their respect by State parties. Not only do State have 
to guarantee human rights protection in their territory, they must also “prevent third parties from 
violating the right in other countries, if they are able to influence these third parties by way of legal 
or political means”231. Therefore, it can be affirmed that “human rights form a necessary part of 
the international rule of law” 232  
Besides, the UNGA recognized the necessity of strengthening the rule of law233. In the 
same declaration, the UN describes the elements of the rule of law, and human rights protection is 
one of them. Furthermore, the “rule of law is associated with economic development, democracy 
and political stability, which are key determinants in rights performance.”234. Therefore, it can be 
affirmed that human rights and the rule of law are intrinsically linked235. The UN have reaffirmed 
that “human rights, the rule of law and democracy are interlinked and mutually reinforcing”236.  
 The guarantee of human rights in various international instruments is not as ideal as it 
sounds. As Petersmann puts it, “effective protection of ‘freedom from poverty’ and constitutional 
limitations of abuse of government powers […] in worldwide IEL [international economic law] 
often remains a cosmopolitan dream.”237 The human rights topic faces several issues that invade 
the world of international investment arbitration. It is possible to classify them in two different 
categories.  
 First, what are human rights and which rights international human rights law contain still 
remain an unanswered question. As Lord Bingham rightly explains, “there is no universal 
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consensus on the rights and freedoms which are fundamental, even among civilised nations.”238 If 
some of them are universally recognised (mostly civil and political rights)239, other rights such as 
socio-economic rights are still debated240. Clearly, there is no “accepted ranking of the different 
rights that make up the list of goodies included in the ever-proliferating set of human rights 
instruments and customary international law”241.  
Therefore, there are issues surrounding the substance of international human rights law (IHRL). 
The absence of consensus surrounding certain rights, the vagueness regarding the definition of 
certain rights (water242, the right to just and favourable condition of work243, the right to an 
adequate standard of living244 etc.) highlight a problem of legal certainty regarding IHRL245. There 
are disagreements amongst jurisdictions, tribunals (be it court or arbitral tribunals) on how to 
protect those human rights. The absence of legal certainty in this broad body of law leads to 
inconsistency in awards as will be discussed in the second chapter.  
The vagueness of IHRL provisions leads some arbitrators, in investment arbitration, to avoid 
dealing with those rights as they do not know how to deal with them. This raises the second issue 
regarding human rights which is their difficult protection through efficient mechanisms.  
 
The mechanisms permitting the protection of human rights and sanctions when they are 
violated lack enforceability. At a transnational and international level, there are major deficiencies 
in protecting human rights.  
If the protection of human rights and compliance with the rule of law can be easily measured when 
it comes to States’ actions, it becomes more complicated when it comes to multinationals and big 
corporations with investment arbitration as a protection mechanism. Nonetheless, it cannot be 
denied that “implementation of human rights has fallen far short of commitment made”246. It 
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becomes more and more complicated to protect human rights at a state level but also on an 
international scale, especially through the mean of international investment arbitration. 
One of the rule of law requirements is an effective redress mechanism for breaches of rights; in 
other words, “[t]he rule of law is the implementation mechanism for human rights, turning them 
from a principle into a reality.”247 It can be said that mechanisms to protect human rights face 
efficiency issues in terms of enforcement248.   
 
 
To conclude on the connection between human rights and the rule of law, the United 
Nations propose a good summary of the situation: “the rule of law and human rights are two sides 
of the same principle, the freedom to live in dignity. The rule of law and human rights therefore 
have an indivisible and intrinsic relationship”249. 
In the upcoming part of this chapter, we will discuss how that international investment arbitration 
is facing important rule of law issues concerning the legal certainty deriving from arbitral 
jurisprudence and the protection of human rights250.   
 
247 Strengthening and Coordinating United Nations Rule of Law Activities 2014, Secretary General, supra note 43 at 
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Chapter 3: The rule of law in international investment arbitration 
 
 The study of the rule of law through the lens of the State has been largely discussed among 
academics251. The same can be noticed about the rule of law at an international level, through the 
actions of many international organisations or recommendations of the United Nations252. The 
question of how it could be strengthened, protected and promoted by governments, laws or courts 
has attracted much attention since time immemorial253. However, much less has been written about 
the rule of law in transnational mechanisms such as international investment arbitration.  
While some doctrine can be found on this topic, it mostly concerns the necessity to protect foreign 
investors’ rights in the BIT concluded between the State and the investor254, but the rule of law has 
been a tacit feature of this alternative mechanism to settle disputes255, as demonstrated by the 
various statements of arbitration institutions256. This paper aims at raising some rule of law issues 
that are usually forgotten when talking about international investment arbitration.  
  
First, the approach taken by investment arbitration regarding the rule of law will be 
analysed (1). Investor-state dispute settlement faces a rule of law crisis; indeed, the issue of legal 
certainty (2) regarding human rights of local population cases (3) is very problematic and clearly 
weakens the rule of law. 
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Section 1: The rule of law in international investment arbitration: issues 
and duty to promote it?   
 
 It is widely acknowledged that the rule of law must be abided by states and that they must 
set up internal mechanisms to guarantee it. Furthermore, states very often make declarations 
emphasizing respect for the rule of law. However, when it comes to international and transnational 
mechanisms of dispute resolution, developed on an ad-hoc basis, this commitment is not as clear.  
 
 International investment arbitration largely developed after the Second World War257. It 
was an alternative dispute resolution mechanism aiming at promoting justice throughout the 
world258. This type of arbitration deals with investments, as defined in the Salini case259, made in 
a host state. Therefore, it opposes a private party to a public one, a state.  The 1959 Abs-Shawcross 
Draft Convention on Investment Abroad aimed at protecting investors’ property against 
expropriation from the host State260 and ensure “security of investment”261. Many BITs have 
followed this draft. In addition, another original goal  of investment arbitration was to promote and 
protect the rule of law.262  
However, the practice of ISDS shows that there are difficulties in achieving this task. Indeed, the 
system is facing an important legitimacy crisis reflecting several rule of law issues263. This crisis 
 
257 Bradlow, supra note 33 at 360. 
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262 Mavluda Sattorova, The impact of investment treaty law on host states: enabling good governance?, Studies in 
international law (Oxford ; Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2018) at 137; Schultz & Dupont, supra note 187 at 
1161. 
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is, amongst other things, due to the perception of bias towards investors, inadequacy to protect 
human and procedural rights with issues of fairness, transparency, inconsistent arbitral awards 
etc.264  
 
The relevance of the situation is due to the fact that more and more, international 
investment arbitration deals with issues concerning the public at large (especially in cases where 
human rights of local population are at stake) but the public has no say in the process, be it 
arbitrators’ appointments, raising questions, being party to the proceeding etc. Indeed, it is 
questionable “whether measures in pursuit of public interest adopted by democratically elected 
governments should be adjudicated by foreign, unelected and unaccountable arbitrators in a 
process largely governed by commercial principles and lacking public input”265. The drafters of 
the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention did not craft it “with the aim of providing investors with a 
right to affect social policy in areas like health, education and housing”266. 
Lee Williams argues that international investment law enables foreign corporations to harm 
domestic regulations and that investment-treaty arbitration amounts to an “inherent assault on 
democracy” because “unelected transnational corporations can dictate the policies of 
democratically elected governments”267. This thesis will discuss the provisions, or their absence, 
and role both of international investment agreements (IIA) and bilateral investment treaties (BIT) 
indifferently.  
For the record, IIAs are concluded between several countries and are concerned with cross-border 
investments matters268,  especially FDI and the protection of foreign investments269. BITs involve 
only two parties and they are a form of IIAs270. BITs deal with private investment made by a 
natural or a legal person of one state in another state271.  
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 Facing this rule of law crisis, one can wonder if there is a duty imposed on arbitration 
mechanisms and arbitrators to guarantee and promote the rule of law, as it would be stated in 
national constitutions. Lord Neuberger is of the opinion that “arbitration really was up there with 
litigation, not merely as a dispute resolution system, but as part of the rule of law.”272 Similarly, 
Schill writes that “the concept of the rule of law is itself a guiding principle for assessing 
investment treaties and investment treaty arbitration and in informing treaty and dispute settlement 
practice”273.  
 
It can be said that most of the time, arbitrators are lawyers, judges or legal academics. Their 
knowledge of the law enables them to understand the importance of the rule of law. Therefore, it 
is professor Park’s opinion that “to some extent, arbitrators are expected to behave like judges in 
their concern for the public interest”274 and the rule of law. In other words, while exercising their 
functions, the rule of law “has to inform arbitrators in how they conduct arbitral proceedings, 
exercise their procedural powers, and interpret investment treaties.”275  
Even though international arbitration documents do not create general obligations on these topics, 
Meshel says that protecting human rights is part of the mandate of arbitrators in respecting and 
implementing the rule of law276. Schill argues that “investment treaty arbitration serves as a 
mechanism to implement the rule of law standards laid down in investment treaties.”277 It also 
enables access to justice for foreign investors.278 
Similarly, the 2015 World Investment Report states that “[t]he expected key function of 
IIAs [international investment agreements] is to contribute to predictability, stability and 
transparency in investment relations”279. It also specifies that “IIAs can help improve countries’ 
regulatory and institutional frameworks, including by adding an international dimension to them 
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and, by promoting the rule of law and enhancing good governance.”280 This is an 
acknowledgement that international investment agreements can help in the promotion and 
protection of the rule of law, especially because they are legally binding. If IIAs promote this goal, 
then arbitrators should start considering it in the disputes they solve.  
Therefore, it seems to be part arbitrators’ mandate and arbitral institutions’ role to foster 
respect for the rule of law. Indeed, they “are not only responsible towards the parties but also 
towards the populations of sovereign States whose interests are at stake in the dispute at hand”281. 
Investment treaties also have a role to play as binding documents, they could offer arbitrator a 
legal basis for the award they render, instead of relying on their general duty at the international 
level.  
 
There are authors who believe that BITs have already fostered respect for the rule of law because 
they have created a safer and fairer environment for investments.282 Schill explains that investment 
treaties promote investments, especially by guaranteeing their stability. The protection of 
investments  “have the objective to lead to economic growth and, ultimately, human 
development”283. In other words, investment treaties grant security to FDI from arbitrary 
governments’ conduct, a goal pursued by the rule of law284. This can explain why they help in the 
promotion of the rule of law.  
Even though this can be true, those BITs have, sometimes, damaged human rights of local 
populations and therefore, jeopardized the rule of law285.  
 
 Nonetheless, there is a recent trend showing that, more and more, BITs contain rule of law 
and/or human rights provisions. International investment agreements “are no longer limited to 
establishing few basic rights of protection for foreign investors, but also reflect public concerns, 
 
280 Ibid; Schultz & Dupont, supra note 187 at 1161. 
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for instance with regard to the protection of health, safety, the environment and core labour 
rights.”286 
BITs could be used as instrument to promote the rule of law as “investment treaties are not per se 
contrary to the rule of law, but can actually further it”287.   
 
Today, investment arbitration is facing criticisms because of the way it works. Indeed, 
“[t]he main criticism leveled at the arbitral model is that it fails to live up to the basic precepts of 
democracy and the rule of law”288. The system is facing a legitimacy crisis at several level highlight 
the fact that investment arbitration is threatening the rule of law. This is problematic; “The 
Economist has described the rule of law as the ‘motherhood and apple pie of development 
economics’289. Respect for the rule of law can foster the economic world by rendering it more 
stable.  
 
It needs to be recalled that even if a general duty for arbitrators to protect the rule of law 
was recognised and backed up by BITs provisions, there remain several problems concerning this 
topic. Undeniably, it is difficult to know to what extent the rule of law can be strengthened as the 
concept knows no consensus on the international scene. The wideness of the concept renders 
development of practical guidance difficult and the taking of actions is challenging.  
It would be a considerable task to discuss all the rule of law issues existing in this field. This is the 




Section 2: Legal certainty: a major rule of law issue in international 
investment arbitration   
 
It has been explained in the first part of this chapter that legal certainty is one of the features 
of the rule of law. It has also been shown that investment arbitration and the rule of law are strongly 
 
286 Karl, supra note 16 at 229. 
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connected and that ISDS faces a legitimacy crisis as some rule of law elements seem not to be 
complied with. Legal certainty in the awards rendered, as well as coherence of the decisions, are 
to be found among those issues.290  
 
International investment arbitration is often criticized for rendering contradictory decisions 
lacking consistency291. Arbitrators have not found a way to solve issues of incoherence among 
investment awards292 and this prevents legal certainty and stability in the system for its users293. 
Indeed, arbitrations has reached contradictory outcomes in similar cases”294, especially in the cases 
revolving around the Argentinian crisis of 2000-2001 where the state adopted anti-crisis measures 
leading to breaches of investors’ rights.  
Investment arbitration has evolved very quickly in the last decades, El Baradei describes it as a 
“fast and unstructured evolution”295. Therefore, shortcomings regarding the interpretation of BIT 
and standards can be highlighted in the various awards rendered by tribunals.296 Sometimes legal 
principle that appeared to have been established by one tribunal, is precluded by another297. This 
generates confusion and unpredictability for the system’s users. It is not surprising that “arbitral 
practice is often inconsistent, even on some crucial issues.”298 
 
This can be explained by several factors. First-of-all, there is no rule of stare decisis299. 
Investment arbitration is a sui generis system, constituted by ad-hoc tribunals established for a 
specific dispute (even though there are now a number of international institutions to resolve 
investor-state disputes)300. In other words, arbitration is a “decentralised and non-hierarchic system 
of law”301. There is no system of binding precedent, as it was stated in the case of Amco v 
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Indonesia302 and Garanti Koza LLP v. Turkmenistan303. Additionally, there is no system of binding 
precedent in ICSID304. Therefore decisions only have a horizontal influence on each other and 
there is only a sort of “functional duty” for arbitrators to consider previous awards on a similar 
matter305. As a consequence, arbitrators sometimes render awards that are completely inconsistent 
even though they had a similar factual background such as in the case of CME v. Czech Republic306 
and Lauder v. Czech Republic.307 
 
In its current state, the only way for investment arbitration to be coherent is for arbitrator to render 
awards with a strong persuasive value.308 As Reinisch explains, “[t]he absence of a system of 
binding precedent must also be regarded from the perspective of the rule of law and its inherent 
demands of predictability as well as equal treatment … It is a basic requirement of the rule of law 
that equal cases should be decided equally”309.  
 
Furthermore, transparency is not obvious in ISDS. The publication of awards and 
procedural documents is often subjected to parties’ approval310, confidentiality clauses can limit 
their availability311, there is no appeal mechanism to ensure coherence of the law, decisions and 
the predictability of treaty interpretation312 can explain further the lack of legal certainty in 
investment arbitration. Kriebaum explains that an appellate body would foster coherence of the 
law, prevent conflicting case law and guarantee the correctness of decisions.313 The limited scope 
of annulment grounds314, as well as the absence of appeal mechanisms315 make it difficult to have 
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consistent and uniform arbitral decisions. Indeed, the annulment procedure does not constitute a 
review of the award and the annulment committees are established on an ad hoc basis316, which 
does not enable permanence and certainty. This “situation is certainly at odds with a full-fledged 
protection of the rule of law.”317 
The facts that “inconsistencies can arise cultivates an impression that arbitration might at times 
rhyme with arbitrariness and that states, in accepting that they should submit themselves to 
arbitration, would in a sense be ‘gambling’ with the general interest”318.  
 
It should be added that the rapid evolution of investment law and ISDS practice has rendered it 
difficult for practitioners to keep up with all the developments and ensure a coherence in the 
decisions rendered.319 
 
Consequently, contradictory awards and inconsistencies in arbitral tribunal positions have 
detrimental impacts. As Franck writes, “[r]ather than creating certainty for investors and 
Sovereigns, the process of resolving investment disputes through arbitration is creating uncertainty 
about the meaning of those rights and public international law”320. The issue of legal certainty 
within ISDS is problematic as, originally, the BIT is an economic agreement. Investment is 
supposed to promote economic development and increase the standards of living of the population 
and it is well-known that there is a necessity for predictability and certainty in the economic sphere. 
In other words, “[w]ithout the clarity and consistency of both the rules of law and their application, 
there is a detrimental impact upon those governed by the rules and their willingness and ability to 
adhere to such rules, which can lead to a crisis of legitimacy”321 
 
Thus, “inconsistencies in arbitral awards constitute a problem for legal certainty and 
predictability and hence for the rule of law”322 In the words of Benjamin Guthrie, this situation in 
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investment arbitration is “antithetical to several of [rule of law] requirements”323. Because of the 
dubious awards rendered there is “a lack of unity in the case law, and host states’ interests may be 
threatened by the philosophy of the system. There is a feeling that going to arbitration, for a host 
state, can be like playing Russian roulette when public interest is involved.”324 
 
Nonetheless, it should be recalled that in many scenarios, the outcome of the award is 
slightly predictable. Some authors have noticed that arbitrators peruse each other’s work; 
therefore, it seems that there is an emerging “investment treaty jurisprudence”325. Even if “the 
importance of inconsistency should not be exaggerated”326, there is a paramount necessity to 
improve this situation and strengthen the rule of law. As Sattorova says, “unless investment treaty 
law ensures the clarity and internal coherence of its message – unless host states know what 
standards they will be held to, investment treaty prescriptions of good governance cannot be 
effectively internalised and transposed into the daily practices of national institutions.”327  
The need for legal certainty is even more acute when such behaviour from arbitration 
tribunals affects the protection of local population’s human rights, as it will be detailed in the 
second chapter of this thesis.  
 
 
Section 3: Human rights: a rule of law element growing in investment 
arbitration 
 
International investment arbitration has shown increased preoccupation for cases dealing 
with human rights, not those of investors, but those of local populations. More and more, 
arbitrators have had to deal with issues regarding the human rights of local population that were 
infringed by an investor’s conduct. 
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There is a growing number of BITs regarding public services328. For instance, in the last 
20 years, numerous investment treaties have emerged “in relation to the water provision and 
sanitation industries”329. The increasing number of BITs is due to pressure exercised by 
international authorities or companies upon governments to privatise their water330. However, 
problems arise by the fault of the investor, concerning tariff increases or water quality issues, 
which ends up in a discriminatory access to water for population. The consequences of a difficult 
or impossible access to water lead to serious public health problems. Facing such situations, 
governments of host states often decided to end the contract concluded with the private investor, 
and are then sued before investment arbitration tribunals.  
 
Here, the difficulty is that international human rights law only applies to human beings but 
no to legal persons331. There are debates as to whether corporations are subject to IHRL332; there 
is a growing number of corporate social responsibilities333 but those instruments are not legally 
binding and do not belong to the applicable law of an investment arbitration. Nevertheless, there 
is “a trend that transnational companies are expected to assume certain extent of corporate social 
responsibilities in the host State”334. 
 
This situation can be explained by the fact that foreign direct investments have an impact on local 
population and states’ regulation. Agirrezabalaga explains that behind investment arbitration 
disputes, there is a public background because of the consequences that investments can have on 
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populations, especially regarding the right to property, access to water, right to a safe environment 
or freedom of expression335.  
Additionally, the relationship between IHRL and IIL was asserted in Sempra Energy International 
v The Argentine Republic.336  The tribunal stated that there is a complex relationship between 
investment treaties and human rights law.337 
 
Foreign direct investments very often lead to a situation of “regulatory chill” and “race-to-the-
bottom” whereby population’s rights are forgotten in front of regulations adopted in order to obtain 
better BITs338. Indeed, “some states, while welcoming the investment offered by corporations, 
have been unwilling or unable to react to corporate human rights abuses or heed the advice of the 
UN treaty bodies in pursuing their protection obligations”339. Because of States’ policies towards 
the attraction of investors, it is possible that international investments impact human rights 
especially through lower regulatory standards340. The conclusion of investment treaties can “create 
positive conditions for improving peoples’ lives, it can also carry the risk of negatively impacting 
on the environment, peoples’ health and the enjoyment of their human rights (water, food, and 
other basic needs)”341. These can have serious effects if domestic regulations provide insufficient 
protection.  
 
A lot has been written on this topic but it is beyond the scope of this thesis to elaborate on 
all the practical drawbacks of foreign direct investments on States’ populations. Nonetheless, if 
States lose some of their power in terms of action and policy because of investment agreements, it 
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must be recalled that from a human rights perspective, “liberalization should not go so far as to 
compromise State action and policy to promote and protect human rights.”342  
It must also be recalled that in terms of human rights, “States have undertaken to respect, protect 
and fulfil human rights nationally which apply in all contexts, including the context of investment 
liberalization”343. As it has been explained, they are sometimes “overwhelmed by the situation”. 
Therefore, it is the author’s view that international investment arbitration can help to bring 
solutions to human rights violations by investors, where the State is failing in meeting such 
obligations.   
 
The “[r]ecognition of the interconnection of human rights with business activities has 
progressed slowly but steadily from the fringe to become a mainstream position”344. Because of 
the impact of investment on local populations and their rights, there is a growing number of 
investment disputes that raise human rights questions.  
 
As it has been explained, investments have an impact on local populations’ rights. This leads to an 
increase in the number of arbitration proceedings that present human rights issues.345 These cases 
and the issues they raise will be analysed in the second part of this thesis. “[H]uman rights issues 
will arise with increasing frequency in arbitral proceedings. A number of arbitral proceedings have 
already been brought under the Bangladesh Accord concluded in the wake of the Rana Plaza 
building disaster in Dhaka in 2013”346. The same can be said about the situation in Latin America, 
as demonstrated by the case of Argentina347.  
 
342 Feria-Tinta, supra note 328 at 612–613. 
343 Ibid at 612. 
344 Nolan, supra note 248 at 218. 
345 Silvia Steininger, “What’s Human Rights Got To Do With It? An Empirical Analysis of Human Rights 
References in Investment Arbitration” (2018) 31 LJIL 33 at 35. 
346 Antony Crockett & Marco de Sousa, “Arbitrating Business and Human Rights Disputes: Viable for Victims?’” 
(2018) 20:3 Asian Dispute Review (Romesh Weeramantry and John Choong (eds)) 104 at 105. 
347 William W Burke-White, “Part IV Chapter 17: The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability under BITs and the 
Legitimacy of the ICSID System” in Michael Waibel & Asha Kaushal, eds, The Backlash against Investment 
Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, 2010) 407 at 408: “More than 40 of the cases presently pending before 
ICSID have been brought against the Republic of Argentina and assert that the Argentine government’s response to 
the catastrophic financial crisis that hit that country in late 2001 and 2002 impaired investor rights secured under 
several of Argentina’s BITs”. 
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The growing number of investment disputes highlights the thriving necessity for arbitrators, to 
operate a balance between the protection of investments and States’ powers to regulate348.   
 
The violation of local populations human rights because of BITs  goes against the rule of 
law, that is supposed to be promoted by States and arbitration. Indeed, the United Nations have 
acknowledged the interdependence of rule of law obedience and human rights’ protection. In a 
resolution adopted in 2009, the General Assembly stated that  “convinced that the advancement of 
the rule of law at the national and international levels is essential for the realization of sustained 
economic growth, sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and hunger and the 
protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms…”349.  
 
Furthermore, investment arbitration does not only have human rights violations problem 
but the absence of a voice for the local populations in the investment mechanisms is also a critical 
issue350. This situation seriously attacks the rule of law as access to justice, transparency and 
openness of the proceedings are not guaranteed for the victims of the investments made351.  
This is due to the fact that an arbitral tribunal is set up to solve a dispute between an investor and 
a State and decide according to the power they are granted via a jurisdiction clause. Being an 
agreement established through a contract, the only parties that can participate in arbitration 
resulting from a dispute regarding the BIT are the ones who have signed that BIT. It is not possible 
for any other person to intervene in the proceedings, except if the parties themselves allow it, which 
is rare.352 
 
This is problematic as investments have impact on both states’ branches of power and its 
population. For instance, when an investment concerns the privatization of water services, 
 
348 Ursula Kriebaum, “Are investment treaty standards flexible enough to meet the needs of developing countries?” 
in Freya Baetens, ed, Investment Law within International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 330 
at 331. 
349 The rule of law at national and international levels, GA Res 63/128, UNGAOR, 63rd Sess, UN Doc 
A/RES/63/128 (2009). 
350 Alessandra Asteriti & Christian J Tams, “Transparency and Representation of the Public Interest in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration” in Stephan W Schill, ed, International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010). 
351 Schill, supra note 51 at 98. 
352 Eugenia Levine, “Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration: The Implications of an Increase in 
Third-Party Participation” (2011) 29:1 BJIL 200 at 206. 
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electricity or distribution of cigarettes (examples are numerous), those investments impact the 
population. For instance, the case of Aguas del Tunari is among the “most dramatic example of 
the consequences of unaffordable water” because the investor (Bechtel) raised up the price up to 
300%”353. Furthermore, state regulations and laws are very often modified to adapt to the 
investment made by the state. All the persons impacted had no say in the contractual negotiations 
that took place and leading to the BIT, but they are very often the first victims of this investment. 
As victims, they have no mechanism available to remedy the situation where their human rights 
are breached. Another consequence is that the arbitral tribunal cannot know what the impact of the 
investor’s behaviour on those local populations was and cannot take into consideration the possible 
consequences of its award on these populations.  
 
A mechanism of amicus curiae exists and enables NGOs representing local populations to 
inform an arbitral tribunal about the practical impacts of a BIT. Thanks to those briefs, arbitrators 
can be more aware of a particular situation created by a BIT. Nonetheless, as it will be analysed in 
chapter two, the filing of such briefs before arbitral tribunals is far from certain. Indeed, some 
arbitral tribunals are reluctant to admit amicus curiae, and when they are, the award does not 
always take them into consideration.354  
 
Thus, the emergence of human rights questions in arbitration highlights the connection 
between international investment arbitration and the rule of law. There is a need to guarantee their 
protection and arbitration could help to fulfill that need. It is important that there be a “full 
recognition of international arbitration as a judicial process subject to the mandatory application 
of Rule of Law principles and of fundamental rights”355, as this author believes. Finally, this 
discussion demonstrates that the world of investment is not immune from wider and crucial 
considerations such as human rights and the rule of law. 
 
 
353 Truswell, supra note 242 at 578. 
354 Levine, supra note 352 at 214, 221. 
355 El Baradei, supra note 51 at 11. 
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To end the first part of our thesis, it can be affirmed that the rule of law is an ancient concept 
that lies at the heart of the international legal order and any legal system356. It is rooted in the most 
important legal documents of our history357 and it is in constant evolution. The rule of law 
enshrines fundamental legal principles that are clearly beneficial at an international level.358 
Initially created to be obeyed by state, the rule of law is not solely an obligation for public entities 
but interferes in the private sphere359.  
 
Nevertheless, “the state of the Rule of Law today is appalling and inexcusable”360. The lacuna of 
the UDHR drafters has dramatic consequences today as they “may not have foreseen the power 
and influence that business corporations would come to wield in our world”361. It has been 
explained that “[t]he body of human rights that have a clear nexus to business”362 and it is 
necessary that private entities promote and respect human rights363.  
 
Investment arbitration is more and more confronted with cases involving business interests 
and human rights. It is often said that “investment law jurisprudence has not taken into account 
sustainable development dimensions and objectives, such as the protection of health, the 
environment, financial stability and other societal rights and interests”364. It also raises questions 
of legal certainty as it will be discussed in the second part of this thesis. There are consequences 
on the implementation of the rule of law and some commentators say that the international 




356 McCorquodale, supra note 2 at 32: “it is evident that the international rule of law has been identified as a goal for 
the international system”; James R Maxeiner, “Some Realism about Legal Certainty in the Globalization of the Rule 
of Law” (2008) 31:1 Hous J Intl L 27 at 28, 30. 
357 Magna Carta, supra note 78; Bill of Rights, supra note 92; Habeas Corpus, supra note 95; United States of 
America: Constitution, supra note 100; DDHC, supra note 99; UN Charter, supra note 42; UDHR, supra note 2; 
ECHR, supra note 42; ICCPR, supra note 169; ICESCR, supra note 170. 
358 Kriebaum, supra note 19 at 203. 
359 McCorquodale, supra note 2 at 35. 
360 El Baradei, supra note 51 at 4. 
361 Robinson, supra note 49 at 21. 
362 Nolan, supra note 248 at 218. 
363 Robinson, supra note 200 at 21. 
364 El Baradei, supra note 51 at 6. 
365 David Schneiderman, Constitutionalising Economic Globalization: Investment Rules and Democracy’s Promise 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) at 114. 
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The way investment arbitration deals with the rule of law concepts of human rights and 
legal certainty in practice will be the focus of Part 2. 
 
 
Part 2: Legal certainty in arbitral jurisprudence dealing 
with socio-economic human rights  
 
 The first Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) was signed between Germany and Pakistan in 
1959366. However, international human rights law started to interfere with international investment 
arbitration recently367, with IIAs becoming more and more human rights friendly. Indeed, the 
Secretary General of the UN warned that investment agreements were posing “grave dangers to 
the enjoyment of human rights”368 because they have been silent on the human rights question for 
a long time369.  
 
In the last two decades, international investment arbitration has been confronted with several 
human rights issues. The first human rights considered were civil or political rights370 such as due 
process, right to a fair trial, property rights, discrimination that are very often associated with 
investors’ rights371. Tribunals managed to engage in interpretations of civil and political rights372 
but this discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
However, another type of rights interferes more and more with investment arbitration: 
those are economic, social, and cultural rights373. They can be found contained in the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights374 which aims at a better standard of living for 
human beings. The number of cases dealing with human rights has increased and socio-economic 
rights “will occupy a prominent place in foreign investment dispute”375.  
 
366 1959 Germany - Pakistan BIT (entered into force 28 April 1962), 1959. 
367 Selected Recent Development in IIA Arbitration and Human Rights: IIA Monitor No.2, 
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2009/7 (2009) at 3 [UNCTAD Report 2009]. 
368 de Zayas, supra note 35 at para 6. 
369 UNCTAD Report 2009, note 367 at 3. 
370 ICCPR, supra note 169. 
371 UNCTAD Report 2009, note 367 at 5. 
372 ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC and ADMC Management Limited v Republic of Hungary (Award), [2006] 
ARB/03/16 at para 497; note 367 at 5. 
373 UNCTAD Report 2009, note 367 at 3–4. 
374 ICESCR, supra note 170. 
375 Simma, supra note 10 at 586. 
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The problem is that, on the one hand, States have submitted themselves to international 
instruments imposing human rights obligations, and on the other hand, they have entered into BITs 
that impose another type of obligations376 and they can both involve human rights377.  
Consequently, it is difficult for States to abide by both types of obligations; affording protection 
so socio-economic rights often lead to breaches of an investment treaty, opening the doors of 
arbitration mechanism378.  
This new trend leads arbitrators to deal with issues that are outside of their original fields of 
competence. More and more, arbitrators are supposed to solve investment disputes and consider 
challenges that impact a whole community and public services379. 
 
The rapid evolution of ISDS380 has left the system with lacunas regarding its ability to 
effectively deal with human rights. The jurisprudence studied in the following chapters will 
demonstrate that investment arbitration has difficulties to adapt to these news concerns. These 
deficiencies exist both at a procedural level and on a substantive law ground and they have 
consequences381.  
  
Procedurally speaking, it is difficult to develop a coherent jurisprudence when dealing with 
considerations outside of the scope of the BIT and where the victims are not even parties to the 
proceedings (i.e. local population)382. Host states face obstacles in justifying their actions that 
 
376 Mehmet Toral & Thomas Schultz, “The state, a perpetual respondent in investment arbitration? Some unorthodox 
considerations” in Michael Waibel et al, eds, The Backlash against investment arbitration: perceptions and reality 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2010) 577 at 588. 
377 Jasper Krommendijk & John Morijn, “‘Proportional’ by What Measure(s)? Balancing Investor Interests and 
Human Rights by Way of Applying the Proportionality Principle in Investor-State Arbitration” in Pierre-Marie 
Dupuy, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & Francesco Francioni, eds, Human Rights in International Investment Law and 
Arbitration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 421 at 424: “complexity of investor-state arbitration relates to 
the fact that both the interests of the state and those of the investor have human rights aspects: obligations with 
regard to human rights protection are relevant for both sides of the balance”; General Comment 15: The right to 
water (arts 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), UNCESCR, 29th 
Sess, UN Doc E/C.12/2002/11 (2002) at para 33 [UN General Comment 15, 2002]. 
378 Bradlow, supra note 33 at 362: “Companies have argued that certain government policies impermissibly threaten 
their property interests, even when those policies otherwise advance human rights”. 
379 Feria-Tinta, supra note 328 at 605. 
380 Tienhaara, supra note 26 at 626–627. 
381 Lo, supra note 331 at 18: “Applicable laws in arbitration procedure can be categorized into procedural rules (to 
decide arbitration procedures) and substantive law (to decide the merit of the dispute).” 
382 UNCTAD Report 2009, note 367 at 5. 
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breach BITs, be it through counterclaims or defenses and third parties are gaining influence to 
afford protections to human rights as it will be seen in Chapter 1.  
Then it will be necessary to emphasise on substantive law, and more precisely on arbitral tribunals 
integrate international human rights law as part of the law applicable to adjudicate (Chapter 2). 
There are underlying predictability and coherence matters in awards that need to be addressed 
regarding the protection socio-economic383.  
Finally, the stance of investment arbitration and its impact on legal certainty, human rights and the 
rule of law will be discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
As a warning, the absence of important empirical data on the topic as well as the 
confidentiality inherent to arbitration384 renders difficult the discussion around the lacunas and 
possible remedies available in ISDS. Nevertheless, “the integration of the law of human rights into 
international investment law is an important concern”385 and cannot be ignored.  
 
 
383 El Baradei, supra note 51 at 5. 
384 Farrugia, supra note 329 at 276. 
385 Christoph Schreuer, “The view of investment tribunals: the relevance of human rights law for investment 
tribunals” in Walid Ben Hamida & Frédérique Coulée, eds, Convergences et contradictions du droit des 
investissements et des droits de l’homme: une approche contentieuse = Convergences and contradictions between 
investment law and human rights law: a litigation approach Publications de l’Institut international des droits de 
l’homme (Paris: Pedone, 2017) at 289. 
 
 
Chapter 1 : Human rights questions facing procedural incoherence in 
ISDS 
 
 Investment arbitration has started to deal with the human rights of local populations since 
the beginning of the XXIst century386. Contrary to other dispute resolution mechanisms, such as 
national and international courts, it is a recent phenomenon387. There exist “a number of routes by 
which human rights issues can come before arbitral tribunals and it seems inevitable that tribunals 
will increasingly be called to grapple with these issues”388.  Even though legal arguments raising 
human rights questions are recent, they become more and more important in investment 
arbitration389. However, arbitral tribunals are confronted with procedural difficulties to admit such 
claims.  
 
As any new quickly growing phenomenon without precedent390, it is not an easy task to tackle 
issues, such as human rights, that normally fall beyond the scope of international investment law. 
The rules of procedures in this matter have not always been adapted to give interest to fundamental 
rights questions, and the practice has been hesitant in driving investment arbitration towards 
human rights obligations. Incoherence exists and, as Feria-Tinta puts it, “dissonance […] may have 
arisen in the practice of investment arbitration. Dissonance, however, may not be a sign of failure 
but of growth.”391.  
 
This chapter aims at shedding some light on the procedural issues raised by human rights 
claims because they can bar the admission of such issues during the proceedings. It will focus on 
 
386 SD Myers, Inc v Government of Canada, 2002 UNCITRAL; Técnicas Medioambiantales TECMED, SA v The 
United Mexican States, [2003] ARB (AF)/00/2 [Tecmed]; Methanex Corporation v United States of America, [2005] 
UNCITRAL . 
387 Feria-Tinta, supra note 328 at 630: “It has taken some time for the practice of investment arbitration to address 
human rights law centrally in its analysis when relevant”. 
388 Crockett & de Sousa, supra note 346 at 111. 
389 Clara Reiner & Christoph Schreuer, “Human Rights and International Investment Arbitration” in Human rights in 
international investment law and arbitration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 96; Steininger, “Leiden 
Journal of International Law”, supra note 345 at 34–35. 
390 Feria-Tinta, supra note 328 at 630; Charles N Brower & Stephan W Schill, “Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boom to 
the Legitimacy of International Investment Law” (2009) 9:2 Chicago J Intl L 471 at 472. 
391 Feria-Tinta, supra note 328 at 630. 
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the main procedural obstacles faced by arbitrators and the ISDS regime at large, in the 
consideration of human rights of the local populations392.  
 
There are three types of procedural obstacles that can limit the taking into account of such 
questions by an investment tribunal. Firstly, the arbitration clause legitimizes the tribunal’s 
existence and  is decisive in determining the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal and the matters it 
can deal with, i.e. human rights.393 If human rights provisions in the BIT are lacking and arbitral 
tribunals take the view that they do not have jurisdiction over such matters, they can be ignored in 
the award394. In this field, BITs are far from being consistent as some of them duly protect human 
rights whereas others are silent on the matter; this will be the focus of Section 1.  
The second procedural hurdle limiting the consideration of human rights claims is the difficult and 
inconsistent participation of third parties, amicus curiae, in the proceedings. Their objective is to 
raise awareness about environmental or human rights questions395. As the case law shows, their 
regular admission is far from being achieved (Section 2).  
Finally, host states also have the power to bring international human rights law at the heart of the 
dispute by raising it as a defence or submitting a counterclaim. Again, the attentiveness of tribunals 
on such questions is incoherent and hesitant as demonstrated by the jurisprudence (Section 3).  
Those procedurals problem limit the admission of human rights claims in ISDS and the 





392 Shinde, supra note 264 at 51: “In the present age, where there is a unanimous concern of all transnational 
institutions towards environment and human rights protection issues, the investment arbitration mechanism needs to 
imbibe a more encompassing value system to perceive these issues with the necessary sensitivity and deal with them 
in a systemic fair manner”. 
393 Feria-Tinta, supra note 328 at 606. 
394 Patrick Dumberry & Gabrielle Dumas-Aubin, “When and How Allegations of Human Rights Violations Can Be 
Raised in Investor-State Arbitration” (2012) 13:3 J of World Investment & Trade 349 at 350: “The lack of 
obligations for investors under BITs is part of a broader debate about how to best address human rights violations 
committed by corporations doing business abroad.” 
395 Ursula Kriebaum, “Privatizing Human Rights: The Interface between International Investment Protection and 
Human Rights” in The Law of international relations: liber amicorum Hanspeter Neuhold, eleven international pub 
ed (2007) 165 at 187: “One way to inform tribunals about the human rights implication of a case under consideration 
are amicus curiae petitions of civil rights groups and human rights NGOs”. 
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Section 1: Extent of arbitration clauses and human rights provisions 
 
Investment arbitration has been created to protect the investors’ property in the host state 
as already mentioned396. BITs aimed at guaranteeing rights and security to investment in face of 
host states’ actions. This is the reason why “[m]any BITs are seen to lack reciprocity, imposing 
obligations on states and granting rights to investors.”397 Where a dispute comes up, the parties 
can have recourse to the arbitration clause provided in the treaty.  
Arbitration clauses are those clauses that will legitimize the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction. They 
grant power to arbitrators to solve a dispute that arises between the parties. Many BITs contain 
arbitration clauses398 but the type of disputes subject to arbitration vary. Indeed, “the parties are 
free to delimit their consent to arbitration by defining it in general terms, by excluding certain 
types of disputes, or by listing the questions they are submitting to arbitration.”399 Generally, these 
clauses are broad enough to refer to ‘any dispute’ or to ‘all disputes’ under the respective 
agreements400. However, those BITs are often quiet regarding human rights provisions 
consequently disputes regarding such issues hardly fall in the scope of the arbitration clauses401.  
As Farrugia explains, “[a]lthough the texts of these agreements provide individually varying 
degrees of protection for the investor, the absence of references to human rights has become more 
and more conspicuous”402.  Indeed, there is an absence human rights provisions in BIT; mentions 
of economic, social and cultural rights, often involved in ISDS, are scarce.  
 
Facing this legal vacuum in the contract, “[t]ribunals have not yet begun to grapple with many of 
these challenging questions and they will find little in the way of guidance in IIAs themselves – 
 
396 Abs & Shawcross, supra note 260; Abs & Shawcross, supra note 261. 
397 Wynne Lawrence & Rosalyn Smith, “Combating Climate Change: The Role Of Investor-State Arbitration In 
Africa”, (17 March 2020), online: Kluwer Arbitration Blog 
<http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2020/03/17/combating-climate-change-the-role-of-investor-state-
arbitration-in-africa/>. 
398 August Reinisch & Loretta Malintoppi, “Methods of Dispute Resolution” in Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino & 
Christoph Schreuer, eds, The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008) at 1219. 
399 Christoph Schreuer, “Consent to Arbitration” in Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino & Christoph Schreuer, eds, 
The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 1408. 
400 Ibid. 
401 Ursula Kriebaum, “Human Rights of the Population of the Host State in International Investment Arbitration” 
(2009) 10:5 J of World Investment & Trade 653 at 662. 
402 Farrugia, supra note 329 at 262. 
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most of which are silent as to such considerations, including what tests and methods should be 
used”403. It is very difficult for arbitrators to find a legal basis to justify human rights considerations 
during their deliberations as, in theory, “a tribunal may not rule on questions that are not submitted 
to it”404. 
 
This section will briefly discuss the various procedural scenarios that can amount to a 
consideration of human rights issues in ISDS. Indeed, there are BITs that are completely defective 
in terms of human rights provisions (sub-section 1). On the other hand, some agreements open the 
doors to the protection of human rights, and it seems that there is a positive evolution on the matter 
(sub-section 2). Depending on the provisions of the contract, it is up to arbitrators to grapple with 
such issues, as it will be discussed in the following chapters. Where the BIT fails to provide 
elements to consider human rights, it is difficult to find a procedural vehicle to incorporate such 
discussion in the deliberations of arbitrators. It will be seen that the inclusion of human rights 
interests in investment treaties and agreements is not constant. This situation, among other things, 
is one of the reasons that explains why it is difficult to reach legal certainty in investment 
arbitration cases dealing with human rights.  
 
 




 It is regularly observed that BIT limit the scope of arbitration to breaches in relation to the 
treaty. Indeed, “[m]ost bilateral investment treaties do not include any human rights clauses”405. 
BITs usually contain provisions to prevent the disruption of an investment, such as fair and 
equitable treatment clauses, protections against discrimination or expropriation and many others, 
all pertaining to the field of international investment law. In other words, “[t]hose agreements only 
specifically explicate obligations of the host state vis-à-vis the foreign investor”406. 
 
403 UNCTAD Report 2009, note 367 at 13. 
404 Ole Spiermann, “Applicable law” in Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino & Christoph Schreuer, eds, The Oxford 
Handbook of International Investment Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 214. 
405 Lo, supra note 331 at 3. 
406 Krommendijk & Morijn, supra note 377 at 422. 
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For instance, a BIT can include clauses to “to avoid inequitable (discriminatory) interference with 
foreign investors’ rights, but State action to combat climate change could give rise to such inequity 
(and therefore claims) regardless of the broader environmental legitimacy of state action.”407 
Consequently, it is noticed by the United Nations that “the large majority of investment treaties 
appear not to touch upon this subject [human rights]”408. 
Nonetheless, where the BIT stipulates that the dispute should be decided “in accordance with the 
provision of the Agreement”, arbitrators often apply such provisions in light with “the principles 
of international law” or “the applicable rules of international law”409. This decision is left at the 
discretion of the arbitrators and is not an obligation.  
 
In the same vein, when the BIT contains provisions enabling the application of ICSID procedural 
rules, article 42(1) provides that:  
 
The tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be 
agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the 
law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of 
laws) and such rules of international law as may be applicable (Emphasis added).410  
 
As such, where the applicable law is not determined by the BIT411, article 42(1) leaves discretion 
to arbitrators to use any international law rules if relevant. The wording “is deliberately used to 
refer not only to domestic law or international law, but also to the combination of domestic and 
international law rules.”412 
Similarly for BITs concluded under NAFTA, article 1131(1) provides that arbitrators must decide 
the cases according to the NAFTA provisions as well as “applicable rules of international law”413.  
 
 
407 Lawrence & Smith, supra note 397. 
408 UNCTAD Report 2009, note 367 at 3. 
409 Yas Banifatemi, “The Law Applicable in Investment Treaty Arbitration (Chapter 9)” in Katia Yannaca-Small, ed, 
Arbitration Under International Investment Agreements: A Guide to the Key Issues (Oxford University Press, 2010) 
191 at 197. 
410 ICSID, supra note 314 article 42(1). 
411 Spiermann, supra note 404 at 230: “only a minority of bilateral investment treaties are explicit as to applicable 
law.” 
412 Lo, supra note 331 at 19. 
413 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 32 I.L.M. 289 and 605 1993 article 1131(1). 
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Two problem can be mentioned here: first the status of international human rights law, as 
it will be discussed in Chapter 2, is subject to debates. The second challenge is that arbitral tribunal 
does not have jurisdiction over concerns not contained in the BIT such as human rights and its 
body of laws. If arbitrators want to incorporate human rights in their analysis of the dispute, they 
have to go through treaty interpretation techniques as it will be developed the second chapter.  
In reading clauses as the one from the ICSID Convention or NAFTA, “it is clear that international 
law is part of the applicable law and thus arbitral tribunals for investor-State arbitration can apply 
international law”414. In other words, if the host state “has undertaken treaty obligations relevant 
to the dispute, it can be taken for granted that they will be applied directly by an arbitral 
tribunal”415.  
 
The previously mentioned procedural rules open the doors for international human rights law to 
be incorporated into the applicable law of the BITs. This a way to bring human rights concerns to 
the attention of the tribunal through procedural law mechanism.  
 
 Contrary to those BITs that do not include human rights clauses, there are others that take 
into account their importance and include clauses to ensure that basic rights like health, 
environment or labour are not infringed.  
 
 




In opposition to the BITs that completely disregard human rights provisions, there are, in 
practice, “very few BITs [that] refer to questions related to human rights. When they do, they 
clearly do not impose any binding human rights obligations on foreign corporations”416.  It is 
 
414 Lo, supra note 331 at 21; Spiermann, supra note 404 at 231: “Even in the absence of a specific treaty provision, 
it is necessary to resolve treaty claims on the basis of international law.” 
415 Spiermann, supra note 404 at 231. 
416 Dumberry & Dumas-Aubin, supra note 394 at 371. 
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observed that there is a new generation of BITs that include provisions concerning the protection 
of human rights, health, labour417.  
For instance, in the 2014 Canada Model BIT there are several human rights provisions concerning 
health, labour, environment and safety418. Furthermore, “Canada has included a voluntary 
corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) provision in the BITs it signs”419 , as in article 16 of its 
Model BIT420. This is not a binding statement but a mere encouragement; it highlights the difficulty 
to impose human rights obligations upon investors. 
Similarly, the 2012 US Model BIT articles 12421 and 13422 promote internationally recognised 
labor rights and environmental regulations and oblige itself not to weaken such laws. 
The DR-CAFTA (Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement) involved, inter 
alia, in the case of David Aven423 decided in 2018, contain provisions regarding health424, labour 
rights425 and environmental protection426.   
Those human rights elements are all enshrined in the ICESCR427 and ICCPR428. Currently, there 
are approximately 3000 BITs429; considering the number of BITs that are in existence, human 
rights are expressly cited in a very small number of BITs430 and they “generally do not provide 
 
417 Simma, supra note 10 at 581. 
418 2014 Canada Model Bilateral Investment Treaty article 15: “the Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to 
encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures”, see also article 18. 
419 Rainbow Willard & Sarah Morreau, “The Canadian Model BIT—A Step in the Right Direction for Canadian 
Investment in Africa?”, (18 July 2015), online: Kluwer Arbitration Blog 
<http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2015/07/18/the-canadian-model-bit-a-step-in-the-right-direction-for-
canadian-investment-in-africa/>. 
420 2014 Canada Model BIT, supra note 418 article 16: “each Party should encourage enterprises operating within its 
territory or subject to its jurisdiction to voluntarily incorporate internationally recognized standards of corporate 
social responsibility in their practices and internal policies, such as statements of principle that have been endorsed 
or are supported by the Parties. These principles address issues such as labour, the environment, human rights, 
community relations and anti-corruption.” 
421 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty article 12: “the Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to 
encourage investment by weakening or reducing the protections afforded in domestic environmental laws”. 
422 Ibid article 13: “the Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by weakening or reducing 
the protections afforded in domestic labor laws.” 
423 David R Aven and Others v Republic of Costa Rica, [2018] UNCT/15/3 . 
424 Dominican Republic, Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA), 2004 c 6. 
425 Ibid c 16. 
426 Ibid cs 10, 17. 
427 ICESCR, supra note 170 see, in particular, articles 8(3), 10, 11, 12. 
428 ICCPR, supra note 169 article 8. 
429 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2019: Special Economic Zones, 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report (WIR) (UN, 2019) at 
17. 
430 Lo, supra note 331 at 4; Farrugia, supra note 329 at 262 footnote 2. 
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references to the residual regulatory rights of the state or the human rights of the host state 
population”431.  
 
In the same vein, “[t]he Morocco-Nigeria BIT, although not yet in force, is notable in that it 
contains binding provisions which promote climate change action.”432. This new BIT imposes 
obligations, not solely on the host State, but also upon investors433. Article 15 of this BIT contain 
express human rights provisions; article 15(6) is particularly interesting and states as follow: “All 
parties shall ensure that their laws, policies and actions are consistent with the international human 
rights agreements to which they are a Party.” It is a remarkable provision in international 
investment law that expressly imposes human rights obligations on both parties. This BIT 
preserves the host state right to regulate434 which particularly scarce in practice and also stipulates 
that investors should strive to comply with corporate social responsibility standards435.   
 To ensure conformity with the BIT, a committee is supposed to monitor investors’ compliance 
with the environmental provisions436.   
The Morocco-Nigeria BIT is an extremely good example of the type of provisions that should be 
included in BIT in order to facilitate human rights protection by ISDS. The fact that written 
provisions exist in the BIT would enable to develop legal certainty in the way they are considered 
and avoid discrepancies in the awards rendered.  
 
 
There is another type of BITs that do not expressly contain human rights provisions, but 
which contain clauses that could enable for the incorporation of international human rights law. 
For instance, certain clauses provide that “any relevant rules of international law applicable”, such 
as in NAFTA Article 1131(1)437 , article 26(6) of the Energy Charter Treaty438, article 40(1) of the 
 
431 N Jansen Calamita, “International human rights and the interpretation of international investment treaties: 
constitutional considerations” in Freya Baetens, ed, Investment Law within International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013) 164 at 177. 
432 Lawrence & Smith, supra note 397. 
433 2016 Morocco-Nigeria Bilateral Investment Treaty (signed), 2016 articles 13, 14, 15 . 
434 Ibid article 23. 
435 Ibid article 24. 
436 Ibid article 14. 
437 NAFTA, supra note 413. 
438 Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) (entered into force 16 April 1998), 2080 UNTS 100 1994. 
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ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement439, article 84(1) of the Japan Mexico Free Trade 
Agreement, and article XI of the 2007 Colombia Model BIT. It is generally admitted that IHRL is 
part of international law and therefore, could fall within the scope of application of these clauses440.  
 
To this list, article 7(1) of the 2008 Germany Model BIT and article 12(1) of the 2003 India Model 
BIT could be added. Similarly, the 2005 IISD Model International Agreement on Investment for 
Sustainable Development article 48(A) contains provisions regarding the applicability of 
principles of international law as well as corporate social responsibility obligations (Article 16). 
The EU-Russia Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation (2007) and the EFTA-Singapore Free 
Trade Agreement (2003)441 open the door for the consideration of any applicable rule of 
international law that can be relevant to settle the dispute which, once again, would allow for the 
incorporation of human rights.  
 
It is encouraging to note that human rights problems are sometimes heard by BIT drafters. In the 
World Investment Report of 2015, it has been observed that among 18 IIAs concluded in 2014 (11 
BITs and 7 “other IIAs”), the majority have included provisions “safeguarding the right to regulate 
for sustainable development objectives”442. The report also mentions that “[a]nother 14 treaties 
contain a clause that explicitly recognizes that the parties should not relax health, safety or 
environmental standards in order to attract investment.”443 Among those treaties, 12 contain 
provisions regarding the “protection of health and safety, labour rights, the environment or 





439 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (entered into force 24 February 2012), 2009 Article 40(1): “The 
tribunal shall decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this Agreement, any other applicable agreements 
between the Member States, and the applicable rules of international law and where applicable, any relevant 
domestic law of the disputing Member State”. 
440 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, “Unification Rather than Fragmentation of International Law? The Case of International 
Investment Law and Human Rights Law” in Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & Francesco Francioni, 
eds, Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration (Oxford University Press, 2009) 45 at 56–59. 
441 2003 EFTA-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (entered into force on 1 January 2003), 2002 Article 61(5). 




Regarding those BITs that mention human rights, it is said that “the provisions are minimal 
in their substances”445. Furthermore, “IIAs give few instructions as to how such human rights are 
to be squared with the investment protections guaranteed to foreign investors”446.  
Dumberry believes that arbitral tribunals should intervene and consider human rights provided that 
“the BIT contains a broadly-worded dispute resolution clause and that violations are related to the 
investor’s investment at the heart of the proceedings”447.  
 
Similarly, there are situations where the BIT is silent about the applicable law or provide 
for the ICSID Convention to be applied to the dispute. In these scenarios, article 42(1) of the 
Convention enables to consider any relevant rules of international law448 and this encompasses 
international human rights law. Such incorporations of IHRL will be discussed in Chapter 2 where 
the mechanisms available to interpret those provisions will be discussed.  
 
It should be added that, along with BITs not mentioning human rights, there are BITs that mention 
human rights but do not address the question of non-compensable expropriation. As Lo puts it, 
excluding compensation for some expropriations “should be the reasonable outcome of applying 
BITs so as to allow the host State to prevent serious human rights abuses. The problem is how 
serious the violation should be in order to enable the host State to effectuate an indirect 
expropriation.”449 In the Annex B.10(c) of the 2014 Canada Model BIT, it is said that “(c) except 
in rare circumstances […] a non-discriminatory measure of a Party that is designed and applied to 
protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as health, safety and the environment, does not 
constitute indirect expropriation.”450 It does not exclude the possibility of compensation from the 




445 Lo, supra note 331 at 3. 
446 UNCTAD Report 2009, note 367 at 8. 
447 Dumberry & Dumas-Aubin, supra note 394 at 371. 
448 ICSID, supra note 314 article 42(1): “(1) The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law 
as may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the 
Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law 
as may be applicable.” 
449 Lo, supra note 331 at 16. 
450 2014 Canada Model BIT, supra note 418 Annex B.10. 
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To end this section, it can be seen that human rights obligations in BITs are far from being 
common practice and it cannot be said that there is a consistent recognition of those interests in 
international investment law451. This situation is problematic for arbitrators who sometimes deal 
with such considerations, as it is part of the applicable law, and sometimes just ignore them. This 
is certainly an issue for legal certainty and consistency in the practice of ISDS. It must be recalled 
that human rights treaties and instruments are numerous and constitute an important part of 
international law. “Since human rights law is part of international law, it is reasonable to apply the 
human rights law as “applicable rules of international law” for the purpose of deciding an 
investment dispute.”452 
Lo suggest that “human rights law should be further built into the main body of BITs to guide the 
normative and operational relationships between human rights law and BITs”453. Indeed, “[w]ith 
amendments to BITs and local legislation promoting environmental and climate-resilient factors, 
ISDS could have an important role in combating climate change”454. If such provisions exist, 
arbitration tribunals “could hold investors to account for breaches of environmental legislation, 
prevent them from claiming in respect of states’ legitimate policy changes, and enforce protective 
measures in favour of sustainable investments.”455 If they are improved, investment treaties could 
be seen as “an instrument geared towards furthering the rule of law”456.  
  
Leaving the stage of wishes to return to the state of practice, human rights questions face 
procedural hurdles to reach the doors of investment arbitration and “tribunals have faced 
difficulties in justifying the necessary application of international law to treaty claims”457. The 
legal vacuum of BITs is an example of the complexity to introduce them in ISDS. Some BITs offer 
the possibility to discuss human rights through their jurisdiction clauses, but they are not common 
 
451 Farrugia, supra note 329 at 278: “investment agreements are, with the exception of a notable few treaties, silent 
on positive human rights obligations (either for the state or the investor).” . 
452 Lo, supra note 331 at 21. 
453 Ibid at 4. 
454 Lawrence & Smith, supra note 397. 
455 Ibid. 
456 Schill, supra note 51 at 89. 
457 Spiermann, supra note 404 at 232. 
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practice458. Furthermore, as it will be explained, they require treaty interpretation and do not 
guarantee that human rights will be protected.  Therefore, this demonstrates that the rule of law 
requirement of legal certainty is attacked; it is, indeed, difficult to ensure coherence and 
predictability where legal provisions are lacking. It is now necessary to focus on another 
procedural tool that could enable human right discussion in ISDS: amicus curiae. As it will be 
explained they, too, raise legal certainty challenges.  
 
Section 2: Admission of amicus curiae 
 
 Human rights considerations are not common practice in international investment 
arbitration. Recently, Bradlow wrote that “to date, the potential for private parties to bring such 
claims [human rights claims] in the ISDS system has largely gone ignored”459. 
As it has been explained in the previous section, most of the time, human rights are not 
incorporated into the BIT or IIA. However, it is known that investments often have an impact on 
the host state population, amounting to human rights breaches460. When dealing with a case, 
arbitral tribunals are not always aware of the human rights considerations triggered by an 
investment461, especially if they are not brought to their attention by the host state throughout the 
proceedings.  
 
Therefore, in such situations, it is possible for amicus curiae to intervene so as to provide assistance 
to the tribunal in deciding the case.  The amicus curiae briefs will provide information regarding 
the context in which the State has taken the measures impacting the investment462.  
 
 
458 Kube & Petersmann, supra note 17 at 95: “The remaining uncertainties revolving around the jurisdictional clause 
may explain the reluctance of ISDS tribunals to engage in discussions about the concrete human rights obligations of 
the host state and to integrate HRL as a substantive, right-based, constitutional law regime”. 
459 Bradlow, supra note 33 at 357. 
460 Kube & Petersmann, supra note 17 at 86–87: “investment agreement and their enforcement by investment 
arbitration can have severe impacts on the human rights of the host state’s population.” 
461 Shinde, supra note 264 at 55. 
462 Kriebaum, supra note 348 at 332: “[m]ost tribunals have not systematically examined the economic and political 
circumstances prevailing in host states when examining compliance with treaty standards.” 
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An amicus has first been defined through the lens of state tribunals, as a “person who is 
not a party to a lawsuit but … has a strong interest in the subject matter”463. Lamb and others 
propose another definition that suits arbitration proceedings and that states as follow: “a “friend of 
the court”, a person or organisation not a party to the dispute but with a perspective or an interest 
in interjecting from which a court or tribunal might benefit”464. These words must not be taken as 
gospel truth because “[i]n international law, however, no single definition exists for amicus 
curiae”465.  
An ICSID tribunal has proposed a more advanced definition: “[a]n amicus curiae is […] not a 
party to the proceeding […] The traditional role of an amicus curiae in an adversary proceeding is 
to help the decision maker arrive at its decision by providing the decision maker with arguments, 
perspectives, and expertise that the litigating parties may not provide”466.  
Third parties are of different kinds; they do not only include NGOs but also political institutions 
such as the European Commission467. 
 
Amicus curiae can help host state’s populations to have a voice in the arbitration proceeding 
where they have human rights complaints because of investments468. Without such third parties’ 
interventions, “individuals of the host state who may otherwise and legitimately have human rights 
complaints […] do not have autonomous standing before an investment tribunal”469. The fact that 
a State is a party to the proceedings leaves arbitral awards to “affect a significantly broader range 
of actors than the two parties to the disputes”470. 
 
 
463 Bryan A Garner & Henry Campbell Black, eds, Black’s law dictionary, 7th ed ed (St. Paul, Minn: West Group, 
1999). 
464 Sophie Lamb, Daniel Harrison & Hen, “Recent Developments in the Law and Practice of Amicus Briefs in 
Investor-State Arbitration” (2017) 5 Indian J Arb L 72 at 72. 
465 Yen-Chiang Chang, “How Does the Amicus Curiae Submission Affect a Tribunal Decision” (2017) 30:3 Leiden 
J Intl L 647 at 648. 
466 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S,A, and Interagua Servicios Integrales de Agua SA v Argentina 
(Order in Response to a Petition for Participation as Amicus Curiae), [2006] ARB/03/17 at para 13. 
467 Levine, supra note 352 at 209: “While third-party involvement originally centered on NGOs, in recent cases 
more varied amicus curiae have sought intervention rights.” 
468 Kube & Petersmann, supra note 17 at 87. 
469 Farrugia, supra note 329 at 266. 
470 Levine, supra note 352 at 200. 
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Intervention of third parties in ISDS is a late phenomenon471; “[p]rior to 2001, amicus 
participation in international arbitration was unknown”472. Indeed, third parties’ participation was 
found to be relevant for the first time in 2005, in the case of  Methanex v. USA473, in which the 
tribunal declared itself competent to admit amicus curiae’s briefs474. Similarly, in UPS v Canada 
the tribunal admitted third parties’ intervention under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules Article 
15(1)475.  
These first cases opened the doors for amicus curiae’s interventions in investment arbitration and 
they influenced the changes that occurred few years later regarding the procedural rules that aimed 
at facilitating amicus’ intervention.  
 
 Before discussing how amicus curiae are actually dealt with in practice and what the trend 
developed by arbitral jurisprudence regarding their intervention is (sub-section 2), it is necessary 
to have a brief look at the hurdles they must overcome in order reach the gates of arbitration 
tribunals (sub-section 1).  
   
Sub-section 1: The procedural conditions to admit third parties  
 
 This section will focus on the procedural rules developed by the International Center for 
Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID) in 2006, and other recent rules of procedures. The 
changes occurred after several calls for more transparency and democracy in investment 
arbitration476.  
The ICSID also advocated for amendments to the existing provisions, as it can be highlighted in a 
Discussion Paper from the Secretariat: “[t]here may well be cases where the process could be 
 
471 Alexis Mourre, “Are amici curiae the proper response to the public’s concern on transparency in investment 
arbitration?” (2006) 5:2 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 257 at 258: “In the context of 
investment arbitration, amicus curiae have for a long time been quite unheard of”. 
472 Lance Bartholomeusz, “The Amicus Curiae before International Courts and Tribunals” (2005) 5 Non-State 
Actors and International Law 209 at 272. 
473 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, supra note 386; Kube & Petersmann, supra note 17 at 87. 
474 Lamb, Harrison & Hen, supra note 464 at 80. 
475 United Parcel Service of America Inc v Government of Canada (Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions for 
Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae), [2001] UNCT/02/1 at para 73 [UPS v Canada]. 
476 Christina Knahr, “The new rules on participation of non-disputing parties in ICSID arbitration: Blessing or 
curse?” in Chester Brown & Kate Miles, eds, Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011) 319 at 321; Lamb, Harrison & Hen, supra note 464 at 72. 
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strengthened by submissions of third parties, not only civil society organizations but also for 
instance business groups or, in investment treaty arbitration, the other States parties to the treaties 
concerned”477.  
 
ICSID Rules of Arbitration have been changed in 2006 and the new rule 37(2) states as follow: 
“After consulting both parties, the Tribunal may allow a person or entity that is not a party to the 
dispute (in this Rule called the ‘non-disputing party’) to file a written submission with the Tribunal 
regarding a matter within the scope of the dispute […]”478. 
This rule provides that non-disputing parties can make submissions to an investment tribunal. The 
same provisions can be found in article 41(3) of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules 2006.  
The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules were also amended; the new article 4(1) makes it possible to 
accept amicus curiae briefs479. The working group that aimed at introducing such improvements 
declared that third parties’ intervention “could be useful for the arbitral tribunal in resolving the 
dispute and promoted legitimacy of the arbitration process”480, a way to strengthen the rule of law.  
 
 Article 37(2) of the ICSID Rules establishes several conditions that must be met in order 
to accept amicus curiae briefs in an investment arbitration proceeding.  
Fist-of-all, the tribunal must consult both parties; then the submission must be made in writing. 
Nonetheless, the arbitral tribunal has discretion in deciding which form the submission can take: 
oral or written briefs481.  
Article 37(2) requires that the submission assist the tribunal482 and that it addresses “a matter 
within the scope of the dispute”.  
 
477 Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration, by ICSID Secretariat, ICSID Secretariat 
Discussion Paper (2004) at para 13. 
478 Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (ICSID Arbitration Rules), ICSID/15 2006 Rule 37(2). 
479 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (entered into force 1st April 
2014), 2013 article 4(1): “After consultation with the disputing parties, the arbitral tribunal may allow a person that 
is not a disputing party, and not a non-disputing Party to the treaty (‘third person[s]’), to file a written submission 
with the arbitral tribunal regarding a matter within the scope of the dispute.” 
480 Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation), by UNCITRAL, 3rd Sess, UN Doc A/CN.9/712 
(2010) at paras 46–51. 
481 Chang, supra note 465 at 650. 
482 Ibid at 649. 
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The amicus must also have an interest in the case; in other words, the submission must be relevant 
to the case483. The NAFTA Free Trade Commission (FTC) went even further by adding the “public 
interest condition” in the FTC Statement484. It was said that “[t]he FTC Statement was a major 
development in investor-state arbitration”485.  
In other words, it is possible for amicus curiae to be accepted under a substantive law ground: the 
public interest involved in the arbitration486 . It is said that “[b]y their nature, every investment 
arbitration involves an element of public interest since a state is a party and any compensation 
payable to investor claimants is funded by its taxpayers”487.  
For instance, in Biwater Gauff, the tribunal acknowledged that the arbitration “raises a number of 
issues of concern to the wider community in Tanzania”488  and that “the public interest in this 
arbitration arises from its subject-matter”489.   
 
Other investment arbitration institutions contain rules admitting amicus curiae submissions such 
as article 3(3) of SCC Arbitration Rules 2017490; rule 29.3 of the 2017 SIAC Investment Rules491; 
article 25(3) of the 2017 ICC Arbitration Rules492. They all contain, more or less, the same 
requirements to admit amicis in the proceedings.  
 
 In addition to procedural rules that enable third parties’ intervention, there are BITs that 
contain specific provisions regarding amicus curiae submissions. For instance, article 32 of the 
Canada 2014 Model FIPA493; article 28(3) US Model BIT494. Yet, this is not common practice and 
 
483 Ibid. 
484 NAFTA Free Trade Commission’s Statement on Non-disputing Party Participation (2003) at para B(6)(d). 
485 Lamb, Harrison & Hen, supra note 464 at 73. 
486 Reiner & Schreuer, supra note 389 at 91. 
487 Amokura Kawharu, “Part III Chapter 11: Participation of Non-governmental Organizations in Investment 
Arbitration as Amici Curiae” in Michael Waibel, Asha Kaushal & Claire Balchin, eds, The Backlash against 
Investment Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, 2010) 275 at 283. 
488 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v United Republic of Tanzania, [2008] ARB/05/22 at para 358; Biwater Gauff 
(Tanzania) Ltd v United Republic of Tanzania (Procedural Order No 5), [2007] ARB/05/22 at para 73. 
489 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, supra note 488 at para 358; Biwater Gauff 
(Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania (Procedural Order No 5), supra note 488. 
490 Arbitration Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber Of Commerce, 2017 Article 3(3). 
491 Investment Arbitration Rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (1st Edition), 2017 Rule 29.3. 
492 International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Rules, 2017 Article 25(3) . 
493 Agreement between canada and - for the promotion and protection of investments, 2014 Article 32. 
494 2012 US Model BIT, supra note 421 Article 28(3) . 
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most of the BITs do not have provisions on third parties’ participation495. Where such provisions 
are lacking, arbitral tribunals must rely on arbitration rules where applicable.  
 
However, along with the several requirements mentioned earlier, third parties’ submissions 
must not unduly burden or unfairly prejudice the proceedings or a party to the proceedings496. 
Indeed, admitting third parties will “generate additional administrative issues”497, and extend the 
proceedings as parties must respond to their submissions. Arbitrators must find a balance between 
party autonomy and privacy, inherent to ISDS, and broader public policy considerations and third 
parties’ interests498. 
This warning concerning the length of the proceedings is important as, originally, arbitration 
intends to be efficient and quick, by avoiding the recourse to state courts. On the other hand, 
transparency is essential499. 
If the watchword to describe investment arbitration is privacy, “which implies that only directly 
involved parties can participate in the proceedings”500, investment arbitration involves State 
parties, which are public entities, and review their conduct on public matters501. Accepting third 
parties enables transparency as it renders the proceedings more opened and accessible for the 
people502; they must be able to know how public concerns are dealt with503. In addition, 
transparency legitimizes the ISDS system504.   
 
495 Lamb, Harrison & Hen, supra note 464 at 74. 
496 Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (ICSID Arbitration Rules), supra note 478 Rule 37. 
497 Knahr, supra note 476 at 334; Lamb, Harrison & Hen, supra note 464 at 75. 
498 Levine, supra note 352 at 206. 
499 Transparency is Bingham of Cornhill, supra note 3 at 97; Mourre, supra note 471 at 265; note 3. 
500 Mourre, supra note 471 at 258. 
501 Ibid at 265“It is about reviewing governmental conduct. It fundamentally affects the public’s interests”. 
502 Methanex Corporation v United States of America (Decision of the Tribunal on the Petition from Third Persons 
to Intervene as “Amici Curiae”), [2001] UNCITRAL at para 49: “arbitral process could benefit from being 
perceived as more open or transparent; or conversely be harmed if seen as unduly secretive. In this regard, the 
Tribunal’s willingness to receive amicus submissions might support the process in general and this arbitration in 
particular; whereas a blanket refusal could do positive harm”; Aguas Argentinas SA, Suez, Sociedad General de 
Aguas de Barcelona SA and Vivendi Universal SA v Argentina (Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency 
and Participation as Amicus Curiae), [2005] ARB/03/19 at para 22. 
503 Farouk El-Hosseny & Ezequiel H Vetulli, “Amicus Acceptance and Relevance: The Distinctive Example of 
Philip Morris v. Uruguay” (2017) 64 Neth Int Law Rev 73 at 75: “confidentiality has become increasingly untenable 
in public interest-related investment treaty arbitration”. 
504 Aguas Argentinas SA, Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona SA and Vivendi Universal SA v Argentina 
(Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae), supra note 502 at para 22: 
“Public acceptance of the legitimacy of international arbitral processes, particularly when they involve states and 
matters of public interest, is strengthened by increased openness and increased knowledge as to how these processes 
function. It is this imperative that has led to increased transparency in the arbitral processes”. 
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Another important requirement is that amicus curiae must, as far as possible, be 
independent: “[t]he Arbitral Tribunals505 agree with the Claimants’ observation that an NDP 
should also be independent of the Parties. This is implicit in Rule 37(2)(a)”506. This requirement 
has also been upheld in Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe S.A (2006)507.  
This requirement is important as the independence of third parties has been questioned in several 
situations such as in the cases of  Von Pezold v. Zimbabwe508 and Philip Morris v. Uruguay509.  
However, it must be said that “some uncertainty remains as to the extent to which an amicus should 
be “independent” and precisely what this term means”510.  
 
 Some tribunals have acknowledged the helpful work of third parties in the proceedings. 
For example, in Biwater Gauff the arbitral tribunal affirmed that it “has found the Amici’s 
observations useful. Their submissions have informed the analysis of the claims […] and where 
relevant, specific points arising from the Amici’s submissions are returned to in that context”511.  
Similarly, in Glamis Gold it was said that the “Tribunal appreciates the thoughtful submissions 
made by a varied group of interested non-parties”512.  
 
It is true that third parties can bring significant information to the tribunal513. Indeed, “[a]s experts 
within their fields, NGOs often have extensive research capabilities, technical information and 
specialist knowledge on areas outside the competence of either of the parties in dispute”514. Such 
expertise is particularly important for cases raising human rights issues such as water, 
 
505 The plural is used here as the Procedural Order No.2 was rendered for two cases: Bernhard Von Pezold and ors v 
Republic of Zimbabwe (Procedural Order No 2), [2012] ARB/10/15 ; and Border Timbers Limited, Border Timbers 
International (Private) Limited, and Hangani Development Co (Private) Limited v Republic of Zimbabwe 
(Procedural Order No 2), [2012] ARB/10/25 . 
506 Bernhard Von Pezold and ors. v Republic of Zimbabwe (Procedural Order No. 2), supra note 505 at para 49. 
507 Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe SA, Suez, Sociedad 16 General de Aguas de Barcelona SA, and InterAguas 
Servicios Integrales del Agua SA v The Argentine Republic (Order in Response to a Petition for Participation as 
Amicus Curiae), [2006] ARB/03/17  Cl. Obs. Tab 11. 
508 Bernhard Von Pezold and ors v Republic of Zimbabwe, [2015] ARB/10/15 at para 38. 
509 Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products SA and Abal Hermanos SA v Oriental Republic of Uruguay, 
[2016] ARB/10/7 at para 55. 
510 Lamb, Harrison & Hen, supra note 464 at 88. 
511 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, supra note 488 at para 392. 
512 Glamis Gold Ltd v United States of America, [2009] UNCITRAL at para 8. 
513 Knahr, supra note 476 at 335. 
514 Ibid. 
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environment, health where the arbitral tribunals could ignore the relevance of those questions in 
the proceedings. In Philip Morris v. Uruguay, the tribunal stated that “in view of the public interest 
in the case, granting the [applications] would support the transparency of the proceedings and its 
acceptability by users at large”515 and that it required “particular knowledge and expertise of […] 
qualified entities”516, which were World Health Organisation and the Pan American Health 
Organisation in the case. 
 
 Now that the major rules regarding third parties’ admission in arbitration proceedings have 
been discussed, it is necessary to look at how arbitral tribunals have actually dealt with them.  
 
 
Sub-section 2: Amicus curiae in the practice of investment arbitration  
 
 
 As it has been said, there was no mention of third parties’ participation in ICSID rules 
before 2006, and such amendments to the rules stem from arbitral practice517. As a consequence 
of the procedural rules’ changes, there has been an increase of amicus curiae participation in ISDS 
after 2006518.   
Some third parties, such as in Aguas del Tunari519, have argued that the right to a fair trial520 was 
procedurally legitimizing their intervention. However, because they are not directly parties to the 
proceedings, “[i]t is doubtful whether the right to a fair trial is suitable to promote amicus curiae 
submissions”521.  
Except the ICSID arbitration case of Aguas del Tunari (2005), where the petition for amicus 
submission was rejected, the following jurisprudence will focus on the cases involving third parties 
after 2006. Nonetheless, Aguas del Tunari is the first case where a third party made an application 
 
515 Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products SA and Abal Hermanos SA v Oriental Republic of Uruguay 
(Procedural Order No 3), [2015] ARB/10/7 at paras 28–29. 
516 Ibid. 
517 Knahr, supra note 476 at 320; Mourre, supra note 471. 
518 Knahr, supra note 476 at 323. 
519 Aguas del Tunari SA v Bolivia (NGO Petition to Participate as Amici Curiae), [2002] ARB/02/3 at paras 47, 48. 
520 ICCPR, supra note 169 Article 14. 
521 Reiner & Schreuer, supra note 389 at 91. 
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before an ICSID Tribunal. In this case, the "tribunal rejected requests from various NGOs and 
individuals to file amicus briefs because the disputing parties had not consented, the amicus briefs 
were unnecessary and the requests were beyond the tribunal’s power and authority to grant”522. In 
addition, the proceedings occurred before ICSID arbitration rules were changed, so at that time, 
the ICSID rules did not foresee third party participation523.   
Even though the tribunal denied the request, this case enabled to highlight that investment 
arbitration can have a public dimension and influenced changes in ICSID rules524. 
 It must be said that “NGOs attempted to participate as amicus curiae in several cases”525 
but they have not always been successful. Amicus curiae’s submissions seem to be relevant 
particularly when economic, social and cultural rights are concerned, such health, water, 
environment, as arbitrators may not be expert in the field and do not have information about the 
local populations’ complaints. In the case of Suez/Vivendi (previously named Aguas Argentina), 
the tribunal said that:   
 
Courts have traditionally accepted the intervention of amicus curiae in ostensibly private 
litigation because those cases have involved issues of public interest and because decisions in 
those cases have the potential, directly or indirectly, to affect persons beyond those 
immediately involved as parties in the case.526 
 
The Biwater Gauff case is the first where amicus curiae was authorised under the new 
ICSID rule 37(2)527. The public interest involved by the case was important, as acknowledged by 
 
522 Lamb, Harrison & Hen, supra note 464 at 80. 
523 Kube & Petersmann, supra note 17 at 84. 
524 Heather Bray, “ICSID and the Right to Water: An Ingredient in the Stone Soup” (2014) 29:2 ICSID Review 474 
at 478. 
525 Knahr, supra note 476 at 321; Aguas Argentinas SA, Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona SA and 
Vivendi Universal SA v Argentina (Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus 
Curiae), supra note 502; Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe S.A., Suez, Sociedad 16 General de Aguas de Barcelona 
S.A., and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v. The Argentine Republic (Order in Response to a Petition 
for Participation as Amicus Curiae), supra note 507. 
526 Aguas Argentinas SA, Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona SA and Vivendi Universal SA v Argentina 
(Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae), supra note 502 at para 16. 
527 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, supra note 488 at paras 59, 62. 
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the tribunal528, and there was a lot of mediatisation surrounding the case. Five NGOs have 
petitioned to participate in the proceedings, bringing experts in human rights and environmental 
issues. Nonetheless, the tribunal refused their attendance to oral hearings and access to key 
documents but accepted written submissions529. The new ICSID rule 37(2)530 enabled third parties’ 
participation even though the investor was against it531. This demonstrates the usefulness of the 
new rules.  
In Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fé, concerning water services and sewage systems, the tribunal 
acknowledged the human rights law dimension and the public interest of the case, and that it 
justifies the acceptance of amicus curiae’s submissions532. 
Amicus curiae’s participation was also admitted in the case of Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija 
SA and Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic533, where access to water issues were raised. The 
arbitral tribunal said that it had authority to admit third parties’ submissions so it enabled joint 
briefs prepared by five NGOs.  
 
The Glamis Gold case534, decided under NAFTA rules, is also famous for the third party’s 
intervention coming from the Quechan Indian Nation, expressing their views on the indigenous 
rights violations committed by the investor535. The tribunal admitted that “the submission satisfied 
the principles of the Free Trade Commission’s Statement on non-disputing party participation”536.  
 
 
528 Ibid at para 147. 
529 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania (Procedural Order No 5), supra note 488 at para 
50. 
530 Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (ICSID Arbitration Rules), supra note 478. 
531 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, supra note 488 at para 356. 
532 Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe S.A., Suez, Sociedad 16 General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and InterAguas 
Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v. The Argentine Republic (Order in Response to a Petition for Participation as 
Amicus Curiae), supra note 507 at para 18. 
533 Compania de Aguas del Aconquija SA and Vivendi Universal v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No, [2007] 
ARB/97/3 . 
534 Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, supra note 512. 
535 Application For Leave To File A Non-Party Submission Glamis Gold Ltd. v United States Of America: 
Submission Of The Quechan Indian Nation (2005); Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, supra note 512 at 
paras 268, 270, 273–274, 282. 
536 Glamis Gold v United States (Decision on Application and Submission by Quechan Indian Nation), [2005] 
UNCITRAL at para 10. 
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In the discontinued case of Piero Foresti et al v. South Africa, commentaries from third party, the 
International Commission of Jurists, was admitted concerning, amongst other things, the apartheid 
regime537. 
 
In the Suez/Vivendi case538, the amicus curiae raised “a causal link between Argentina’s measures 
during the financial crisis and its obligation to ensure that its population’s right to water is 
protected”539 and the tribunal acknowledged the existence of such concerns540. Therefore, amicus 
curiae briefs  were admitted even if investors were against it.  
 
In Pac Rim Cayman, the tribunal authorised third parties’ submissions541. However, the tribunal 
did not consider the argument of the third party. Indeed, the parties did not consent to accept 
CIEL’s factual evidence nor their participation to the hearings. Furthermore, “the Tribunal’s 
decisions in this Award do not require the Tribunal specifically to consider the legal case advanced 
by CIEL”542. For those reasons, “in the circumstances, it would be inappropriate for the Tribunal 
to do so”543.  
 
In Philip Morris v Uruguay, amicus curiae’s submissions from the WHO, the PAHO, and WHO 
FCTC were accepted544 to deal with right to health questions. The tribunal acknowledged that 
“granting the request would support the transparency of the proceeding and its acceptability by 
users at large”545. These comments highlight the concern of arbitrators for the rule of law.  
 
537 Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli & Others v The Republic of South Africa, [2010] ARB(AF)/07/1 at paras 25–29 
[Piero Foresti v South Africa]. 
538 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona SA, and Vivendi Universal SA  v The Argentine Republic, [2015] 
ARB/03/19 . 
539 Bray, supra note 524 at 482. 
540 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona SA, and Vivendi Universal SA  v The Argentine Republic 
(Decision on Liability), [2010] ARB/03/19 at para 28: “a situation that raised concern in the public and the press 
with respect to the health and safety of the population.” 
541 Pac Rim Cayman LLC v The Republic of El Salvador, [2016] ARB/09/12 at para 1.24, 3.28 and others. 
542 Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. The Republic of El Salvador, supra note 541 at para 3.30. 
543 Ibid at para 3.30. 
544 Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of 
Uruguay, supra note 509 at paras 38–46. 
545 Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products SA and Abal Hermanos SA v Oriental Republic of Uruguay 
(Procedural Order No 4), [2015] ARB/10/7 at para 30. 
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In this case, amicus curiae had a strong influence on the decision rendered by the tribunal546. 
Arbitrators made extensive references to third parties’ briefs to discuss several points, from 
tobacco’s health impacts to Uruguay’s obligations towards health547. More importantly, the 
tribunal referred to WHO/PAHO submissions to find that the measure taken by Uruguay were 
necessary to protect its population’s health, and did not amount to expropriation548. Here, amicus 
curiae clearly influenced the legal analysis of the tribunal549.   
 
Recently, an amicus curiae brief was authorised in Infinito Gold v. Costa Rica550, raising 
environmental rights issues. The case is still pending and it remains to be seen whether their 
intervention will have an impact on the tribunal.  
 
On the contrary, in Von Pezold v. Zimbabwe, when human rights issues were raised and 
the ICSID Arbitration Rules were applied to the case, the amicus curiae’s interventions were 
refused551. In the Von Pezold award, Kube and Petersmann comment that “the tribunal saw the 
human rights relevance but was insecure how to engage specifically with arguments raised only 
by third parties”552. Similarly in Chevron v Ecuador, amicus curiae were not admitted as the parties 
refused to grant them permission to make submissions553. Both parties argued that the brief would 
not be “helpful” to the tribunal554 and irrelevant during the jurisdictional stage which concerns 
legal issues555. Chevron and Ecuador explained that, in determining the tribunal’s jurisdiction, it 
was not relevant to admit EartRight International’s brief556.  
 
546 Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of 
Uruguay, supra note 509 at paras 391, 393–394. 
547 Ibid at paras 74–75, 138, 141, 306, 391, 393, 407; El-Hosseny & Vetulli, supra note 503 at 90: “The tribunal 
repeatedly cited in its award the amici’s briefs (over 21 times)”. 
548 Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of 
Uruguay, supra note 509 at paras 306–307. 
549 El-Hosseny & Vetulli, supra note 503 at 91. 
550 Infinito Gold Ltd v Republic of Costa Rica (Procedural Order No 2), [2016] ARB/14/5 [Infinito Gold v Costa 
Rica]. 
551 Bernhard Von Pezold and ors. v Republic of Zimbabwe, supra note 508 at para 38; Bernhard Von Pezold and ors. 
v Republic of Zimbabwe (Procedural Order No. 2), supra note 505. 
552 Kube & Petersmann, supra note 17 at 90. 
553 Chevron Corporation (USA) v The Republic of Ecuador (Procedural Order No 8), [2011] UNCITRAL PCA 
Case No 2009-23 . 
554 Ibid at paras 18, 12. 
555 Ibid at paras 18, 13. 
556 Ibid at paras 13–14. 
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In both, Von Pezold and Chevron third parties’ participation was refused whereas there was a lot 
of media pressure and public protests regarding the human rights involved557. 
 
In the recent environmental case of Gabriel Resources v Romania558, third parties (Alburnus 
Maior, Greenpeace CEE, Romania and Independent Centre for the Development of Environmental 
Resources (ICDER)) sought to intervene as amicus curiae559. The tribunal admitted that it “enjoys 
a degree of discretion”560 in admitting the submissions, even if opposed by one party.  
However, the arbitrators explained that the submission did not provide an additional useful 
expertise on top of provided by the parties561 but could bring factual expertise562. Applications for 
participation of all third parties were authorised but to a very limited extent563. They could observe 
the hearing, without participation564; they could only refer to factual questions but could not raise 
any legal arguments, nor rely on testimonies565. 
 
If a “greater tolerance of limited third party-participation” has been noticed a few years 
ago566, it seems that the trend is recently changing with the cases of Von Pezold, Chevron and 
Gabriel Resources. Today, it seems that the state of the jurisprudence regarding third parties’ 
intervention in situations where there are human rights complaints, lacks coherence. The admission 
of third parties is rather inconsistent and this raises concerns regarding legal certainty.  
 
Before concluding on this section, it should be noticed that while amicus brief may have 
an informative or persuasive value, arbitral tribunals are not bound to consider them567. 
 
557 Kube & Petersmann, supra note 17 at 89–90. 
558 Gabriel Resources Ltd and Gabriel Resources (Jersey) Ltd v Romania (Procedural Order No 19), [2018] 
ARB/15/31 at paras 17–23: The investor sought to build an open-pit gold mine using cyanide in a dense population 
area. It is argued that this practice would have serious impacts on health and the environment. It would also imply 
the displacement of entire communities and destruction of cultural heritage. 
559 Ibid at para 11. 
560 Ibid at para 50. 
561 Ibid at para 60: “the Tribunal has serious doubts as to whether the Applicants will assist the Tribunal ‘by bringing 
a perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is different from that of the disputing parties.’” . 
562 Ibid: “do have a particular knowledge of factual issues relevant to this dispute that may assist the Tribunal”. 
563 Ibid at para 75. 
564 Ibid at para 75.2. 
565 Ibid at para 75.1(b). 
566 Levine, supra note 352 at 208. 
567 Knahr, supra note 476 at 335: "(“tribunal are certainly under no obligation to follow the arguments presented in 
amicus curiae briefs, they may still take them into consideration and this could potential lead to better-informed 
decisions.” . 
 97 
The absence of an obligation to consider amicus curiae’s briefs leads to an absence of coherence 
as to whether an arbitral tribunal will be influenced by their arguments or not568. In other words, 
arbitrators have the discretionary power to consider amicus submissions. Such a fact was 
highlighted in the Pac Rim Cayman v El Salvador569 decision: “Tribunal’s decisions in this Award 
do not require the Tribunal specifically to consider the legal case advanced by CIEL”570.  
 
Some say that the consequence of this lack of consideration is that if the dispute is resolved 
in favour of the investor, the award “may threaten the public interest, for example, by increasing 
the cost of public welfare regulation or the operation of public services.”571 Similarly, Schadendorf 
is of the opinion that “[h]uman rights arguments provided by amici, sometimes detailed and well-
founded were not observably employed by the tribunals in support of their findings and sometimes 
even explicitly ignored”572.  
It is said that “tribunals have been influenced to some degree by amicus briefs but that they have 
refrained from making express reference to amicus briefs in their awards”573. In light of recent 
cases involving human rights considerations with due consideration to amicis’ intervention, it 
remains to be seen what the receptiveness of arbitral tribunals towards third parties’ intervention 
in the future, will be.  
 
It is hard to assess what the real impact of amicus curiae submissions on the arbitrators’ reasoning 
actually is574, as some awards mention while others don’t and because not all cases are publicly 
available. In Biwater Gauff575 the arbitral tribunal recognised the public interest question affecting 
the proceedings (right to water) and the usefulness of amici’s submissions576, but it did not make 
any further mentions of the human right to water, “nor any discussion of the of the consequences 
 
568 Kawharu, supra note 487 at 280–295. 
569 Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. The Republic of El Salvador, supra note 541. 
570 Ibid at para 3.30. 
571 Kawharu, supra note 487 at 284. 
572 Sarah Schadendorf, “Human Rights Arguments in Amicus Curiae Submissions: Analysis of ICSID and NAFTA 
Investor-State Arbitration” (2013) 10:1 Transnational Dispute Management; Eric de Brabandere, “Human Rights 
Considerations in International Investment Arbitration” in Malgosia Fitzmaurice & Panos Merkouris, eds, The 
Interpretation and Application of the European Convention of Human Rights: Legal and Practical Implications 
Queen Mary Studies in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 2012) 183. 
573 Lamb, Harrison & Hen, supra note 464 at 86. 
574 Ibid at 85: “It is difficult to measure directly the influence of amicus briefs on the determinations of tribunals.". 
575 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, supra note 488. 
576 Ibid at para 392: “the Arbitral Tribunal has found the Amici’s observations useful.” . 
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of such a right for investment law”577. In Philip Morris578, it has been said that the third parties 





This sub-section aimed at demonstrating that amicus curiae participation could lead 
arbitrators to deal with human rights and “contribute to the popular acceptance and legal coherence 
of investor-state dispute settlement”581. However, the practice demonstrates that their admission is 
far from being regular, coherent and certain. Indeed, “[a]rbitral practice has shown that the 
adoption of the new rules on participation of non-disputing parties in 2006 has not led to a situation 
where non-disputing parties have become ‘regulars’ in investment arbitrations”582. Considering 
the diverging positions of arbitral tribunals regarding amicus curiae participation, it can be said 
that “[t]here is no consistent practice and no clear guidance as to what role amici arguments should 
play in the judicial decision-making”583.  
It is true that  “NGOs are indeed increasingly being granted amicus curiae status in investor-State 
arbitration proceedings, but this is by no means an automatic right”584. In addition, the 
“participation rights of third parties remain extremely limited”585.  
 
The consequence of this irregularity and incoherence is that there is no possibility to 
evaluate the length, costs and outcome of proceedings if there is no legal certainty on amicus’ 
participation. The words of Levine written almost ten years ago, are still relevant today: “the 
current institutional and practical approach to amicus intervention in investment arbitration can be 
categorized as discretionary and largely not formalized”586. Such situation does not promote the 
 
577 Truswell, supra note 242 at 582. 
578 Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of 
Uruguay, supra note 509. 
579 Ibid at paras 306–307. 
580 El-Hosseny & Vetulli, supra note 503 at 91. 
581 Kawharu, supra note 487 at 295. 
582 Knahr, supra note 476 at 337. 
583 Kube & Petersmann, supra note 17 at 91. 
584 Dumberry & Dumas-Aubin, supra note 394 at 371. 
585 Levine, supra note 352 at 214. 
586 Ibid. 
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rule of law, supposed to govern any dispute resolution mechanisms, which aims at ensuring a 
certain formalism, coherence and legal certainty.  
 
The next will discuss how human rights issues can be brought to the attention of the tribunal 
by the host state. The mechanisms available will be studied and an analysis of the awards rendered 
will enable to understand whether there is legal certainty in the admission of such claims. 
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Section 3: The host state’s objections: human rights as a defence or 
counterclaim 
 
 In international investment law, where a dispute587 between the host state and the investor 
arises, the later has the possibility to bring a claim before an arbitral tribunal. It is a one-way action 
whereby “the claims always go in one direction, from the investor to the host state”588. The investor 
can either invoke a treaty claim or a contract claim. Farrugia writes that “the jurisdictional limits 
of an investment tribunal empower it only to decide on issues brought by ‘investors’ […] relating 
(either directly or indirectly) to an ‘investment’ (defined by the relevant treaty)”.589   
 
Consequently, it is impossible for a host state to bring a claim against an investor, particularly for 
breaches of human rights obligations590. This means that the state must find another way to raise 
these issues before an arbitral tribunal. This is of importance as  “one of the state’s primary 
functions is to protect its citizens from rights violations by third parties, and it has been commented 
that ‘privatisation of essential goods and services does not mean privatization of international 
responsibility’”591 . Given this obligation imposed on the state, it is necessary that it be allowed to 
raise issues where an international investment agreement, or a BIT has been violated. As a 
respondent in an arbitration case, the host case “could raise human rights arguments to justify its 
own actions taken against a claimant investor”592. 
 
Among the thirty-five available awards mentioning human rights dealt with in this paper, 
socio-economic rights considerations were brought to the attention of the arbitral tribunal by the 
host state twenty-eight times. To do so, the host state mentioned human rights in their pleadings, 
without really emphasising them. These cases will not be discussed in detail in the section below. 
 
587 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v UK), [1924] PCIJ (ser B) No 3 at para I.19: “disagreement on a 
point of law or fact, conflict of legal views or of interests between two persons”. 
588 Ishakawa, supra note 248 at 33. 
589 Farrugia, supra note 329 at 266. 
590 Lo, supra note 331 at 11: “Thus if it arises that a foreign investor is infringing human rights of local people 
through investment activities, the host State does not have a position to bring arbitration claim under investor-State 
arbitration based on such violation”. 
591 Farrugia, supra note 329 at 266; Fabrizio Marrella, “The Human Right to Water and ICSID Arbitration: Two 
Side of a Same Coin or an Example of Fragmentation of International Law” (2011) II Current Issue of Public 
International Law 11 at 24. 
592 Dumberry & Dumas-Aubin, supra note 394 at 360. 
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However, in other instances, host states used human rights as a defence (sub-section 1) or asserted 
a counterclaim (sub-section 2).  
 
 
Sub-Section 1: Human rights as a defence for host states 
 
As it has been explained, it is not possible for a host State to bring a claim against an 
investor for breaches of international human rights law obligations. Therefore, one of the ways to 
consider human rights breaches is to raise it as a defence593. In this scenario, the host State tries to 
justify that the measures taken were necessary to protect its population’s human rights and to 
comply with its constitutional and international law obligations594.  
 
Most of the time, host State raised the necessity defence, arguing that human rights 
considerations would prevail over the BIT obligations595. The 2009 United Nations report notices 
that “human rights arguments raised by government in defence of alleged IIA breaches […] 
appears to be an emerging trend”596. 
 
The plea of necessity has mostly been invoked by Argentina in the arbitration proceedings brought 
after the financial crisis it faced in 2001-2002, known to be the worst economic and social crisis 
in the country597. Argentina used such arguments to justify the emergency measures taken 
regarding the protection of the right to water and right to health, at the expense of its BITs 
obligations. Argentina argued that its measures were necessary to protect the public order and 
 
593 Lo, supra note 331 at 15: There are “situations where human rights law is relevant for the host States to defend 
their measures or policies against possible allegations by foreign investors.” 
594 UNCTAD Report 2009, note 367 at 8; Kube & Petersmann, supra note 17 at 89. 
595 Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena SA v Republic of Costa Rica (Final Award), [2000] ARB/96/1 ; 
Tecmed, supra note 386; CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentina, [2005] ARB/01/8 ; Azurix Corp v The 
Argentine Republic, [2006] ARB/01/12 ; Siemens AG v The Argentine Republic, [2007] ARB/02/8 ; Sempra Energy 
International v The Argentine Republic, supra note 336; Compania de Aguas del Aconquija SA and Vivendi 
Universal v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No., supra note 533; Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic 
of Tanzania, supra note 488; Impregilo SpA v Argentine Republic, [2011] ARB/07/17 ; SAUR International SA c 
République Argentine, [2012] ARB/04/4 . 
596 UNCTAD Report 2009, note 367 at 8. 
597 Azurix Corp. v The Argentine Republic, supra note 595 at para 400. 
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guarantee security598 because it was in a state of emergency599. As explained in the case of EDF v 
Argentina, “the Emergency Tariff Measures guaranteed free enjoyment of certain basic human 
rights such as life, health, personal integrity and education, which were directly threatened by the 
socio-economic crisis suffered by Argentina”600.  
As a consequence of an emergency situation, “[t]he investor’s expectations must be balanced 
against the host state’s needs to take action in the public interest at a time of crisis”601. In practice, 
there are several cases where Argentina’s laudable measures did not justify its violation of the BIT 
obligations.  
 
Indeed, defences raised for the protection of human rights by a host State are dealt with in 
an incoherent manner by arbitral tribunals, especially in cases involving Argentina. There are few 
cases were arbitral tribunals have accepted the necessity defence as in Continental casualty v. 
Argentina602 and LG&E Energy Corp and others v. Argentine Republic603.  
 
On the opposite, there are examples where the arbitral tribunal refused Argentina’s defence 
based on necessity and human rights considerations, to justify governmental measures.   
In the case of CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina604, Argentina raised human rights 
protection as a defence to justify the interferences with the Argentina-United State BIT. It argued 
that the “economic and social crisis that affected the country compromised basic human rights”605. 
However, the tribunal rejected the defence raised.606   
 
Another example is Azurix case, where water and sewage concession contracts were granted to the 
investor. Argentina sought to rely on the protection of human rights to justify the measures taken 
against the investor. The tribunal refused those arguments because they were not well justified nor 
 
598 Burke-White, supra note 347 at 413. 
599 Ibid at 415. 
600 EDF International SA, SAUR International SA and León Participaciones Argentinas SA v Argentine Republic, 
[2012] ARB/03/23 at para 910. 
601 Ibid at para 1005. 
602 Continental casualty v Argentina (Award), [2008] ARB/03/9 . 
603 LG&E Energy Corp and others v Argentine Republic (Decision on Liability), [2006] ARB/01/1 . 
604 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina, supra note 595. 
605 Ibid at para 114. 
606 Ibid at para 121. 
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argued by the host State. Therefore, the tribunal failed to understand whether there were actual 
incompatibilities between the BIT and human rights treaties.607  
 
In the case of Sempra v. Argentina the arbitral tribunal refused to apply the defense raised by the 
state608 and refused to admit that the constitutional order during the crisis was in danger, even 
though an expert confirmed Argentina’s obligations to maintain a constitutional order under the 
American Convention on Human Rights609. The tribunal nonetheless recognised the important 
human rights questions at stake610. 
 
Similarly in Impregilo SpA, the defence of necessity was raised by Argentina to justify the 
emergency measures taken for the human rights protection of its population. Such defence was 
refused by the tribunal611.  
 
Other host States have raised the necessity defence, facing times of crisis. Same holdings were 
rendered in Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica612 and 
Técnicas Medioambiantales TECMED, S.A. v. The United Mexican States613. In those cases, the 
tribunal recognised that the reasons behind the measures were legitimate according to the State, 
but not relevant to assess potential BIT breaches. In Biwater Gauff v Tanzania, the host State raised 
as a defence the threat to welfare in a time of crisis614, but it was rejected by the tribunal.  
 
 The decisions rendered in Argentina cases is particularly interesting. Indeed, all cases 
involved the same factual conditions, i.e. Argentina and the financial crisis, and often concerned 
the same human rights, i.e. health and water. Nevertheless, outcomes managed to be contradictory. 
It is right to affirm that “arbitrators have differed sharply as to the weight to be accorded to this 
 
607 Azurix Corp. v The Argentine Republic, supra note 595 at 261. 
608 Sempra Energy International v The Argentine Republic, supra note 336 at para 355. 
609 Ibid at para 332. 
610 Ibid: “this debate raises the complex relationship between investment treaties, emergency and the human rights of 
both citizens and property owners”. 
611 Impregilo SpA. v Argentine Republic, supra note 595 at paras 353, 359. 
612 Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica (Final Award), supra note 595 at para 
72. 
613 Tecmed, supra note 386 at para 120. 
614 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, supra note 488 at paras 434, 436. 
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generalised human rights defence by Argentina”615. In other words, while similar defences are 
raised, they are sometimes accepted, sometimes discarded. The contradictory findings in situations 
where similar facts are raised, cause concerns regarding the coherence of the jurisprudence 
developed by arbitral tribunals as well as concerns about legal certainty. It is also impossible for 
the host state and the investor to predict a possible outcome.  
 
In addition to the reluctance regarding the acceptance of human rights defence, there are several 
instances, where the arbitral tribunals have refused the defence of necessity by saying that the host 
State arguments based on human rights, were too weak and not sufficiently developed to justify 
the necessity defence616.  As Kulick explains, “[t]his murky and cryptic reference to broad human 
rights considerations appears to be somewhat of a pattern in Argentina’s argumentation in several 
disputes involving the 2001-02 financial crisis”617. Perhaps the fact that a developing state is 
involved has an impact on the weakness of arguments.  
 
Consequently, it can be seen that Argentina and other states often tried to bring the human 
rights’ protection defence in order to justify emergency measures that impacted investors and BITs 
obligations618. “This line of argument has stressed the need to protect the human rights of citizens 
by ensuring basic order and/or access to those services which are instrumental to public health and 
welfare”619 . However, there is also an incoherence when human rights arguments are raised as a 
defence by the host State; “[s]o far, tribunals did not seem to pay specific attention to the states' 
duty to mitigate and counteract threats for the human rights of populations suffering under an 
economic crisis.”620 It can be affirmed that “arbitrators have taken sharply different views when 
confronted with this generalized human rights defence”621. They often have refused to admit 
justifications for the protection of human rights. The incoherence of the jurisprudence in terms of 
defence raised by host states as well as poor human rights protection undermine the rule of law. It 
 
615 UNCTAD Report 2009, note 367 at 9. 
616 Azurix Corp. v The Argentine Republic, supra note 595; Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic, supra note 595. 
617 Andreas Kulick, Global public interest in international investment law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012) at 278. 
618 Kube & Petersmann, supra note 17 at 80. 
619 UNCTAD Report 2009, note 367 at 8. 
620 Kube & Petersmann, supra note 17 at 84. 
621 UNCTAD Report 2009, note 367 at 5. 
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is dubious whether the investment arbitration regime bolsters human rights and legal certainty, two 
core elements of the rule of law.  
 
 The use of defence mechanism to bring human rights considerations into ISDS has been 
discussed and seems to be unsuccessful most of the time. It is now the time to consider the other 
mechanism available to the host State: the counterclaim.  
 
 
Sub-section 2: Difficulty to accept counterclaims based on human rights  
 
 During the proceedings, it is possible for a host state to make a counterclaim, but this 
possibility only exists for treaty claims. Not only does it work only for treaty claims but there must 
be an initiated arbitration proceeding. Therefore, if there is no undergoing arbitration proceeding, 
the state cannot address the human rights breaches from its own will. This is problematic as there 
is no other way for the State to sue the investor for treaty breaches, where the later has violated 
human rights provisions contained in the BITs. Admission of counterclaims is a recent 
phenomenon where human rights are concerned622. 
 
There are a few cases where the host states have used such a mechanism against the investor, where 
they had infringed their human or environmental rights commitments. The case having authority 
regarding counterclaims admission is Saluka Investments BV v Czech Republic623. Counterclaims 
can be admitted “where the arbitration clause is sufficiently broad and the rules/convention 
governing the arbitration contemplated counterclaims”624.   
However, Reiner notices that “invocations of human rights obligations by host states have been 
met with little enthusiasm”625.  
 
 
622 Elena Burova, “Jurisdiction of Investment Tribunals Over Host States’ Counterclaims: Wind of Change?”, (6 
March 2017), online: Kluwer Arbitration Blog. 
623 Saluka Investments BV v The Czech Republic, [2006] UNCITRAL . 
624 Farrugia, supra note 329 at 282. 
625 Reiner & Schreuer, supra note 389 at 90. 
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There are three recent cases where counterclaims were used. In the case of Urbaser626, 
Argentina made a counterclaim by alleging that Urbaser failed “to provide the necessary 
investment into the [water] Concession, thus violating its commitments and obligations under 
international law based on the human right to water”627. The tribunal established that it had 
jurisdiction to hear the counterclaim after interpreting Article X(1) of the Spain-Argentina BIT628. 
It is the first time that an investment tribunal recognises its jurisdiction over human rights 
counterclaims629. In this case, Argentina was not successful in its counterclaim.  
In the case of Burlington v. Ecuador630, Ecuador brought two types of counterclaims, among which 
one concerned environmental right, because of soil contamination by the investor. First, the 
tribunal found itself to have jurisdiction over the counterclaim, which is rare631. Furthermore, 
based on Ecuador’s Constitution of 2008, environmental harm is a strict liability offence and the 
investor was obliged to pay compensation for that632. Therefore, both Ecuador’s counterclaims 
were successful.  
The outcome of the counterclaim is laudable regarding human and environmental rights, as most 
of the time, counterclaims do not succeed on the merits633. This is an example of how procedural 
rules of ISDS could be used to protect human rights and hold investors accountable for their 
actions.  
 
In the case of David Aven634, Costa Rica submitted a counterclaim for the environmental damages 
caused by the investor for the building of tourist facilities. The tribunal admitted jurisdiction for 
 
626 Urbaser SA and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia Ur Partzuergoa v The Argentine Republic, [2016] 
ARB/07/26 . 
627 Ibid at para 36. 
628 Ibid at para 1143. 
629 Edward Guntrip, “Urbaser v Argentina: The Origins of a Host State Human Rights Counterclaim in ICSID 
Arbitration?”, (10 February 2017), online: EJIL: Talk! <https://www.ejiltalk.org/urbaser-v-argentina-the-origins-of-
a-host-state-human-rights-counterclaim-in-icsid-arbitration/>. 
630 Burlington Resources Inc v Republic of Ecuador (Decision on Ecuador’s Counterclaims), [2017] ARB/08/5 . 
631 Farrugia, supra note 329 at 281: "only a handful of cases exist, in published form, to give insight into the 
mechanics of how a tribunal handles state-initiated counterclaims”; Anne K Hoffmann, “Counterclaims in 
Investment Arbitration” (2013) 28:2 ICSID Review 438 at 452; Eric de Brabandere, “Human Rights Counterclaims 
in Investment Treaty Arbitration” (2018) Revue Belge de Droit International (Grotius Centre) . 
632 Burlington Resources Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador (Decision on Ecuador’s Counterclaims), supra note 630 at 
para 1075. 
633 Ishakawa, supra note 248 at 37. 
634 David R. Aven and Others v. Republic of Costa Rica, supra note 423. 
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Costa Rica’s counterclaim635, under CAFTA-DR. However, the tribunal decided that it was 
inadmissible as lacking evidence from Costa Rica636.  
 
It is important to note that counterclaims are not brought on an automatic basis by host 
states and there is no obligation for them to use counterclaims to abide by their duty of protecting 
their population against private entities human rights violations.637  
 
It can be seen that the recent practice of investment tribunals is more favorable towards 
counterclaims; “[t]he award in Urbaser v Argentina does create a precedent for a host state human 
rights counterclaim”638. The mention of “precedent” is of importance as it suggests the 
development of a trend to admit counterclaims which would bring coherence in the matter and 
improve legal certainty. Indeed, “Urbaser makes its contributions where human rights enter 
investment disputes as an element of the state’s claims or defenses against the investor, as opposed 
to the investor’s claims against the state”639.  
The thoughts of Reiner and Schreuer expressed earlier640 need to be reconsidered in light of the 
recent evolution in the practice of counterclaims. As Farrugia puts it, “[t]hese tentative steps 
towards the admission, rather than rejection of counterclaims have interesting implications for 
human rights”641 especially if the BIT contains water or environmental provisions, or says to 
comply to domestic law. Such elements could be used as a legal basis for authorising more 
counterclaims in ISDS. Ishakawa promotes the use of counterclaims when saying that it is a 
mechanism by which “host states could try to hold investors liable for any damage allegedly caused 
with respect to the investment.”642 
 
Nonetheless, there are still hurdles to go through in order to have a counterclaim admitted 
by an investment arbitration tribunal. As Cazala puts it, “il sera difficile pour l’État de présenter 
 
635 Ibid at para 742. 
636 Ibid at para 747. 
637 Ishakawa, supra note 248 at 36. 
638 Guntrip, supra note 629. 
639 David Attanasio & Tatiana Sainati, “International dispute settlement–investment arbitration–fair and equitable 
treatment–corporations as subjects of international law–human right to water and sanitation–rights and obligations 
of investors” (2017) 111:3 The American Journal of International Law 744 at 746. 
640 Reiner & Schreuer, supra note 389 at 90. 
641 Farrugia, supra note 329 at 282. 
642 Ishakawa, supra note 248 at 35. 
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devant un tribunal arbitral d’investissement, une demande reconventionnelle portant sur des 
allégations de violations de droits de l’homme par l’investisseur"643. This is so because the position 
of arbitration tribunals regarding states’ counterclaims is very strict; “il est le plus souvent exigé 
que la demande reconventionnelle entretienne avec la demande principale un lien indivisible »644. 
The cases of Urbaser645 and Burlington646 show an improvement in the matter, as there is a 
departure in both cases from the strict interpretation of the connection criterion647.  But, once the 
counterclaim is admitted, it does not mean that it will be successful. The host state will have to 
prove its allegations. There is no guarantee that the investor will be found liable for human rights 
breaches and forced to pay damages. In light of the state of the law regarding counterclaims, even 
if there have been recent improvements in practice, E. Gaillard is calling for a modification of the 
BIT to facilitate the use of counterclaims by the State party.648 
 
Thus, evolution can be observed in the admission of counterclaims by investment tribunals, 
in cases raising human rights issues. Reiner notices that “[t]hese awards seem to indicate the 
tribunals’ reluctance to take up matters concerning human rights, preferring to dismiss the issues 
raised on a procedural basis rather than dealing with the substantive arguments themselves”649. 
This uncertainty as to how and when counterclaims will be admitted by an investment arbitration 
tribunal threatens the rule of law, and the coherence and predictability that it supposes to guarantee. 
Such positive observations cannot be noticed regarding defence mechanisms based on human 
rights, as there is an important incoherence as to their admission. Furthermore, they are very often 
unsuccessful, which does not help to improve the human rights violation’s situation.  
  
However, it is a positive development that some arbitral tribunals accept counterclaims and 
especially those raising human rights concerns as it enables them to consider such issues and limit 
wrongful investors’ actions. It also redresses an asymmetry inherent in investment arbitration and 
 
643 Cazala, supra note 340 at 334. 
644 Ibid. 
645 Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The Argentine Republic, supra note 626. 
646 Burlington Resources Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador (Decision on Ecuador’s Counterclaims), supra note 630. 
647 Burova, supra note 622: “ the approaches of tribunals both in Burlington and Urbaser indicate a long-awaited 
move from the restrictive interpretation of connection criterion”. 
648 Emmanuel Gaillard, “L’avenir des traités de protection des investissements” in Charles Leben, ed, Droit 
international de l’investissement et de l’arbitrage transnational (Paris: Pedone, 2015) at 1037–1041. 
649 Reiner & Schreuer, supra note 389 at 90. 
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BIT, whereby only the investor is afforded protection650. In other words, it is a way for a State to 
seek damages where an investor has violated international human rights law, where no other 
mechanism is available to victims651. Certainly, “admission of counterclaims in certain 
circumstances helps investment arbitration advance the rule of law on several counts”652.  
It remains that the procedural hurdles for counterclaims’ admission must be overcome and it is not 
an easy task. Such improvement in the procedure would enable the protection of human rights by 
arbitration tribunals, which would also strengthen the rule of law653.  
 
 Where the procedural obstacles are not overcome to bring human rights considerations 
before an investment arbitration tribunal, it is possible for the arbitrators themselves to take upon 
the matter by considering the substantive law at stake. The mechanism of treaty interpretation 
available to investment tribunals to incorporate international human rights law will be discussed 
in the following chapter. Far from being perfect, this mechanism faces the challenges attached to 
human rights law: its vagueness.   
 
650 Burova, supra note 622. 
651 Ishakawa, supra note 248 at 33: “neither host states nor individuals and communities injured by an investor’s 
conduct may pursue the investor’s responsibility in investment treaty arbitration.” 
652 Ibid. 
653 Ibid at 36–37. 
 
 




 The consideration of international human rights law for local population has not been of 
interest to arbitral tribunals for a long time. Indeed,  “BITs exist primarily to investors more than 
for host States.”654  As Knhar writes, “[i]t is one of the particularities distinguishing investment 
arbitration from commercial arbitration that in most instances it is more than just the disputing 
parties’ interest at stake in the disputes”655. Human rights considerations are a recent phenomenon 
but it is difficult to introduce them within an investment law disputes.  
 
The previous chapter emphasised on the procedural problems that investment arbitration 
faces and that prevent a deeper consideration of human rights issues. It has been shown that on 
various procedural points, there are clear issues of legal certainty as no coherence neither 
predictability can be observed.  
At a substantive level, there is an “interpretative presumption that treaties are intended to produce 
effects which accord with existing rules of international law”656. In other words, the BIT concluded 
must respect other rules of international law, which IHRL is part of. The 2006 International Law 
Commission recalled that Article 31(3)(c) is useful at enable to add material sources external to 
the treaty if relevant in its interpretation657. Furthermore, “[a]rticle 31(3)(c) also requires the 
interpreter to consider other treaty-based rules so as to arrive at a consistent meaning”658. 
 
Then it can be wondered why arbitration tribunals do not directly deal with human rights problems 
where it is clear that an investor’s behaviour has seriously impacted the host state population 
because of its investment. It can also be questioned why arbitration tribunals, which are the only 
 
654 Truswell, supra note 242 at 579. 
655 Knahr, supra note 476 at 337. 
656 Simma, supra note 10 at 583; Case concerning the Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Preliminary 
Objections), [1957] ICJ Rep 142 ; Corfu Channel Case (Judgement), [1949] ICJ Rep 24 ; Anglo-Iranian Oil Co 
Case (Jurisdiction) Judgement, [1952] ICJ Rep 104 . 
657 Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from 
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, by ILC, 58th Sess, UN Doc A/61/10 (United Nations, 2006) 
at para 18. 
658 Ibid at para 21. 
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ones to deal with multinational corporations at a transnational and international level, do not take 
measures to condemned them for human rights breaches.  
If the procedural hurdles are overcome, it is difficult to admit human rights arguments based on 
substantive grounds. Indeed, the dissection of awards raising local populations’ fundamental rights 
issues enables to highlight two types of difficulties.  
 
First-of-all, the article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaty (VCLT), 
entered into force on the 27th of January 1980, is underused or used in a confused manner. 
Sometimes, this article enables the application of international human rights law in the dispute and 
sometimes, it completely discards it. However, as some authors have suggested, this article could 
be an entry point for arbitrators in the consideration of local populations’ human rights659. Far from 
being perfect, the first section will emphasize on the usefulness of VCLT article 31(3)(c) (Section 
1).  
 
After providing an explanation of how IHRL can interfere in the field of ISDS, it will be necessary 
to discuss the difficulties faced by arbitrators in considering IHRL. Far from their original field of 
activity, this body of law knows difficulties in its meaning and application660, especially when it 
comes to economic, social and cultural rights (ECOSOC rights). As it has been explained, the great 
majority of the case law dealing with human rights in ISDS concerns ECOSOC rights. However, 
they are very contested and the second section of this chapter aims at studying how they are dealt 
with by investment arbitration tribunals (Section 2)
 
659 Anne van Aaken, “Defragmentation of Public International Law Through Interpretation: A Methodological 
Proposal” (2009) 16:2 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 483 at 501–506; Simma, supra note 10 at 582; Lo, 
supra note 331 at 23. 
660 Noor Khadim, Is a Spade always a Spade? The Protection of Basic Human Rights and Indigenous Rights under 
Investment Treaties (University of Oxford, 2017); Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters & Geir Ulfstein, The 
constitutionalization of international law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 339–340: “it is no longer clear 
what exactly international law is.” 
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Section 1: Treaty interpretation issues 
 
 Human rights discussions in investment disputes are still feverish as can be seen from an 
overview of the jurisprudence concerning local population’s human rights. This can be attributed 
to the fact that, often, BITs contain ambiguous and vague provisions concerning human rights 
questions661. In the words of Van Harten, BITs generally establish “a set of broadly-framed ideals 
that have in run been assigned different and at times conflicting meanings when interpreted by 
arbitrators”662 which make the outcome of investment disputes unpredictable663.  
 
In addition, international human rights law is often not part of the law applicable to the dispute so 
arbitrators would exceed their mandate by applying such rules of law. However, as Simma 
explains, arbitrators must find a way to connect human rights with the investment treaty and the 
situation that arises under the BIT664. Treaty interpretation means to achieve this objective; 
“[t]reaty interpretation is a process of finding out proper meaning of treaty terms through various 
interpreting methods”665. It is recognised that investment treaties must be interpreted in light of 
international law666.  
 
 VCLT article 31(3)(c) would be very useful in enabling IHRL to reach the doors of 
investment arbitration. Arbitral tribunals could “rely on human rights law to help interpret BIT 
provisions”667, to clarify its language and parties’ obligations in terms of human rights (Sub-
section 1). However, if article 31(3)(c) can bring some improvements, its meaning raises questions 
and it is a  powerful (maybe too much) tool for arbitrators’ intervention (Sub-section 2).  
 
 
661 Castellarin, supra note 298 at 215. 
662 Gus Van Harten, “Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural Fairness, and the Rule of Law” in Stephan W Schill, 
ed, International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 629. 
663 Karl, supra note 16 at 231. 
664 Simma, supra note 10 at 583. 
665 Lo, supra note 331 at 22. 
666 Asian Agricultural Products LTD v Republic of Sri Lanka (Award), [1990] ARB/87/3 at para 39; Bruno Simma & 
Theodore Kill, “Harmonizing Investment Protection and International Human Rights: First Steps Towards a 
Methodology” in Christina Binder et al, eds, International investment law for the 21st century: essays in honour of 
Christoph Schreuer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 691. 
667 Lo, supra note 331 at 22. 
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Sub-section 1: Article 31(3)(c) VCLT as an entry door for human rights’ 
consideration 
 
Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states as follow: “[t]here 
shall be taken into account, together with the context: […] (c) Any relevant rules of international 
law applicable in the relations between the parties.”668  
In other words, it is up to those who apply the law to consider norms of international law to 
interpret a treaty669, if it is of any relevance in the dispute at stake. Article 31(3)(c) lays down very 
few conditions: there must be an existing rule of international law, that is relevant to the dispute at 
stake and that is applicable between the parties670. It has been said that investment arbitration has 
a public interest in nature because it opposes States’ interest and the private interests of an 
investment671.   
 
Where there is an important public interest issue and more specifically economic, social and 
cultural rights impacted by an investment, arbitrators could use the VCLT to bring international 
human rights law in the spotlight672. Article 31(3)(c) enables arbitrators to take into consideration 
international human rights treaties673, especially if the State parties to the BIT are parties to these 
human rights treaties.  
As Simma explains, “human rights law can only be taken into account if, and as far as, an 
investment tribunal is allowed to consider rules of international law whose source is not found in 
the treaty in question”674. Similarly, Van Aaken has argued that Article 31(3)(c) opens the door 
for the introduction of a proportionality principle in ISDS. Such a principle would enable 
arbitrators to balance obligations under the investment treaty and other international law rules such 
 
668 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (entered into force 27 January 1980), United Nations, Treaty Series, 
vol. 1155, p. 331 1969 s 31(3)(c). 
669 Simma & Kill, supra note 666 at 692: “Article 31(3)(c) may be invoked as the legal basis for considering 
external rules of international law only when a tribunal is actually engaged in the interpretation of a treaty”. 
670 Ibid at 695. 
671 Agirrezabalaga, “Derechos humanos en el arbitraje de inversión”, supra note 335 at 484; Petersmann, supra note 
227 at 292; Truswell, supra note 242 at 577; Cazala, supra note 340 at 319. 
672 Zarra, supra note 281 at 173. 
673 Lo, supra note 331 at 23: “Human rights law should play two roles in the interpretation of BIT clauses. First, it 
should be able to inform the “ordinary meaning” of some BIT terms and, second, it should serve as the “relevant 
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties”". 
674 Simma, supra note 10 at 582. 
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as IHRL675. Having recourse to VCLT article 31(3)(c) to interpret investment treaties would not 
only enable international human rights law to be relevant to the dispute but, it could also shed some 
light on investment law and its relationship with human rights questions676. Consequently, where 
the BIT provides for the application of international law rules, the arbitral tribunal could have 
recourse to IHRL677.  
 
Nonetheless, it must be recalled that article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT cannot be used to modify the 
provision of a BIT but only to harmonize the interpretations: it has a role of “harmonization qua 
interpretation”678. Such behaviour lies in the hands of arbitral tribunals.  
 
Along with the incorporation of IHRL to protect local populations into investment disputes, 
“[u]nder the recognised rules of treaty interpretation […] it may be possible to identify rights and 
interests beyond those expressed positively in the treaty”679.   
 
 Therefore, in theory, the use of article 31(3)(c) would be a great mechanism to protect 
human rights populations as it would introduce IHRL in arbitrators’ discussion of the relevant law 
applicable to a BIT. Applicable law is not limited to binding rules of law680.   
However, arbitral practice shows differently. Among the cases that concern economic, social or 
cultural rights, some awards have made express mention of the VCLT. There are only very few 
mentions of Article 31(3)(c) and it is clearly not used enough. Consequently and unfortunately, 
among those awards, only a very few numbers actually dealt with human rights considerations681.  
 
 
675 van Aaken, supra note 659 at 501–506. 
676 Calamita, supra note 431 at 168; Krommendijk & Morijn, supra note 377 at 422. 
677 Dupuy, supra note 440 at 56: “it is quite evident that the applicability of public international law raises no 
difficulty, including that part of general international law (namely, customary international law) which entails a set 
of obligations to protect fundamental human rights”. 
678 Simma, supra note 10 at 584. 
679 Calamita, supra note 431 at 177. 
680 Simma & Kill, supra note 666 at 697: “the concept of a rule of law being ‘binding’ has a precise and discrete 
legal content, the same is not the case for the concept of ‘applicability’”. 
681 S.D. Myers, Inc. v Government of Canada, supra note 386; Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, 
supra note 386; Parkerings-Compagniet AS v Republic of Lithuania, [2007] ARB/05/8 ; Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, 
Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, supra note 509; Urbaser S.A. 
and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The Argentine Republic, supra note 626; David R. Aven 
and Others v. Republic of Costa Rica, supra note 423. 
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There are cases where human rights of local populations were not deemed to be relevant 
for the investment tribunal whereas article 31(3)(c) was effectively mentioned, often to interpret 
other BIT provisions. In other words, the awards do not give any relevance to human rights682. 
This shows that in almost half of the cases where article 31(3)(c) was considered, human rights of 
local population were ignored in the ratio of the award. Some examples will be developed now.  
 
In the case Methanex Corporation v. USA683, the state of California banned the sale and use of 
“MTBE” (methyl tertiary-butyl ether), a gasoline additive684. The U.S.A raised the question of 
health and environment as they have been impacted by MTBE685.  
In the award, the tribunal decided to apply the relevant rules of international law mentioned as 
mentioned by article 1131(3) NAFTA686. To do so, the tribunal accepted to rely on Article 38(1) 
of the ICJ Statute687 to apply the relevant rules of international law.  
Furthermore, the tribunal stated that “[i]t has also been necessary for the Tribunal to consider the 
application of Articles 31(3) and 32 of the Vienna Convention.”688   
However, even if the tribunal considered the protection of health and the environment, it did not 
use article 31(3)(c) to incorporate international human rights law instruments. There is no mention 
of the right to health, rather the notion of “public health” is raised689 and no human rights 
consideration “straightaway”.  
 
In Parkerings companies AS v. Lithuania (2007), the arbitral tribunal had recourse to article 
31(3)(c) VCLT to interpret the FET standard690. However, the tribunal did not mention cultural 
rights nor international human rights law instruments.  
 
682 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, supra note 386; Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of 
Lithuania, supra note 681; Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, supra note 512; Grand River Enterprises 
Six Nations, Ltd, et al v United States of America, [2011] UNCITRAL ; Impregilo SpA. v Argentine Republic, supra 
note 595; EDF International S.A., SAUR International S.A. and León Participaciones Argentinas S.A. v. Argentine 
Republic, supra note 600; Bernhard Von Pezold and ors. v Republic of Zimbabwe, supra note 508. 
683 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, supra note 386. 
684 California Senate, MTBE Public Health and Environment Protection Act of 1997, Bill No 521, Bill No 521 (9 
October 1997). 
685 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, supra note 386 Preface . 
686 Ibid pt II, Chapter B, p. 1, para 2. 
687 Ibid pt II, Chapter B, p. 1, para 3. 
688 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, supra note 386 Part II, Chapter B, para 18. 
689 Ibid pt II, Chapter 1, p. 22, para 45. 
690 Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, supra note 681 at paras 275 and followings. 
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The same use of the VCLT in Glamis Gold Ltd v. United States of America (2009)691, where the 
State of California adopted stricter environmental standards and also affecting indigenous rights692. 
In their award, arbitrators admitted being guided by article 31 of the VCLT to interpret FET 
standards693. However, the arbitral tribunal found indigenous rights to be irrelevant694 and not in 
their “case-specific mandate”695. Therefore, they were not discussed696.  
 
Similarly, in Grandriver Enterprises v. USA (2011), issues regarding indigenous rights as well as 
the right to health were brought to the attention of the tribunal by both, the claimant and the 
respondent697.  
In the award, the tribunal said that it “understands the obligation to "take into account" other rules 
of international law to require it to respect the Vienna Convention's rules governing treaty 
interpretation”698 but carried on by saying that “[t]his is a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction; it has 
no mandate to decide claims based on treaties other than NAFTA”699. It is curious that arbitrators 
have acknowledged their duty to interpret the BIT in light of international law without considering 
IHRL while it was relevant in the instant case. It is worth mentioning that discussion surrounding 
the right to health is non-existent.  
 
The same attitude can be observed in Impregilo SpA v. Argentine Republic (2011)700, where the 
arbitral tribunal had recourse to article 31 of the VCLT in order to interpret an MFN clause but it 
did not pay consideration to human rights provisions (i.e. the right to water). Moreover, it even 
rejected the necessity defence of Argentina that raised its human rights obligations under 
international law as well as the necessity to guarantee the right to water701. 
 
 
691 Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, supra note 512. 
692 Ibid at paras 166–185. 
693 Ibid at para 606. 
694 Ibid at para 8; Christina Binder, “Case Study: Glamis Gold Ltd. (Claimant) v United States of America 
(Respondent), NAFTA/UNCITRAL Award, 8 June 2009” (2016) SSRN Journal 1 at 8. 
695 Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, supra note 512 at para 8. 
696 Binder, supra note 694 at 8, 10. 
697 Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v United States of America, supra note 682 at para 2. 
698 Ibid at para 71. 
699 Ibid. 
700 Impregilo SpA. v Argentine Republic, supra note 595. 
701 Ibid at paras 228, 230. 
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In the case EDF International v. Argentina, the arbitral tribunal referred to article 31(3)(c) of the 
VCLT702 in order to interpret the France-Argentina BIT. The arbitral tribunal acknowledged the 
relevance of human rights in international investment law703 but was not convinced by the fact that 
Argentina could not abide by its BIT obligations and IHRL ones.”704 
 
In Bernhard von Pezold and ors. v. Republic of Zimbabwe705, the arbitral tribunal, in its award, 
made references to article 31of the VCLT when it acknowledged that “it is helpful to refer to 
Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention, which notes that, together with the context, the decision 
maker shall take into account “any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which 
establishes the agreement of the Parties regarding its interpretation”706.  
However, in its Procedural Order No. 2, Dated 26 June 2012, the tribunal completely rejected its 
capacity to consider international human rights law provisions concerning indigenous people: “The 
Arbitral Tribunals are not persuaded that consideration of the foregoing is in fact part of their 
mandate under either the ICSID Convention or the applicable BITs. The Respondent has not yet 
filed a substantive pleading in these proceedings.”707  
A reference to Article 31(3)(c) and not solely article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT would have enabled 
the tribunal to consider other rules of international law. But it completely ignored this provision of 
the Vienna Convention.  
 
There is an “in-between” case, the one of Philip Morris v. Uruguay708, where the tribunal protected 
human rights using international law but not through the direct use of article 31(3)(c). In this case,  
Uruguay adopted measures regarding the control of tobacco so as to protect public health and abide 
by its international and domestic obligations709. The arbitral tribunal referred to article 31(3)(c) to 
interpret the FET standard in light of other rules of international law710. However, it did not use 
 
702 EDF International S.A., SAUR International S.A. and León Participaciones Argentinas S.A. v. Argentine 
Republic, supra note 600 at paras 891–892. 
703 Ibid at para 912. 
704 Ibid at para 914. 
705 Bernhard Von Pezold and ors. v Republic of Zimbabwe, supra note 508. 
706 Ibid at para 407. 
707 Bernhard Von Pezold and ors. v Republic of Zimbabwe (Procedural Order No. 2), supra note 505 at para 59. 
708 Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of 
Uruguay, supra note 509. 
709 Ibid at para 305. 
710 Ibid at para 317. 
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this interpretative tool to incorporate human rights considerations in its reasoning. In discussing 
the right to health, the tribunal only relied on the World Health Organization Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC)711 to which Uruguay is a party and Switzerland a 
signatory712. Tribunal made reference to human health713 and recognised Uruguay’s duty to 
guarantee the right to health714. The arbitral tribunal, by rendering an award favorable to the host 
state, participated to the protection of the human right to health, without expressly saying so.   
 
It is interesting to note that the door opened by reference to article 31(3)(c), was not used 
to bring human rights considerations in the arbitration. Indeed, there are arbitral tribunals that were 
willing to use the VCLT to interpret BIT provisions but not to incorporate IHRL in the 
proceedings, especially in a situation of crisis. In the following cases, arbitrators have gone further 
in the consideration of human rights. 
 
In the early case of SD Myers v. Government of Canada715, Canada banned the export of PCB 
(polychlorinated biphenyl) wastes because of its negative impact on the environment and 
health.”716 In this case, the arbitral tribunal recognised that was “appropriate for the Tribunal to 
examine the international law rules of interpretation. The first port of call is the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties”717. However, the tribunal only relied on article 31(3)(a) and (b)718 and 
examined some international law instruments719.  Arbitrators have discussed NAFTA in light of 
the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation720 and the Basel Convention721, 
under which  “State parties to the Basel Convention accept the obligation to ensure that hazardous 
 
711 WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (entered into force 27 February 2005), United Nations, Treaty 
Series, vol. 2302, p. 166. 2003. 
712 Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of 
Uruguay, supra note 509 at para 85. 
713 Ibid at paras 158, 304, 394. 
714 Ibid at 304. 
715 S.D. Myers, Inc. v Government of Canada, supra note 386. 
716 Ibid at para 95. 
717 Ibid at para 200. 
718 Ibid at para 201. 
719 Ibid at para 204. 
720 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (entered into force 1 January 1994), 32 I.L.M. 1480 
1993; S.D. Myers, Inc. v Government of Canada, supra note 386 at paras 216, 250. 
721 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (entered 
into force 5 May 1992), 1673 U.N.T.S. 126 1989. 
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wastes are managed in an environmentally sound manner”722. The tribunal, in using the 
interpretation rules provided by the VCLT recalls that “[t]he drafters of the NAFTA evidentially 
considered which earlier environmental treaties would prevail over the specific rules of the 
NAFTA in case of conflict. Annex 104 provided that the Basel Convention would have priority if 
and when it was ratified by the NAFTA Parties.”723  
It is a rare case where there is an extended discussion surrounding the interpretation of a BIT in 
light of international environmental provisions.  
 
Recently, an arbitral tribunal effectively put words of this thought regarding the use of 
article 31(3)(c). The case of Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia Ur Partzuergoa 
v. The Argentine Republic724, concerning water and sewage services725726, the tribunal admitted 
that it was its role to interpret the convention by taking into account the rules of the VCLT, more 
particularly article 31(3)(c)727. It emphasised on its role to duly consider other rules of international 
law: “[t]he Tribunal must certainly be mindful of the BIT’s special purpose as a Treaty promoting 
foreign investments, but it cannot do so without taking the relevant rules of international law into 
account. The BIT has to be construed in harmony with other rules of international law of which it 
forms part, including those relating to human rights”728.   
The Urbaser tribunal expressly recognised the possibility to incorporate human rights 
considerations in investment arbitration through Article 31(3)(c) but more importantly, that 
arbitrators had the duty to do so. It accepted that such considerations were within its powers. The 
tribunal discussed the relevance of the human right to water and sanitation for the dispute, in light 
of Article 31(3)(c)729.   
 
722 S.D. Myers, Inc. v Government of Canada, supra note 386 at 106. 
723 Ibid at para 214. 
724 Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The Argentine Republic, supra note 626. 
725 Ibid at para 34. 
726 Ibid at paras 68–69. 
727 Ibid at para 1200. 
728 Ibid. 
729 Ibid at paras 1204–1205. 
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The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights says that “States parties should 
ensure that the right to water is given due attention in international agreements”730. According to 
the Urbaser tribunal, such comment “includes the possibility to consider matters related to the 
human right to water in the dispute resolution mechanisms provided for in such agreements”731. 
This decision demonstrates the usefulness of Article 31(3)(c) in ensuring that human rights are 
considered and relevant in ISDS.  
The case of David R. Aven and Others v. Republic of Costa Rica732, is also noteworthy and 
involved environmental concerns. During the dispute, the tribunal noted that “both Parties are in 
agreement that the customary international law rules of treaty interpretation constitute “applicable 
rules of international law” under Article 10.22(1) DR-CAFTA and that such rules are reflected” in 
the VCLT733. The arbitral tribunal considered article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT in order to construe the 
meaning of DR-CAFTA provisions734 that concerned environment protection. Tribunal 
acknowledges that the parties to the treaty at stake must “act in line with principles of international 
law”735. In this case, the arbitral tribunal effectively relied on article 31(3)(c) to incorporate 
environmental provisions736.  
 As shown in SD Myers, Urbaser and David Aven, it is possible for arbitrators to use the 
VCLT to construe the meaning of a BIT by adding environmental and international human rights 
law provisions. It moves from a theoretical concept to a practical tool is ISDS. It is a great step 
forward compared to the decisions rendered in the past where arbitrators usually found IHRL 
irrelevant or not within their jurisdiction. 
 
 
730 UN General Comment 15, 2002, note 377 at para 35: it also adds that "Agreements concerning trade 
liberalization should not curtail or inhibit a country’s capacity to ensure the full realization of the right to water”. 
731 Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The Argentine Republic, supra note 626 
at para 1209. 
732 David R. Aven and Others v. Republic of Costa Rica, supra note 423. 
733 Ibid at para 375. 
734 Ibid at para 411. 
735 Ibid at 412. 
736 Ibid at paras 417, 418; Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat 
(entered into force 21 December 1975), 996 U.N.T.S.245 1971; Convention on Biological Diversity (entered into 
force 29 December 1993), 1760 U.N.T.S. 69 1992. 
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 It must also be mentioned that there is a case where the VCLT was used to introduce human 
rights elements, but it concerned civil and political rights of the investor. In the case of Al 
Warraq737, the tribunal makes an extensive discussion of the obligations covered by the ICCPR738. 
The tribunal recalled that by being a State party to the ICCPR, it “undertakes to refrain from doing 
anything injurious to human rights and do everything to ensure respect for human rights of the 
individual person concerned. It is the failure to honour this obligation that amounts to a violation 
of the principle of good faith”739. 
 
It can be seen that the recognition of States’ obligation to protect civil and political rights is clearer 
than regarding the protection of economic, social and cultural rights.  
Indeed, in situations where similar human rights of local populations (i.e. economic, social and 
cultural rights) are concerned, the reference to article 31(3)(c) is hazardous and irregular. “There 
are certain interpretive tools available to arbitrators, including provisions of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) which have been underutilized by IIA arbitrators to 
date”.740 Arbitrators deal with the treaty interpretation rules in a very unpredictable manner and it 
impacts legal certainty. The parties to the BIT cannot know when the VCLT will be used to 
incorporate human right provisions in the arbitration proceedings. It can be said that “[b]ecause of 
its general applicability, Article 31(3)(c) provides a potential gateway for reference to human rights 
instruments in the interpretation of investment treaties”741.  
Finally, there are investment cases where arbitrators have referred to human rights 
obligations, more precisely economic social and cultural rights, without using article 31(3)(c) 
 
737 Hesham Talaat M Al-Warraq v The Republic of Indonesia, 2014. 
738 Ibid at paras 177, 202, 556 and following. 
739 Ibid at 558, 559, 560. 
740 UNCTAD Report 2009, note 367 at 13; Moshe Hirsch, “Conflicting Obligations in International Investment Law: 
Investment Tribunals’ Perspective” in Yuval Shany & Tomer Broude, eds, The Shifting Allocation of Authority in 
International Law: Considering Sovereignty, Supremacy and Subsidiarity (Hart Publishing, 2008) at paras 323–343. 
741 Calamita, supra note 431 at 178. 
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VCLT742. Two of these cases involved environmental as well as health issues743 and the other four 
cases involved the human right to water 744.  
 
For instance, in the case of Azurix Corp745, the arbitral tribunal affirmed that the BIT must be 
interpreted in accordance with the VCLT746 made a reference to article 31(1) of the VCLT in order 
to interpret the fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard747 but not to article 31(3)(c).  
Similarly, in the case of Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija SA and Vivendi Universal v. Argentine 
Republic748, involving access to water, the tribunal acknowledged that it had to interpret the BIT 
in light of article 31(1) of the VCLT749 to interpret certain BIT provisions like the FET standard. 
However, it did not mention article 31(3)(c) in order to take into account other relevant rules of 
international law. The tribunal’s reference to the Vienna Convention did not serve the purpose of 
considering IHRL.  
In SAUR International, the tribunal went as far as stating that:  “human rights in general, and the 
right to water in particular, are one of the various sources that the tribunal should take into account 
to resolve the dispute."750 Again,  human rights were not further dealt with by arbitrators in order 
to reach a decision.  
 
Where there is no mention of article 31(3)(c) VCLT, human rights consideration is 
inconsistent. Unless human rights are actually part of a BIT, VCLT should be used consistently to 
deal with these issues.  
 
742 Azurix Corp. v The Argentine Republic, supra note 595; Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of 
Tanzania, supra note 488; SAUR International S.A. c. République Argentine, supra note 595; Suez, Sociedad 
General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A.  v The Argentine Republic, supra note 538; Pac 
Rim Cayman LLC v. The Republic of El Salvador, supra note 541; Burlington Resources Inc v República del 
Ecuador, [2017] ARB/08/5 . 
743 Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. The Republic of El Salvador, supra note 541; Burlington Resources Inc. v. República 
del Ecuador, supra note 742. 
744 Azurix Corp. v The Argentine Republic, supra note 595; Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of 
Tanzania, supra note 488; SAUR International S.A. c. République Argentine, supra note 595; Suez, Sociedad 
General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A.  v The Argentine Republic, supra note 538. 
745 Azurix Corp. v The Argentine Republic, supra note 595. 
746 Ibid at para 307. 
747 Ibid at paras 307, 359. 
748 Compania de Aguas del Aconquija SA and Vivendi Universal v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No., supra note 
533. 
749 Ibid at para 7.4.2. 
750 SAUR International SA c République Argentine (Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability), [2012] ARB/04/4 at 
para 330. 
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Furthermore, this analysis of IHRL considerations shows that there is a lack of coherence 
in the awards rendered where economic, social and cultural rights are relevant. There is a trend 
highlighting that VCLT is not used in a consistent manner where there are human rights issues. In 
many cases where it is mentioned, it does not serve the purpose of protecting human rights by 
bringing IHRL to the dispute. Article 31(3)(c) VCLT is a tool that could be used “for reconciling 
different international law norms in the areas of foreign investment and human rights”751. Indeed, 
“through the normative substance of economic and social rights recognised in the Covenant as 
they could inform the interpretation of investment treaties by arbitral tribunals qua article 
31(3)(c)”752.  
 
Therefore, it can be said that article 31(3)(c) is the tool that “covers both of the relationships 
opening the interpretation of an investment treaty to human rights considerations”753. Clearly, 
“investment arbitrators are equipped with sufficient interpretative tools to achieve the idea of a 
thick rule of law and to ensure sufficient policy space for host states to regulate in the public 
interest”754. But there is a serious issue of predictability and  legal certainty that weakens both the 
arbitral system and the rule of law. Arbitrators, in fulfilling their duties, must now address those 
recurring cross-cutting issues of investment and human rights law755. Through a better application 
of Article 31(3)(c), arbitrators could develop a trend of interpretation that would be coherent and 
predictable so as to ensure legal certainty756. There are some defects concerning article 31(3)(c) 
that need to be mentioned.  
 
 
Sub-section 2: The problems of Article 31(3)(c) 
 
 
751 UNCTAD Report 2009, note 367 at 13; Anne van Aaken, “Fragmentation of International Law: The Case of 
International Investment Protection” (2008) VVII Finnish Yearbook of International Law 91 at 91–130. 
752 Simma, supra note 10 at 591. 
753 Ibid at 584. 
754 Schill, supra note 51 at 101. 
755 Simma & Kill, supra note 666 at 707. 
756 Ibid at 703: “The practice of referring to external rules to determine the meaning of generic terms would seem to 
be a fruitful field for the harmonization of human rights and international investment law”. 
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 The reference to article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT can be a tool for arbitrators to develop the 
protection of local population’s human rights in ISDS. However, it is a mechanism that has some 
flaws.  
 
First-of-all, the content of article 31(3)(c) rises debates as to what it actually is. As it stands, 
“[t]here shall be taken into account, together with the context […] (c) Any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties”757, the VCLT provides no 
guidance how as how the interpretation should be done. Similarly, it does not explain what “take 
into account” means, neither what are the “relevant rules of international law”. As Calamita 
explains, “the meaning of ‘take into account’ is of particular interest as it raises global question 
about what role the introduction of human rights treaties via the mechanism of Article 31(3)(c) 
might have in the interpretative process”758. 
Furthermore, the absence of precision regarding the “relevant” international law rules leaves it 
difficult to arbitrators to know the extent to which international human rights law is to be taken 
into account when interpreting a BIT759. Normally, this is a reference to the sources contained in 
article 38 of the ICJ Statute760. In considering certain human rights, arbitrators must establish that 
they are actually rules of law761.  
 
This is a situation that creates a paradox because this provision of the VCLT is supposed to provide 
guidance for treaty interpretation but the tool itself is vague and unclear as to its meaning762. It 
highlights, again, legal certainty issues. 
 
Additionally, by enabling arbitrators to bring new norms, that were not considered by the 
parties into ISDS, it grants them considerable power and discretion763.  Article 31(3)(c) is “a tool 
of interpretation not explicitly vested with the power to modify”764.   
 
757 VCLT, supra note 668 s 31(3)(c). 
758 Calamita, supra note 431 at 178. 
759 Simma & Kill, supra note 666 at 695; Richard K Gardiner, Treaty interpretation, The Oxford international law 
library (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 258, 260. 
760 Statute of the International Court of Justice (entered into force 24 October 1945) Article 38. 
761 Simma & Kill, supra note 666 at 695. 
762 Calamita, supra note 431 at 178. 
763 Simma, supra note 10. 
764 Simma & Kill, supra note 666 at 694. 
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Bringing human rights law during the phase of the proceedings is an ex post approach; it does not 
correspond to what the parties initially intended, especially if there is no mention at all of any 
human rights provisions in the BIT.765   
This raises questions as to the powers of arbitrators. They must not go too far in exceeding it as 
they are under the threat of seeing their award annulled by an ad-hoc Committee established under 
the rules contained in the ICSID Convention766. If the award is not submitted to the ICSID 
Convention, the parties can seek judicial review in the national courts of the state where the 
arbitration took place767. This procedure can be useful because the arbitration clause limits 
arbitrators’ jurisdiction which means that if they go too far in their interpretation and exceed the 
mandate that was given to them, either party can request annulment of the award768.  
 
 Nonetheless, it seems that the consideration of human rights is a growing trend in ISDS 
especially because of their essential nature. As Farrugia writes, “[i]t is now accepted as perfectly 
permissible for a tribunal to draw upon […] general human rights considerations when applying 
international law […] to investment agreements provided that such consideration takes place in 
the context of the investment dispute”769. 
All this being said, it would be better if BIT provisions were clearer when signed by States. Clear 
provisions would bring better legal certainty than relying on treaty interpretation provisions770. It 
would avoid relying on arbitration awards only because they are of persuasive value in the field of 
investment law. 
 
This section has focused on how international human rights law could serve arbitral 
tribunals where problems regarding human rights of local populations are raised. The awards 
studied show that the mention of article 31(3)(c) is not systematic and that it is clearly underused 
for the purpose of protecting human rights771. It has been explained that it is possible for arbitrators, 
 
765 Simma, supra note 10. 
766 ICSID, supra note 314 s 52(1)(b). 
767 Juan Fernandez-Armesto, “Different Systems for the Annulment of Investment Awards” (2011) 26:1 ICSID 
Review 128 at 134. 
768 Ibid at 139–140. 
769 Farrugia, supra note 329 at 264. 
770 Calamita, supra note 431 at 168. 
771 Zarra, supra note 281 at 173: “investment tribunals do not often make reference to such a principle, and they 
merely apply the rules of international law that, on a case-by-case basis, appear to be relevant”. 
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indeed necessary, to introduce such considerations by the means of the VCLT on a regular basis772 
so as to enable the protection of local populations and the promotion of legal certainty773.  
Obviously, “international law includes ‘a set of obligations to protect fundamental human rights’ 
just as much as it includes investment protections and investment law”774. Even if the use of the 
VCLT can be improved, international human rights laws and more particularly economic, social 
and cultural rights, are known to be vague. Their protection by arbitral tribunals is difficult and 
hardly consistent. The following section aims at discussing what problems arbitral tribunals face 




772 Ibid at 174. 
773 Simma & Kill, supra note 666 at 694, 707: “The capacity of these interpretative methods to effectively transmit 
the normative content of external rules in a way that promotes coherence among legal regimes should not be 
discounted”. 
774 Farrugia, supra note 329 at 264. 
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Section 2: The uncertainty of socio-economic rights in investment 
arbitration 
 
Human rights are often considered to be civil and political rights; “[h]owever, within 
international law, human rights refer to both civil and political rights as well as socioeconomic 
rights”775. There is an important number of cases that concern the right to water, to health, to 
culture and environmental rights. Those as economic, social and cultural rights; “[a]s such, this is 
the set of rights that the ISDS regime most urgently needs to protect”776. 
Those rights are second or third generation rights; they are considered not to be clear enough and 
their definitions and status are still controverted777. Environmental rights have for their part slowly 
been elevated, in the last decade, to the rank of human right778.  
 
Where the investor, who obtained a contract to deliver public services fails to abide by its 
obligation, the State has a duty to ensure that its population benefit from the public service. Indeed, 
“[f]ailure to effectively regulate and control water services providers” amount to a breach of the 
right to water from the State779. However, regarding economic, social, and cultural rights “the 
States’ obligations necessary to operationalize the rights are themselves the subject of debate.”780 
 
The most important legal instrument for this discussion is ICESCR781. Most of the 
governments of the world, 170 States exactly, are parties to this Convention782. By being party to 
this Convention, States must take steps “ […] with a view to achieving progressively the full 
 
775 Bradlow, supra note 33 at 359; Jack Donnelly, Universal human rights in theory and practice, 3rd ed (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2013) at 40–54. 
776 Bradlow, supra note 33 at 360. 
777 Marcelos Neves, “The symbolic force of human rights” (2007) 33:4 Philosophy and social criticism 411 at 421: 
“This very extensive view of human rights, including so-called third- and even fourth-generation rights, has drawn 
criticism for vagueness, not to mention innocuousness”. 
778 Francesco Francioni, “International Human Rights in an Environmental Horizon” (2010) 21:1 EJIL 41 at 42–43: 
“Recent practice shows that the protection of the natural environment in special socio-cultural contexts is a sine qua 
non for the enjoyment of human rights by members of the relevant group or community.” 
779 UN General Comment 15, 2002, note 377. 
780 Simma & Kill, supra note 666 at 706. 
781 ICESCR, supra note 170. 
782 “International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, online: United Nations Treaty Collection 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&clang=_en>. 
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realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including 
particularly the adoption of legislative measures”783.  
The ICESCR is relevant when States sign treaties with international corporations that tend to 
ignore human rights784.  
The work of arbitrators in incorporating human rights law in their decisions is facilitated if the host 
state is party to the ICESCR. The convention can form part of the relevant law to be applied.785 
The U.N. reaffirmed that “[j]udges, adjudicators and members of the legal profession should be 
encouraged by States parties to pay greater attention to violations of the right to water in the 
exercise of their functions.”786 
 
 Therefore, there is a general duty to ensure that economic, social and cultural rights are 
guaranteed throughout the world787. In the previous section, it has been argued that ISDS should 
seriously take into considerations international human rights law so as to limit investors’ 
misconduct towards human rights and uphold States’ measures that seek to protect them.  
Once arbitrators manage to incorporate IHRL as relevant law into the dispute thanks to treaty 
interpretation, they face another issue: the vagueness of socio economic rights.  
 Those rights are at the origin of a lot of debates and known to be nebulous and uncertain 
(sub-section 1). These difficulties impact the inclusion of such rights as well as the coherence of 




783 ICESCR, supra note 170 s 2(1). 
784 UN General Comment 14, 2000, note 231 at para 50: violation of the Covenant can be constituted by “the failure 
of the State to take into account its legal obligations regarding the right to health when entering into […] agreements 
with [...] multinational corporations” . 
785 Simma, supra note 10 at 586–587. 
786 UN General Comment 15, 2002, note 377 at para 58. 
787 Lo, supra note 331 at 14: “There are certain categories of human rights which require States to ensure that their 
people will be able to enjoy minimum standards of health and livelihood.” 
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Sub-section 1: Vagueness of international human rights law 
International human rights law is said to be vague, containing ambiguous human rights that 
are difficult to apply because of their indeterminate status.788 The vagueness of  human rights 
“implies dissent about the material, personal and temporal scope of validity of such rights.”789 This 
is blatant regarding economic, social and cultural rights790. These rights, essential to the realisation 
of any human beings791, such as the right to water, the right to health, the right to a safe 
environment, cultural rights and many others are not easily ascertainable. As Lord Bingham puts 
it, “[i]t must be accepted that the outer edges of some fundamental rights are not clear-cut.”792 
Petersmann explains that international human right law is incomplete in nature793. ECOSOC rights 
are difficult to characterize in their substance also because they contain other implicit rights 
declared by international organisation. Sometimes, U.N. bodies have recognised other human 
rights that were not originally contained in the ICESCR.  
For instance, “the right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation as a human right that is 
essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights” was developed from article 11 of the 
ICESCR794: the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to life.795 The Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provided an explanation as to what constitutes the right to 
water. It stated that “[t]he human right to water entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, 
physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic use”796   
 
 
788 John Tobin, “Seeking to persuade: A Constructing Approach to Human Rights Treaties Interpretations” (2010) 
23:1 Harvard Human Rights Journal 201 at 201: “Human rights protected in international treaties are invariably 
vague and ambiguous”. 
789 Neves, supra note 777 at 420. 
790 Calamita, supra note 431 at 182. 
791 ICESCR, supra note 170 Article 2(1). 
792 Bingham of Cornhill, supra note 3 at 68. 
793 Petersmann, supra note 227 at 290. 
794 ICESCR, supra note 170 s 11. 
795 The human right to water and sanitation, GA Res 64/292, UNGAOR, 64th Sess, UN Doc A/RES/64/292 (2010); 
Human rights and access to safe drinking water and sanitation, HRCOR, 15th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/15/9 
(2010); note 377; The human right to safe drinking water and sanitation, HRCOR, 18th Sess, UN Doc 
A/HRC/RES/18/1 (2011) at 2: “the right to an adequate standard of living and inextricably related to [...] the right to 
life and human dignity”. 
796 UN General Comment 15, 2002, note 377 at para 2. 
 132 
It would be too long to discuss the question of vagueness regarding socio-economic rights. 
Therefore, there will be a focus on the human right to water to highlight this problem. Also, it has 
been the subject of many investment arbitration cases.  
  
The human right to water is not expressly enshrined in the ICESCR neither it is in other binding 
international human rights law instruments797, except for women798, children799, and prisoners of 
war800. This loophole is curious because it is a “biological fact that every person needs water to 
survive. Unlike other resources, water can be neither substituted nor artificially produced”801.  
Truswell explains this gap by the fact that “water is so obviously vital to human life that early 
drafters of human rights instruments did not feel that a right to water needed to be stated”802. It is 
an old prerequisite for realizing any other human right803.   
 
The reality is that the human right to water sounds inferior to civil and political rights:  
In practice, economic, social and cultural rights are treated as distinct and often 
subordinate to civil and political rights. These differences and inequalities between the 
two groups of rights are reflected in the differently worded obligations, 
implementation and enforcement mechanisms contained in the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR804. 
 
The ICESCR “merely requires” whereas the ICCPR imposes obligations; “international human 
rights treaties are themselves largely indeterminate and lack sufficiently clear normative content 
to serve as a principled interpretative guide to the rights and obligations in other treaties”805. As a 
consequence, “the international community has inadvertently perpetuated the belief that the right 
to water is inferior to or less fundamental than other human rights”806. Only forty-one countries 
 
797 Bray, supra note 524 at 475. 
798 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (entered into force 3 September 
1981), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 1979 Article 14(2h). 
799 Convention on the Rights of the Child (entered into force 2 September 1990), 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 1989 Article 24. 
800 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of prisoners of War (entered into force 21 October 1950), 75 
UNTS 135 1949 Article 26. 
801 Truswell, supra note 242 at 572. 
802 Ibid; Rebecca Brown, “Unequal burden: Water privatisation and women’s human rights in Tanzania” (2010) 18:1 
Gender and Development 59 at 59. 
803 Bray, supra note 524 at 476; Aristotle, Metaphysics, translated by Hugh Tredennick (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1933) at 983b. 
804 Bray, supra note 524 at 476–477. 
805 Calamita, supra note 431 at 182; Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, “How to Influence State: Socialization and 
International Human Rights Law” (2004) 54 Duke Law Journal 621 at 676; Tobin, supra note 788. 
806 Bray, supra note 524 at 477. 
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have guaranteed the right to water in their domestic legislation or constitution807. It can be noted 
that such a guarantee does not exist in most of the countries. Even though it is repeatedly affirmed 
by various authorities, the human right to water is not internationally accepted808.   
 
The guidance given by the ICESCR concerning the realisation of socio-economic rights is poor. It 
states that the rights it contains must be “realised progressively on the basis of the resources 
available to States”809. In practice, it is difficult to assess what “realised progressively” actually 
means and how judges and arbitrators should apply such statement. 
 
The international disagreement regarding the status of the right to water is also noticeable 
regarding the adoption of the UNGA resolution which proclaim the right to water as a human 
right810. Forty-one countries abstained from voting this resolution and among them the U.S.A, 
Canada, Japan, U.K, Australia. Such behaviour has consequences; “[t]he reluctance of powerful 
countries (and major aid donors) to define access to fresh water as a human right will delay the 
rights-based treatment of water access under international law”811. This highlights the absence of 
consensus and incoherence regarding the right to water.   The controversy also exists regarding the 
right to a safe environment: “[t]he exact scope of those human rights obligations continues to fuel 
animated discourse”.812 
The status of economic, social and cultural rights is often opened to debates as noticed by the U.N.: 
“there is sometimes vigorous debate within the human rights law field as to whether there is a 
hierarchy of human rights”813.   
 
 
807 Farrugia, supra note 329 at 267. 
808 Truswell, supra note 242 at 572; Will Schreiber, “Realizing the Right to Water in International Investment Law: 
An Interdisciplinary Approach to BIT Obligations” (2008) 48:2 Natural Resources Journal; Fitzmaurice, Malgosia, 
“The human right to water” (2006) 18 Fordham Environmental Law Review 537; The Right to Water, by OHCHR, 
Health and Human Rights Publication Series 3 (Geneva: WHO, 2003). 
809 ICESCR, supra note 170 s 2; Truswell, supra note 242 at 573. 
810 UN Doc A/RES/64/292 note 795 at 2: "the right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation as a human right 
that is essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights”. 
811 Truswell, supra note 242 at 574. 
812 Farrugia, supra note 329 at 282. 
813 UNCTAD Report 2009, note 367 at 13. 
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The fact that human rights provisions in international treaties are ambiguous, very general, and 
open to debates render their implementation complicated814. The application of socio-economics 
rights raises difficulties for international human rights bodies and national courts, even though 
they are more familiar with this practice. This situation can explain why it is complicated to raise 
these rights in international investment arbitration and why there is a lack of consideration and 
enforcement of those rights by investment arbitrators. It is hard for adjudicators to apply vague 
provisions.  
 
Facing socio-economic rights claims, arbitrators must assess the standards of realization as it 
depends on the country in question and the economic, political, and judicial situation surrounding 
it. Article 2(3) of the ICESCR provides that “[d]eveloping countries, with due regard to human 
rights and their national economy, may determine to what extent they would guarantee the 
economic rights recognized in the present Covenant to non-nationals”815.  
In investment arbitration cases, the defending State is often a developing country (either from 
South America or Africa). The legal materials are vague on the topic and it does not facilitate the 
work of arbitrators to consider IHRL, especially if they are experts in international investment law.  
It is necessary that they become able to grapple these issues as “constitutional and legal protection 
of economic and social rights remains weak in many common law countries and less-developed 
countries, effective protection of ‘freedom from poverty’ […] often remains a cosmopolitan 
dream”816.  
 
In conclusion, there are still international debates on the meaning and recognition of certain 
human rights, such as the right to water or the safe environment. Calamita and Tobin express the 
view that the imprecision of terms in human rights treaties, and the fact that it lacks “delegation 
mechanisms for binding, authoritative interpretation […] is chosen to facilitate textual 
agreement”817. It seems that there is political desire to leave things vague so as to enable to 
adoption of binding international human rights law instruments.  
 
814 Louise Doswald-Beck & Sylvian Vité, “International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law” (1993) 293 
International Review of the Red Cross 94 at 106: “[t]he major difficulty of applying human rights law as enunciated 
in the treaties is the very general nature of the treaty language”. 
815 ICESCR, supra note 170 s 2(3). 
816 Petersmann, supra note 227 at 293. 
817 Calamita, supra note 431 at 182; Tobin, supra note 788. 
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Nevertheless, McCorquodale rightly writes that “human rights – civil, political, economic, social, 
cultural and collective that might be considered to be included in a rule of law”818 and they should 
be protected, especially in States where there is governmental and economic instability (Argentina, 
Bolivia, Tanzania and others). ISDS is confronted with these questions and must be a mechanism 
to strengthen their protection on a regular basis. The following sub-section will demonstrate that 
IHRL’s vagueness has consequences on the coherence of the jurisprudence developed by 
investment arbitrators.  
 
 
Sub-section 2: Inconsistent considerations of IHRL as a consequence of vagueness 
 
 The absence of binding precedent or “jurisprudence constante” in international investment 
arbitration, together with the fact that it is an ad-hoc mechanism, impact the consistency and 
coherence of the decisions that are rendered. This is particularly true in cases where economic, 
social and cultural rights are involved as they derive from a body of law known to be vague.  
This sub-section will focus on how the arbitral jurisprudence consider international human right 
law as part of substantive law, and whether there is consistency.  
  
Arbitrators have considered that international human right law was irrelevant to investment 
arbitration, as in Biloune v Ghana819. The tribunal said that its “competence is limited to 
commercial disputes” and that it would “arbitrate only disputes “in respect of” the foreign 
investment”820. The tribunal added: “while the acts alleged to violate international human rights of 
Mr Biloune […] this Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to address […] a claim of violation of human 
rights”821.  
Similar statements occurred in cases involving socio-economics rights of local populations, where 
serious disregards of human rights had occurred. For instance, in Von Pezold v Zimbabwe, the 
 
818 Robert McCorquodale, “Defining the international rule of law: defying gravity?” (2016) 65:2 ICLQ at 282. 
819 Biloune and Marine Drive Complex Ltd v Ghana Investments Centre and the Government of Ghana (Award on 
Jurisdiction and Liability), 1989 Ad-hoc Arbitration. 
820 Ibid at para 61. 
821 Ibid. 
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arbitral tribunal said that IHRL was not within its jurisdiction822 and “it did not feel competent to 
interpret indigenous rights and did not find human rights to be applicable”823. The tribunal also 
refused to recognise the connection between international investment law and IHRL824.   
Similar statements can be found in Border Timbers Limited825, Siemens826, and Sempra827, in which 
the arbitral tribunal found that international human rights law was not relevant to the dispute, nor 
in its mandate and did not mention it in its reasoning.  
 
Contrary to this tendency, there have been arbitrators who found international human rights 
law to be relevant for the case they were adjudicating. These decisions will be discussed in order 
to see how they consider and protect human rights in their decisions.  
 
In National Grid PLC v. Argentine Republic828, the Tribunal acknowledged the importance of 
Argentina’s obligations under international law829 and stated that Argentina “had as an objective 
the protection of social stability and the maintenance of essential services vital to the health and 
welfare of the population, an objective which is recognized in the framework of the international 
law of human rights.”830 However, the tribunal did not consider human rights in reaching its 
decision and IHRL did not  really impact the reasoning and the award rendered.  
 
822 Bernhard Von Pezold and ors. v Republic of Zimbabwe, supra note 508 at para 59: “The Arbitral Tribunals are 
not persuaded that consideration of the foregoing [human rights obligation under international law] is in fact part of 
their mandate under either the ICSID Convention or the applicable BITs". 
823 Kube & Petersmann, supra note 17 at 90; Bernhard Von Pezold and ors. v Republic of Zimbabwe (Procedural 
Order No. 2), supra note 505 at para 57. 
824 Bernhard Von Pezold and ors. v Republic of Zimbabwe, supra note 508 at para 58: “The Petitioners provided no 
evidence or support for their assertion that international investment law and international human rights law are 
interdependent". 
825 Border Timbers Limited, Border Timbers International (Private) Limited, and Hangani Development Co. 
(Private) Limited v Republic of Zimbabwe (Procedural Order No. 2), supra note 505 at paras 58–59: “The 
Petitioners provided no evidence or support for their assertion that international investment law and international 
human rights law are interdependent [...] The Arbitral Tribunals are not persuaded that consideration of the 
foregoing is in fact part of their mandate under either the ICSID Convention or the applicable BITs”. 
826 Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic, supra note 595 at paras 79, 121. 
827 Sempra Energy International v The Argentine Republic, supra note 336 at para 332; Kulick, supra note 617 at 
281: “There is little doubt as to the Tribunal’s eagerness to avoid considering human rights implications”. 
828 National Grid plc v The Argentine Republic (Award), [2008] UNCITRAL . 
829 Ibid at para 136. 
830 Ibid at para 245. 
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Similarly, in the case of EDF International, the tribunal did “not call into question the potential 
significance or relevance of human rights in connection with international investment”831. It added 
that “the Tribunal should be sensitive to international jus cogens norms, including basic principles 
of human rights”832 but it was not persuaded that the respondent’s actions were necessary to protect 
human rights833.  
In both cases, human rights were considered in the tribunal’s reasoning but not afforded any 
protection.  
 
There is, here, an illustration of the inconsistency arbitral tribunals concerning the 
relevance of human rights law in ISDS. This incoherence is particularly noticeable in awards 
dealing with the human right to water.  
Sometimes tribunals have not considered, nor given protection to the right to water834. In 
Azurix v. Argentina, the tribunal stated that “[a]ccording to Argentina’s expert, a conflict between 
a BIT and human rights treaties must be resolved in favor of human rights because the consumers’ 
public interest must prevail over the private interest of service provider”835 but then, the Tribunal 
concluded that consumers’ rights had not been violated. “The Tribunal fails to understand the 
incompatibility” between BIT’s obligations and human rights ones836.  
In Suez v Argentina837, the tribunal admitted the severity of Argentina’s financial crisis. 
Nonetheless, it affirmed that “Argentina is subject to both international obligations, i.e. human 
rights and treaty obligations, and must respect both of them. Under the circumstances of this case, 
Argentina’s human rights obligations and its investment treaty obligations are not inconsistent, 
 
831 EDF International S.A., SAUR International S.A. and León Participaciones Argentinas S.A. v. Argentine 
Republic, supra note 600 at para 912. 
832 Ibid at paras 192–193. 
833 Ibid at para 914. 
834 Aguas del Tunari SA v Bolivia (NGO Petition to Participate as Amici Curiae), supra note 519; Azurix Corp. v 
The Argentine Republic, supra note 595; Compania de Aguas del Aconquija SA and Vivendi Universal v Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No., supra note 533; Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, supra 
note 488; Impregilo SpA. v Argentine Republic, supra note 595; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona 
S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A.  v The Argentine Republic, supra note 538. 
835 Azurix Corp. v The Argentine Republic, supra note 595 at para 254. 
836 Ibid at para 261. 
837 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S,A, and Interagua Servicios Integrales de Agua SA v Argentina 
(Decision on Liability), [2010] ARB/03/17 at para 235. 
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contradictory, or mutually exclusive838. IHRL was not relevant in the discussion and the tribunal 
decided in favour of the investor. 
 
Again, this can be seen in the Suez/Vivendi case839 where the tribunal recognised the  “fundamental 
role of water in sustaining life and health and the consequent human right to water”840 but 
“Argentina could have attempted to apply more flexible means to assure the continuation of the 
water and sewage services to the people of Buenos Aires and at the same time respected its 
obligations of fair and equitable treatment”841.  
In Biwater Gauff, the tribunal acknowledged that “the arbitration raises a number of issues of vital 
concern to the local community […] water or other infrastructure services”842. The tribunal was 
aware of the challenges for local population and the potential impact of the award843, but the right 
to water received little relevance in the decision. The Biwater decision is more nuanced than the 
previous awards regarding the consideration of international human rights law.  
 
However, there are cases were arbitrators took into account human right to water issues 
and human rights law at large844. However, they did not guarantee human rights protection in all 
these cases.   
In the case of SAUR International, the tribunal made very interesting comments regarding the right 
to water:  
Les droits de l’homme en général, et le droit à l’eau en particulier, constituent l'une 
des diverses sources que le Tribunal devra prendre en compte pour résoudre le 
différend car ces droits sont élevés au sein du système juridique argentin au rang de 
droits constitutionnels et, de plus, ils font partie des principes généraux du droit 
international.845  
 
838 Ibid at para 240. 
839 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A.  v The Argentine Republic 
(Decision on Liability), supra note 540: “The provision of water and sewage services to the metropolitan area of 
Buenos Aires certainly was vital to the health and well-being of nearly ten million people”. 
840 Ibid at para 252. 
841 Ibid at 260. 
842 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania (Procedural Order No 5), supra note 488 at para 
50. 
843 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, supra note 488 at 358: “this arbitration raises a 
number of issues of concern to the wider community in Tanzania.” 
844 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, supra note 386; SAUR International S.A. c. République 
Argentine, supra note 595; Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The Argentine 
Republic, supra note 626. 




It added that the right to water amounts to “un droit fundamental” for citizens846. However, few 
lines later, it said that “[l]e droit fondamental à l’eau et le droit de l’investisseur à bénéficier de la 
protection offerte par l’APRI opèrent sur des plans différents"847. It is an odd statement considering 
that the tribunal acknowledged the importance of guaranteeing the human right to water and 
recognized that it has a duty to take them into account. Then, the tribunal affirmed that the States 
human rights obligations were compatibles with the ones deriving from the BIT848. 
Like Biwater decision, there is a move from absence of human rights considerations to an 
acknowledgment of the existence of human rights problems. Nevertheless, the interest for IHRL 
remains poor and not consistent. Arbitrators do not have a clear position on the matter, like in 
SAUR International. “The actual impact of this recognition on the Tribunal’s decision remains 
unclear”849, it goes from the admission fundamental rights questions to their absence of guarantee 
in their reason. They admit IHRL without deeply engaging in the matter. In the end, the case was 
settled in favour of the investor. It cannot be said that human rights were protected rendered the 
tribunal and that local population having their right to water breached were helped by the 
arbitrator’s decision. Therefore, the right to water in ISDS cases “often only played a marginal role 
in the judicial reasoning”850.  
 
It is only in Methanex851 and Urbaser852 that the tribunals actually dealt with IHRL and granted 
protection to the right to water.  
In Urbaser, it was said that “investors can be subject to the duties prevailing under different 
branches of international law, including human rights”853. The tribunal affirmed that the right to 
water is a recognised human right and that the obligation to respect human rights is put both on 
 
846 Ibid. 
847 Ibid at para 331. 
848 Ibid. 
849 Lorenzo Cotula, “Human Rights and Investor Obligations in Investor-State Arbitration” (2016) 17:1 J of World 
Investment & Trade 148 at 153. 
850 Kube & Petersmann, supra note 17 at 81. 
851 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, supra note 386. 
852 Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The Argentine Republic, supra note 626. 
853 Shinde, supra note 264 at 54. 
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the State and the investor854. Private parties are not exempted from complying with human rights 
obligations855.   
 
This case law regarding the human right to water shows that the relevance of IHRL 
incoherent. The same right is concerned, sometimes the host state is the same (i.e. Argentina) but 
the attitude of arbitral tribunals is very different. There are cases where host state’s measures were 
protected by the tribunals and others where it was not.  
 
The right to health is regularly raised in ISDS856. It is often associated with investments impacting 
water or the environment. There are cases were health and human rights issues were not relevant 
for the tribunal. 
In SD Myers, both parties acknowledged that PCBs raised serious health concerns857. However, 
the arbitrators held that Canada “could have satisfied any health or environmental concerns it had 
in a manner that did not impair open trade”858 and decided for the investor.  
In Grandriver859, the regulation of tobacco in the USA under the MSA (Master Settlement 
Agreement) was discussed. The arbitral tribunal went as far as saying that “the evidence before it 
leaves open to question whether the MSA scheme has in fact produced substantial health benefits 
for the participating states”860. The right to health was not further discussed.  
Again, in Tecmed v. Mexico, the tribunal did not establish that the investment, requiring a waste 
dumping license, actually threatened health and considered the State measures to be an obvious 
expropriation861. Questions of human rights law were avoided by the tribunal.  
 
 
854 Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The Argentine Republic, supra note 626 
at paras 1193, 1205. 
855 Ibid at paras 1193, 1199: “an obligation on all parts, public and private parties, not to engage in activity aimed at 
destroying such rights”; Attanasio & Sainati, supra note 639 at 746. 
856 Lo, supra note 331 at 15: “The problem is whether a measure taken by the host State to fulfill the requirements of 
the right to health will not be subject to compensation requirements as required by the BITs even if an investment is 
thus seriously affected.” . 
857 S.D. Myers, Inc. v Government of Canada, supra note 386 at para 153. 
858 Ibid at para 298. 
859 Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v United States of America, supra note 682. 
860 Ibid at para 185. 
861 Tecmed, supra note 386 at para 144. 
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There is a limited number of cases where actual consideration was granted to the right to 
health862. In Methanex863, the tribunal granted protection to the right to health in an implicit 
manner, relying on the State police powers. It recognised that the MTBE (methyl tertiary butyl 
ether), a derivative of methanol, was contaminating water sources, harming the environment and 
endangering health. It found that the United States adopted “a non-discriminatory regulation for a 
public purpose” that could not amount to an expropriation864. Nevertheless, there was no real 
discussion of IHRL.  
In Chemtura v Canada865, the tribunal affirmed that the host State measure was “motivated by the 
increasing awareness of the dangers presented by lindane for human health and the 
environment”866. The tribunal was more inclined to afford protection to the right to health867.  
 
Recently, Philip Morris v Uruguay868 is famous for its express human right to health’s869 
considerations and prevalence870. The issue of public health was raised regarding the plain 
packaging for tobacco products. The arbitral tribunal reaffirmed the police powers doctrine 
enabling a host State to adopt measures for public health reasons, particularly the consumption of 
tobacco871. The tribunal also said that the BIT could not prevent the host State to regulate in the 
protection of public health872. “[T]ighter tobacco control is basically to enhance the protection of 
human rights, especially the right to health”873. 
 
862 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, supra note 386; Chemtura Corporation v Government of 
Canada (Award), [2010] UNCITRAL ; Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos 
S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, supra note 509. 
863 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, supra note 386. 
864 Ibid at para 7. 
865 Chemtura Corporation v Government of Canada (Award), supra note 862. 
866 Ibid at para 266. 
867 Ibid at para 135. 
868 Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of 
Uruguay, supra note 509. 
869 Ibid at para 304. 
870 Zarra, supra note 281 at 171–172: “for the first time a tribunal fixed a clear hierarchy between the protection of 
public concerns and private interest of the investor”. 
871 Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of 
Uruguay, supra note 509 at para 287. 
872 Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products SA and Abal Hermanos SA v Oriental Republic of Uruguay 
(Decision on Jurisdiction), [2013] ARB/10/7 at para 174; Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. 
and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, supra note 509 at para 291: “Protecting public health has 
since long been recognized as an essential manifestation of the State’s police power as indicated also by Article 2(1) 
of the BIT which permits contracting States to refuse to admit investments “for reasons of public security and order, 
public health and morality”. 
873 Lo, supra note 331 at 17. 
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Moving to another important fundamental right, investments often have an impact on the 
environment (i.e. gold mining operation, mining exploitation operations, water treatment and 
provision etc.) bringing right to a safe environment matters in ISDS. There was a time were 
environmental questions did not interest investment arbitration874. In Compañia de Desarrollo 
where the tribunal stated that “[t]he international source of the obligation to protect the 
environment makes no difference”875  and added “no matter how laudable and beneficial to society 
as a whole - are, in this respect, similar to any other expropriatory measures”876.   
 
In SD Myers, the tribunal concluded that the Canadian ban of exports of PCB waste aimed firstly 
at protecting the waste industry and not the environment877. In Vattenfall878 environmental 
measures were adopted by Germany after a report highlight the negative impact of the coal-power 
plant on the environment and river’s health879. Germany agreed to settle the case and lowered its 
environmental standards to fit the investor. Germany was referred to the European Court of Justice 
by the European Commission for its failure to protect the river’s wildlife880.  
 
These cases highlight the absence of socio-economic rights mentions in investment arbitration 
awards. They are example of how the system fails in the protection of environmental rights.  
 
Some improvements in the matter is noticeable in Glamis Gold v USA881. The arbitral 
tribunal studied the impact of California’s environmental resolutions on investor’s rights under 
NAFTA and decided in favour of the host State. This award “is a good example for demonstrating 
 
874 Aguas del Tunari SA v Bolivia (NGO Petition to Participate as Amici Curiae), supra note 519; Tecmed, supra 
note 386. 
875 Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica (Final Award), supra note 595 at para 
71. 
876 Ibid at para 72. 
877 S.D. Myers, Inc. v Government of Canada, supra note 386 at para 162. 
878 Vattenfall AB v Federal Republic of Germany (Request for Arbitration), [2009] ARB/09/6 . 
879 Ibid at para 40. 
880 European Commission, “Germany in Court for inadequate nature protection”, (26 March 2015), online: 
European Commission <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_15_4669>. 
881 Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, supra note 512. 
 143 
that the indirect influence of human rights considerations is beginning to stretch beyond the 
confines of compensation”882.  
In the Chemtura award, there was increasing awareness of the dangers presented by lindane for 
the environment. The tribunal stated that “[a] measure adopted under such circumstances is a valid 
exercise of the State's police powers and, as a result, does not constitute an expropriation”883.  
 
In Pacific Rim Cayman v. El Salvador, the country was sued for not delivering the mining 
concession to the investor as it did not meet the environmental regulatory requirements884. In the 
award, environmental issues were discussed, especially the fact that the mining concession would 
render water sources contaminated885. The investor’s claim was dismissed. The tribunal granted 
protection to the environment by recognising that El Salvador did not breach any of its obligations 
under CAFTA886.  
 
Burlington v. Ecuador887 raised other environmental concerns, where Ecuador adopted Law 42, 
increasing taxes for oil companies on windfall profits and subsequently breached by the investor. 
In the decision on counterclaims, arbitrators discussed the notion of environmental harm at 
length888 and found Burlington liable for the “costs of restoring the environment” (i.e. 
environmental damages)889. The tribunal recognized “the public interest that underlies Ecuador’s 
environmental counterclaim, namely the protection of the Amazon rainforest, which represents a 
major stake in the survival of mankind.”890 This case showed that “BITs are not international 




882 Kulick, supra note 617 at 303. 
883 Chemtura Corporation v Government of Canada (Award), supra note 862 at para 266. 
884 Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. The Republic of El Salvador, supra note 541 at para 3.9 and following, 6.21. 
885 Ibid at para 8.33. 
886 Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), 43 I.L.M. 514 2004. 
887 Burlington Resources Inc. v. República del Ecuador, supra note 742. 
888 See in particular ibid at para 273. 
889 Burlington Resources Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador (Decision on Ecuador’s Counterclaims), supra note 630 at 
para 1099. 
890 Burlington Resources Inc. v. República del Ecuador, supra note 742 at para 632. 
891 Burova, supra note 622. 
 144 
Recently, in David Aven892, due consideration was granted to environmental issues. Investors 
decided to build tourist facilities. Costa Rican authorities issued injunctions to end the works of 
investors, building tourist facilities893, as it led to felling of trees and impacted wetlands, therefore 
damaging the environment. Arbitrators accepted “giving preference to the standards of 
environmental protection that were stated to be of interest to the Treaty Parties at the time it was 
signed”894. The tribunal recalled that “Under Article 10, Section A of DR-CAFTA, foreign investors 
have the obligation to abide by and comply with the measures taken by the host State to protect the 
environment”895.  
Even if there was a contrast between human rights and environmental cases where arbitrators were 
more inclined to take international environmental law into account896, this belief is evolving in 
light of the recent cases that grapple with other human rights questions897.  
 
There are few cases where indigenous rights were raised before arbitral tribunals like in 
Glamis Gold, which acknowledged the existence indigenous rights problems in the disputes but 
found it irrelevant to consider them898.  
Recently, in the Von Pezold case, the tribunal after indigenous rights have been raised to its 
attention, said that it was “not persuaded that consideration of the foregoing is in fact part of their 
mandate under either the ICSID Convention or the applicable BITs”899.  
Contrary to the other two cases, in Grandriver Enterprise, the claimant alleged that the measures 
taken by the USA to regulate the sale of tobacco were violating its rights as indigenous, because 
tobacco production was part of its culture900. Even if the tribunal briefly discussed the issue, it 
dismissed the claim, giving precedence to US health protection’s measures901.   
 
892 David R. Aven and Others v. Republic of Costa Rica, supra note 423. 
893 Ibid at paras 93 and following. 
894 Ibid at para 412. 
895 Ibid at paras 736–739. 
896 Moshe Hirsch, “Investment Tribunals and Human Rights: Divergent Paths” in Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann & Francesco Francioni, eds, Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration (Oxford 
University Press, 2009) 97 at 106. 
897 Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The Argentine Republic, supra note 626; 
Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, 
supra note 509. 
898 Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, supra note 512 at para 8. 
899 Bernhard Von Pezold and ors. v Republic of Zimbabwe, supra note 508 at para 59. 
900 Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v United States of America, supra note 682 pt II. 
901 Ibid at paras 209, 221, 234. 
 145 
Indigenous rights are not good arguments to raise in front of investment tribunals as arbitrators 
usually find them of little interest.  
 
Finally, cultural rights do not seem to be problematic for arbitral tribunals. Both in the case 
of Southern Pacific Properties902 and in Parkerings companies903, the arbitral tribunals have duly 
considered and granted protection to cultural rights violated by the investors904. In the few 
available cases concerning cultural rights, the position adopted by arbitrators is consistent. 
 
There are pending cases which involve human rights considerations such as environmental 
rights905 and health906. It remains to be seen how arbitrators will deal with these issues and if they 
will grant them some importance. The case of Gabriel Resources has already caused a lot of ink 
to flow in the media. In order to have their voices heard, local populations impacted by the 
investment are being represented by various NGOs907.   
 
It can be seen that the position of arbitral tribunals regarding the relevance of international 
human rights law in cases where economic, social and cultural rights are impacted by the 
investment, is oscillating908. Arbitrators do not provide any coherence in their statements regarding 
the relevance of IHRL. It should also be noted that it is complicated for them to address human 
rights issues. It is hard to understand how arbitrators in cases with similar factual background, 
similar respondents and the same human rights at issue, can reach completely opposite solution909, 
 
902 Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v Arab Republic of Egypt (Award), [1992] ARB/84/3 . 
903 Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, supra note 681. 
904 Ibid at paras 382, 383, 465. 
905 Infinito Gold v Costa Rica, supra note 550; Chevron Corporation (U.S.A.) v The Republic of Ecuador 
(Procedural Order No. 8), supra note 553; Gabriel Resources Ltd. and Gabriel Resources (Jersey) Ltd. v Romania 
(Procedural Order No. 19), supra note 558. 
906 Chevron Corporation (U.S.A.) v The Republic of Ecuador (Procedural Order No. 8), supra note 553. 
907 “Gabriel Resources seeks damages from Romania in intl. arbitration over blocking gold mine due to 
environmental & access to water concerns”, (2015), online: Business & Human Rights Resource Centre 
<https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/gabriel-resources-seeks-damages-from-romania-in-intl-arbitration-over-
blocking-gold-mine-due-to-environmental-access-to-water-concerns-0>; Lisa Kadel & Christian Schliemann, 
“Gabriel Resources v. Romania: Local Residents as Third Parties in Investor-State Dispute Settlement?”, (19 April 
2019), online: Oxford Human Rights Hub <https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/gabriel-resources-v-romania-local-residents-as-
third-parties-in-investor-state-dispute-settlement/>. 
908 Schreuer, supra note 385 at 289: “The attitude of investment tribunals towards human rights considerations is not 
uniform. In a number of decisions, tribunals have shown a reserved or even negative attitude towards arguments 
based on human rights”. 
909 Tienhaara, supra note 26 at 614: “there have been cases where several awards have been issued addressing the 
same facts where panels have reached diverging conclusions.” 
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thereby creating such inconsistency within the jurisprudence. This challenges the concept of legal 
certainty910. 
In the cases discussed, human rights terminology is scarce. In other words, it appears that arbitral 
tribunals would rather mention the “public interest”, “public health” rather than use the word 
“human right”. As noticed by Cazala, “la pratique générale des tribunaux ne semble pas accorder 
de poids aux considérations de protection des droits de l’homme dans cet exercice"911.  
In addition, the “combination of imprecise, ambiguous standards and ad hoc arbitral resolution has 
led to a lack of coherence in the development of a ‘system’ of international investment treaty-
based law”912. Indeed, the “formulation et l’autorité parfois incertaine de ces droits ne favorisent 
sans doute pas leur prise en compte la plus large par les tribunaux d’investissements".913  
 
Thus, the vagueness of human rights law impacts ISDS and the awards rendered on the 
matter challenge legal certainty914.  
Therefore, it is necessary to conduct a deeper analysis of the tendency emanating from 
investment arbitration jurisprudence. This is the objective of the following chapter which will also 





910 Paunio, supra note 182 at 51; Hobér, supra note 197 at 64. 
911 Cazala, supra note 340 at 331. 
912 Calamita, supra note 431 at 167. 
913 Cazala, supra note 340 at 321. 
914 Calamita, supra note 431. 
 
 
Chapter 3: Consequences of arbitral jurisprudence on legal certainty, 
human rights and the rule of law 
 
In the last two decades, environmental and human rights issues have interfered with 
investment arbitration and ISDS cannot ignore these questions anymore. We have demonstrated 
that it is difficult to bring human rights claims before investment arbitration tribunals, both at the 
procedural and substantive stages. The system needs to adapt and evolve in light of the global 
changes and societies’ development.  
It is necessary to analyse what are the consequences of this on the jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals 
and its impact of legal certainty and the rule of law.  
 
Therefore, this chapter aims at analyzing the trend developed by arbitral tribunals in cases 
involving human rights and what can be inferred from their decisions (Section 1). The 
jurisprudence of investment arbitration has consequences on legal certainty and it is necessary to 
understand what the effects of an absence of legal certainty in ISDS are, more precisely on human 
rights (Section 2). Finally, the impact of international investment arbitration on the rule of law, 
through the human rights and legal certainty elements, will bring the final thoughts to this thesis 
(Section 3).
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Section 1: The trend of investment arbitration jurisprudence 
 
 Ten years ago, Toral and Schultz wrote that investment arbitration “seems to be leaning 
toward separation of human rights and investor’s rights like oil and water”915. Is it still the case ? 
This section will focus on analysing the investment arbitration jurisprudence concerning human 
rights.  
Host states taking measures to protect their local communities from an investment are often found 
to be in breach of an investment treaty in arbitration. “Human rights scholars and civil society, 
argue that foreign investors and governments do not prioritize the obligation to respect and protect 
fundamental human rights, thereby systematically undermining human rights standards”916. 
Human rights issues are often confronted with expropriation and FET standards and “these two 
obligations have the greatest potential to place limit upon state action for the protection and 
promotion of human rights while favouring commercial interests of foreign investors”917.  
 
If human rights and the environment are recurring issues, one must not ignore the 
“‘thinness’ of jurisprudence” regarding human rights918. Awards rendered are still very much silent 
regarding human rights law.919  
This section will discuss the consistency in the jurisprudence developed by investment arbitration 
tribunals (sub-section 1) and then show that evolution is actually occurring in this field (sub-section 
2). Bringing public international law matters into international investment law nonetheless remains 
a difficult task and ISDS is still confronted with difficult adjustments (sub-section 3).  
 
 
Sub-section 1: An obvious inconsistence in investment arbitration awards involving 
human rights  
 
 
915 Toral & Schultz, supra note 376 at 589. 
916 Steininger, “Leiden Journal of International Law”, supra note 345 at 34. 
917 Barnali Choudhury, “Democratic Implications Arising from the Intersection of Investment Arbitration and 
Human Rights” (2009) 46:4 Alta L Rev 983 at 995. 
918 Simma, supra note 10 at 578. 
919 Kube & Petersmann, supra note 17 at 67. 
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Because of procedural and substantive problems, there is inconsistency in affording 
protection to human rights. This has been demonstrated in the two previous chapters. The 
vagueness of economic, social and cultural rights clearly impacts how arbitrators consider them. 
Guntrip suggests that “the next stage in introducing human rights into ICSID arbitration will be to 
determine, with more precision, which rights are capable of forming the basis of host state human 
rights counterclaim”920.  
 
In jurisprudence involving socio-economic rights, amicus curiae are emerging and bringing 
transparency921: but they are not consistently admitted. “There is scope for more expansive amicus 
intervention. Whether more intense intervention will materialise in all the circumstances is far less 
clear”922. Third parties are often confronted to several admissibility criteria and they cannot fully 
participate in the proceedings923. The unsuccessful participation of third parties affect the 
opportunity for tribunals to consider human rights924 and do not establish a stable and predictable 
environment for the parties, the tribunals and the third parties. Similar problems exist regarding 
counterclaims or the defence of protecting human rights; they are often dismissed and the relevance 
of IHRL does not meet unanimity among arbitral tribunals925. 
 
From this demonstration, it can be affirmed that arbitral tribunals “have not developed a coherent 
methodology for evaluating the human rights dimensions of investment disputes”926. Indeed, 
investment tribunals did not establish consistent body of rules in dealing with human rights927 and 
this seriously impacts the rule of law.  
 
 
920 Guntrip, supra note 629. 
921 Mourre, supra note 471 at 270: “there is certainly a trend towards increased transparency in investment 
arbitration, and the admission of amicus curiae briefs is part of that tendency”. 
922 Lamb, Harrison & Hen, supra note 464 at 91. 
923 Mourre, supra note 471 at 270. 
924 Ibid at 266: “letting amici curiae enter the dark room will show the world how concerned international arbitrators 
are about issues like the environment, welfare or public health”. 
925 Cazala, supra note 340 at 334: “il sera difficile pour l’État de présenter devant un tribunal arbitral 
d’investissement, une demande reconventionnelle portant sur des allégations de violations de droits de l’homme par 
l’investisseur”; Gaillard, supra note 648 at 1037–1041; See Thesis note 122 Part 2, Chapter 1, Section 3. 
926 Kube & Petersmann, supra note 17 at 86. 
927 Hirsch, supra note 896 at 107. 
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 The Argentinian crisis is a blatant example of inconsistency in arbitral tribunals dealing 
with socio-economic rights. All claims arose out of the 2001-2002 financial crisis and the measures 
taken by Argentina to stabilize its situation but harming investors928. The cases often involved the 
right to water and the right to health. At a procedural level, there are cases where third parties were 
admitted and other not929. In addition, the necessity defense was sometimes accepted to justify 
emergency measures and sometimes refused930. The problem is that different arbitral tribunals 
“when confronted with the same facts, evidence, and argumentation would reach very different 
interpretations of the law and diametrically opposite holdings is, by itself, sufficient to call into 
question the legitimacy and viability of the ICSID arbitral system”931.   
In substance, consideration of human rights was frugal932. Most of the time arbitration tribunals 
swept away its argumentation as it was only “cursory reference to “human rights” without any 
further specification and elaboration”933. 
There is a spectacular incoherence regarding Argentina’s decisions leading to completely 
contradictory outcomes from arbitral tribunals. Burke-White writes that the decisions are “deeply 
problematic, due in part to poor legal reasoning and questionable treaty interpretation and, also, to 
the contradictory holdings in the awards”934.  
 
Argentina’s cases can be contrasted with the Tanzanian one935, involving access to water and 
environmental questions. The state was not required to pay damages for breaching the BIT and the 
importance of those problems on local populations was acknowledged936. It is optimistic that “the 
outcome reached by the tribunal effectively supported the decision by a State to take drastic 
measures to regain control of its water supply from a private supplier whose performance had been 
poor”937.  
 
928 Burke-White, supra note 347 at 410. 
929 See note 122 Part 2, Chapter 1, Section 2. 
930 See Thesis ibid Part 2, Chapter 1, Section 3. 
931 Burke-White, supra note 347 at 425. 
932 See Thesis note 122 Part 2, Chapter 2, Section 2, Sub-section 2. 
933 Kulick, supra note 617 at 279. 
934 Burke-White, supra note 347 at 408. 
935 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, supra note 488. 
936 Bray, supra note 524 at 481. 
937 Truswell, supra note 242 at 582; Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, supra note 488 
at para 486; See also Kulick, supra note 617 at 300: “the Biwater award appears to have internalized the relevance 
of Global Public Interest considerations to an even higher degree than Azurix”. 
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The vagueness and imprecision of economic, social and cultural rights render their 
protection by arbitral tribunals difficult. However, “dialogue about whether access to water is a 
human right, should not distract from the central fact regarding the necessity of water. Indeed, this 
fact alone should be sufficient to influence the treatment of water contracts by investment 
tribunals”938.  
Pellet regrets that, “comme c’est trop souvent le cas dans le droit des investissements, la 
jurisprudence est loin d’être homogène – fragmentation au sein d’un sous-système, conséquence 
difficilement évitable du mécanisme très décentralisé de règlement des différends relatifs aux 
investissements existant tant à l’intérieur qu’à l’extérieur du CIRDI"939.  
 
 It seems that the Urbaser case940 is at the origin of some positive evolution in the 
investment arbitration jurisprudence, as the case put some light on the arbitrators’ capacity to 
consider human rights and impose obligations upon investor.  
 
In 2016, the Urbaser case broke the pattern established by ISDS case in recognizing that 
investors could be subject to human rights obligations941. Indeed, the tribunal clearly “held that 
international human rights condition the treatment that an investor is entitled to receive from a 
state and that human rights impose obligations on the investor itself”942. The tribunal “attempted 
to integrate human rights obligations with investment protections and generate a consistent set of 
state obligations”943. The tribunal also stated that the investor knew about Argentina’s obligations 
 
938 Truswell, supra note 242 at 575. 
939 Alain Pellet, “Notes sur la ‘fragmentation’ du droit international: droit des investissements internationaux et 
droits de l’homme” in Denis Alland et al, eds, Unité et diversité du droit international: ecrits en l’honneur du 
professeur Pierre-Marie Dupuy (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2014) at 765. 
940 Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The Argentine Republic, supra note 626. 
941 Ibid at para 1196: “in order to ensure that such rights be enjoyed by each person, it must necessarily also be 
ensured that no other individual or entity, public or private, may act in disregard of such rights”. 
942 Attanasio & Sainati, supra note 639 at 744; Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia Ur 
Partzuergoa v. The Argentine Republic, supra note 626 at para 1209. 
943 Attanasio & Sainati, supra note 639 at 747; Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia Ur 
Partzuergoa v. The Argentine Republic, supra note 626 at paras 618–624, 720. 
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regarding the right to water944 and that it should have framed its expectations in light of this 
framework945.   
The case is innovative as it qualified both IHRL and IIL “as integrated and complementary parts 
of the international legal system”946 in opposition to other SAURI947 or Suez948 cases which stated 
that these areas of law could not operate together.  
In Urbaser, the arbitrators made a step forward as they admitted that the UDHR949 and ICESCR 
established a right to water950. The tribunal acknowledged that obligations were deriving from the 
right to water. It is clear that “individuals and entities necessarily have obligations not to act in 
disregard of the rights enshrined in these [international human rights law] instruments”951. 
 
This position is new as “[h]istorically, international has not imposed any direct obligation on 
corporations”952. The “Urbaser tribunal recognized corporate human rights obligations. It may 
seem surprising that an investment tribunal, rather than a human rights body, was the first to do 
so”953. The Urbaser case “proves the increasing convergence of human rights with investment 
law”954 and this is of utmost importance as “these two sets of legal regimes belong to the same 
legal order, namely this international one”955. 
 
The following cases involving similar human rights and environmental problems have been 
inspired by the decisions rendered in Urbaser956  
 
944 Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The Argentine Republic, supra note 626 
at paras 720–723. 
945 Ibid at para 624; Attanasio & Sainati, supra note 639 at 745. 
946 Attanasio & Sainati, supra note 639 at 750. 
947 SAUR International S.A. c. République Argentine, supra note 595. 
948 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A.  v The Argentine Republic, 
supra note 538. 
949 UDHR, supra note 2. 
950 Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The Argentine Republic, supra note 626 
at paras 1196–1197. 
951 Attanasio & Sainati, supra note 639 at 745. 
952 Ibid at 749; Dumberry & Dumas-Aubin, supra note 394 at 356. 
953 Attanasio & Sainati, supra note 639 at 749. 
954 Zarra, supra note 281 at 172. 
955 Dupuy, supra note 440 at 61. 
956 Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The Argentine Republic, supra note 626. 
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The Philip Morris’ decision is important in the implicit protection afforded to the right to health 
and host state regulations on plain packaging for tobacco productions957. The tribunal recognised 
that the case raised an important public interest issue958. The case also acknowledges the relevance 
of third parties’ intervention, as in Pacific Rim Cayman and Infinito Gold cases959. It shows that 
“the increasing receptiveness towards amicus briefs continues”960.  
Similarly, in the David Aven case, the tribunal repeated that investors’ obligations towards 
environmental standards and breaches of these obligations incur liability961. The tribunal made 
reference to the Urbaser and Burlington v Ecuador cases in order to justify its jurisdiction to 
consider environmental right claim962. It agreed with Urbaser’s decisions that investors do not 
have immunity for environmental rights breaches nor erga omnes obligations (i.e. human 
rights)963.  
 
The decisions in Philip Morris964, Urbaser965 but also recently David Aven966, “squarely 
go against the decisions in which tribunals expressly dismissed human rights argument stating that 
[their] competence is limited only to the commercial merits in the disputes”967. These decisions 
demonstrate an evolution in the system of ISDS where human rights law can play a role in the 
resolution of the disputes.  
 
The outcome of Burlington v Ecuador968 is also positive for the protection of the environment. In 
that case, the tribunal granted protection to respondent’s right both under Ecuador domestic and 
international law969. However, such position should not be taken for granted as the award lacks 
 
957 Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of 
Uruguay, supra note 509 at paras 9–12. 
958 Ibid at paras 39, 338. 
959 Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. The Republic of El Salvador, supra note 541; Infinito Gold v Costa Rica, supra note 
550. 
960 Lamb, Harrison & Hen, supra note 464 at 87. 
961 David R. Aven and Others v. Republic of Costa Rica, supra note 423 at para 734. 
962 Ibid at para 736. 
963 Ibid at paras 737–739. 
964 Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of 
Uruguay, supra note 509. 
965 Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The Argentine Republic, supra note 626. 
966 David R. Aven and Others v. Republic of Costa Rica, supra note 423. 
967 Zarra, supra note 281 at 172. 
968 Burlington Resources Inc. v. República del Ecuador, supra note 742 at paras 631–632; Burlington Resources Inc. 
v. Republic of Ecuador (Decision on Ecuador’s Counterclaims), supra note 630. 
969 Burova, supra note 622. 
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harshness regarding human rights and also fails to impose binding obligations on the investors 
regarding environmental protection of the Amazon rainforest. The case has some positive impacts 
and it continues the trend showing that ISDS can be a mechanism for protection against violations 
of rights from investors.  
 
Given the above, it is fair to say that “there is a recent tendency of arbitrators to integrate 
non-economic concerns between the law applicable to decide the merits of a dispute, giving due 
(and primary) consideration to the host State’s regulatory powers on matters that affect public 
needs”970. Nevertheless, there is still a long way before it is rooted in the practice of arbitral 
tribunals as there are also recent cases that go against this movement971.  
 
The review of the cases noted above demonstrates that human rights and environmental issues are 
more and more often dealt with by arbitrators. Having said that, it is far from being a consistent 
practice. It also seems that “tribunals have been more willing to consider human rights issues in 
another context, namely that of amicus curiae submissions”972. Nevertheless, the reluctance of 
arbitrators to engage in such discussions remains obvious.  
 
Sub-section 2: Difficulties of ISDS to admit changes 
 
 It has been explained that change seems to occur in the field of ISDS with arbitral panels 
being slowly inclined to grant due consideration to human rights and environmental questions. 
Human rights and environmental arguments are gaining importance within the system. 
Nonetheless, the case law discussed in Chapter 2 demonstrates that “human rights as a multilevel 
legal system protecting substantive entitlements continue to play only a marginal role in ISDS 
arbitration”973.  
 
970 Zarra, supra note 281 at 172. 
971 Border Timbers Limited, Border Timbers International (Private) Limited, and Hangani Development Co. 
(Private) Limited v Republic of Zimbabwe (Procedural Order No. 2), supra note 505; Suez, Sociedad General de 
Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A.  v The Argentine Republic, supra note 538; Bernhard Von 
Pezold and ors. v Republic of Zimbabwe, supra note 508. 
972 Reiner & Schreuer, supra note 389 at 90. 
973 Kube & Petersmann, supra note 17 at 86. 
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As developed in Chapter 2974, the reference to human rights is scarce. There is an absence of socio-
economic rights terminology and no direct reference to the ICESCR, except in Urbaser975. 
References to article 31(3)(c)976 to incorporate human rights are poor and amicus’ submissions are 
not common practice977.  Considering the number of awards discussed, “we can here observe a 
similar pattern of reluctance to directly refer to or consider human rights argumentation in the 
analyzed case law”978. 
 
The general overview of investment arbitration demonstrates a reluctance of arbitrators to duly 
regard human rights and environmental problems in deciding a case979. Cazala notices « l’absence 
d’enthousiasme des membres des tribunaux d’investissements pour se confronter à des questions 
de protection des droits de l’homme »980.  Hirsch justifies this situation by the fact that “structural 
differences [between public international law and international investment law] have led 
investment tribunals to grant precedence to the contractual or consensual rules that have been 
agreed upon by host states and investors […]”981. Tribunals would, therefore, give prominence to 
what has been agreed by the parties and the information available to them982.  
 
On the opposite, arbitral tribunals “are more open towards human rights as due process … 
and as principle of procedural fairness … Other substantive human rights, e.g., indigenous rights 
or the right to water are hardly taken into consideration in substantive terms”983. For instance, in 
the Phoenix Action Ltd v. Czech Republic984, the tribunal affirmed that there was no protection for 
“investments made in violation of the most fundamental rules of protection of human rights, like 
 
974 See Thesis note 122 Part 2, Chapter 2. 
975 Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The Argentine Republic, supra note 626 
at para 1209. 
976 VCLT, supra note 668 Article 31(3)(c). 
977 See Thesis note 122 Part 2, Chapter 1, Section 2. 
978 Kulick, supra note 617 at 300. 
979 Feria-Tinta, supra note 328 at 601: "The international law of investments and the law of human rights appear to 
have, in the practice of arbitration, an uneasy, tense, strained relationship”; See Thesis note 122 Part 2, Chapter 2, 
Section 2. 
980 Cazala, supra note 340 at 330. 
981 Moshe Hirsch, “Interactions between Investment and Non-Investment Obligations” in Peter Muchlinski, Federico 
Ortino & Christoph Schreuer, eds, The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008) 319 at 344. 
982 Ibid. 
983 Kube & Petersmann, supra note 17 at 69. 
984 Phoenix Action Ltd v Czech Republic (Award), [2009] ARB/06/5 . 
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investments made in pursuance of torture or genocide or in support of slavery or trafficking of 
human organs”985. Similarly, in EDF v Argentina, the tribunal acknowledged that protection of jus 
cogens norms could justify any treaty breaches, but this is not the case for any human rights’ 
protection986. Therefore, “BITs must not be interpreted to prevent governments from fulfilling their 
obligations, for example, to prevent torture and slavery”987. 
 
The difficulty of applying economic social and cultural rights988, as well as the international 
acceptance and recognition of first generation rights can explain this difference of treatment. 
Consequently, incoherence in investment awards where jus cogens norms are infringed is scarce, 
probably because they are recognised to be the highest laws of humanity.  
Nonetheless, such difference of treatment should not remain. As Alain Pellet explains, « on peut 
considérer que les droits humains, qui ne sont pas reconnus comme cogens ni même obligatoires 
au plan universel, sont impératifs dans les cercles plus « intégrés » comme l’Europe et l’ensemble 
des démocraties « occidentales » »989. It is necessary to stop granting protection to investments 
that infringe fundamental rights, they are necessary for the life of any human being990.  
 
It is possible to draw another comparison with the position of arbitral tribunals concerning 
corruption where “contracts of corruption or on contracts obtained by corruption cannot be upheld 
by this Arbitral Tribunal”991. Bribery effectively threatens the rule of law and international 
society992. It is interesting to question whether fundamental human rights could be afforded the 
same type of protection where they are violated by an investor993. They, too, are threats to human 
life and infringement of the rule of law. Therefore, “to extent that recent tribunals have denied 
 
985 Ibid at para 78. 
986 EDF International S.A., SAUR International S.A. and León Participaciones Argentinas S.A. v. Argentine 
Republic, supra note 600 at para 914. 
987 Simma & Kill, supra note 666 at 705. 
988 See Thesis note 122 Part 2, Chapter 2, Section 2. 
989 Pellet, supra note 939 at 763. 
990 Truswell, supra note 242 at 585: “Even before access to safe water is universally recognised as a human right, the 
biological necessity of fresh water is sufficient reason for private water contracts to receive special treatment under 
investment law”. 
991 World Duty Free Company Limited v Republic of Kenya (Award), [2006] ARB/00/7 at para 157. 
992 World Justice Project, note 3; Metal-Tech Ltd v Republic of Uzbekistan (Award), [2013] ARB/10/3 at paras 116, 
389: “ensure the promotion of the rule of law, which entails that a court or tribunal cannot grant assistance to a party 
that has engaged in a corrupt act”. 
993 Dumberry & Dumas-Aubin, supra note 394 at 365: “when fundamental human rights abuses have been 
committed. In our view, these are precisely the kind of investments not worthy of protection under a BIT”. 
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admissibility of claims based on misrepresentations made by the claimant and bribery, it is 
submitted that they should do the same when faced with human rights violations”994.  
 
There are authors who explain that the reluctance, Berünhrungsangst 995, of arbitrators to 
intervene concerning human rights interests in investment arbitration, can be justified by their 
professional background. As Simma puts it, “[t]his might be in the investment arbitrators’ genes, 
because what is probably the large majority of them has a private or commercial law rather than a 
public law or public international law background”996. It is clear from the jurisprudence in ISDS 
that “[l]es tribunaux arbitraux ont en effet, en règle générale, tendance à suivre une logique 
d’investissement plutôt qu’à se fonder sur les règles protectrices des droits humains”997.  
 
Nonetheless, the reluctance of arbitrators to tackle human rights questions seems to be 
subject to positive evolution.998. It can be hoped that the trend developed after Urbaser999 will 
continue to influence other arbitral tribunals and not remain dead letter1000. As Burke-White rightly 
puts it, “[w]ithout an appellate review, those repeat precedents gain perhaps undue weight and 
authority within the system”1001.  
 
The inconsistency that remains in the human rights jurisdiction challenges legal certainty and 
consequently the rule of law. The absence of legal certainty in the law and the case law has serious 
impacts, be they at the legal, environmental, economic level. It is necessary to focus on some of 





995 Simma, supra note 10 at 576. 
996 Ibid. 
997 Pellet, supra note 939 at 770. 
998 Farrugia, supra note 329 at 282: “The evidence suggests that, at the very least, human rights considerations are in 
the ascendancy generally". 
999 Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The Argentine Republic, supra note 626. 
1000 Attanasio & Sainati, supra note 639 at 750: "“Urbaser lays the framework for addressing international human 
rights obligations in the context of international investment protections. Whether other tribunals will build upon this 
framework to impose liability on a corporation for human rights violations remains to be seen”. 
1001 Burke-White, supra note 347 at 427. 
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Section 2: The consequences of insufficient legal certainty  
 
The rapid evolution of international investment law and arbitration, the growing number 
of cases and human rights issues in ISDS, in a field normally hermetic to such issues, have made 
it difficult for arbitrators to keep up with legal certainty1002. However, “[c]oherence is an 
undeniable feature of any credible method of dispute settlement”1003. For a legal system and a 
dispute settlement mechanism to be efficient, it is necessary that it renders coherent decisions, with 
a consistent understanding of the law especially where factual situations are similar and ensure 
predictability for its users. It must provide legal certainty. However, this is far from being achieved 
in ISDS and the case law studied highlight important inconsistencies. Prof Saverio Di Benedetto 
offered an interesting metaphor about the legal certainty problems in the system:  
 
the image which best synthesizes [international investment law and arbitration] is that 
of a patchwork, given its fragmentation into a multiplicity of autonomous legal 
instruments and, by the same token, the settlement of investment disputes by 
independent investment tribunals. This patchwork provides [the] notion of 
fragmentation in the international law on foreign investments, and if taken to its 
extreme consequences, would even prevent scholars from construing international 
investment law in a unitary manner1004. 
 
 Insufficient legal certainty in ISDS the system and its users; it creates a serious problem of 
predictability and security for investors and host states, but also for arbitrators themselves (sub-
section 1). Unsatisfactory legal certainty does not enable investment arbitration to effectively 
protect human rights (sub-section 2) and neither promote coherence among the international 






1002 Tienhaara, supra note 26 at 627. 
1003 Zarra, supra note 281 at 184. 
1004 Saverio Di Benedetto, International Investment Law and the Environment (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2013) at 22. 
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Sub-section 1: Legal consequences  
 
  The absence of a strict legal certainty can have few positive impacts as it avoids the 
development of strict and rigid jurisprudence in ISDS. The system is able to adapt to every case 
before it1005. Furthermore, it is said that inconsistency is valuable as “it keeps the investment 
arbitration community vigilant and contributes to the development and refinement of substantive 
and procedural standards”1006.  
 
 However, the negative consequences of insufficient legal certainty are far more numerous. 
The first ones to be affected by poor legal certainty are the users of the ISDS system, i.e. the host 
State and the investor. For instance, the introduction of human rights considerations at the stage of 
the arbitral proceedings by amicus curiae or arbitrators in their reasoning, whereas the BIT was 
silent on the matter, is “a surprise” for both parties. Very often, the parties have not introduced 
legally binding provisions regarding environment and human rights protection in their agreements. 
Unfortunately, “[t]he language used in IIAs has generated unanticipated (and at times inconsistent) 
interpretations by arbitral tribunals, and has resulted in a lack of predictability as to what IIAs 
actually require from States.”1007 Therefore, it creates a serious problem of predictability and legal 
certainty for ISDS users1008.  
 
This is problematic as commercial and international transactions require the utmost degree 
of stability and therefore, legal certainty1009. Insufficient legal certainty in the awards cumulatively 
with “the imprecision of human rights treaty terms (and the absence of authoritative interpretation) 
raises further concerns about the indeterminacy of the parties’ rights and obligations and the ex 
ante ability of affected parties to know the law”1010. In other words,  it is “producing a piecemeal, 
 
1005 Wrbka, supra note 186 at 13–14. 
1006 Irene M Ten Cate, “The Costs of Consistency: Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration” (2013) 51:2 Colum J 
Transnat’l L 418 at 471. 
1007 Reforming international investment governance 2015, note 263 at 126. 
1008 Simma, supra note 10 at 579–581. 
1009 Dell Computer Corp c Union des consommateurs, [2007] 2007 CSC 34, [2007] 2 RCS 801 at para 145: “This 
movement towards harmonization can be explained by the importance of legal certainty for commercial and 
international transactions” . 
1010 Calamita, supra note 431 at 182. 
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horizontal jurisprudence”1011 and parties to a BIT cannot be secured about the meaning and duties 
under a BIT1012.  
 
On the one hand, investors have legitimate expectations deriving from the contract they obtained 
under a BIT1013. Consistency and predictability “is likewise fundamental for confidence building 
vis-à-vis foreign investors and for creating stable investment conditions in the host country”1014.  
Contractual certainty requires that investors know the regulations and State’s position regarding 
human rights protection as it was reaffirmed in Azurix v. Argentina: “it is not only a matter of 
physical security; the stability afforded by a secure environment is as important from an investor’s 
point of view”1015. 
On the other hand, States become unsecured about the measures that can be adopted because  
“[i]mprecision in investment treaties can lead to unwelcome and unforeseen challenges to state 
regulatory action”1016. The UNCTAD noticed the complexity of this situation in its 2012 Report 
when it stated that “if the State and its subnational entities do not know in advance what type of 
conduct may be considered a breach of a treaty, then it cannot organise its regulatory and 
administrative decision-making processes and delegation in a way that ensures that its conduct will 
not incur liability”1017.  
 
The way in which human rights are considered by arbitral tribunal is problematic. It is 
known that “companies have used the ISDS regime to deter States from adopting policies that 
advance socioeconomic rights”1018. 
 
1011 N Jansen Calamita, “The (In)Compatibility of Appellate Mechanisms with Existing Instruments of the 
Investment Treaty Regime” (2017) 18 The Journal of World Investment & Trade 585 at 587. 
1012 Fortier, supra note 24 at 189: participants of the system are “unable to known or determine with any certainty 
their rights and obligations in a given situation”. 
1013 Julia Motte-Baumvol, “Le comportement de l’investisseur” in Walid Ben Hamida & Frédérique Coulée, eds, 
Convergences et contradictions du droit des investissements et des droits de l’homme: une approche contentieuse = 
Convergences and contradictions between investment law and human rights law: a litigation approach Publications 
de l’Institut international des droits de l’homme 35 (Paris: Pedone, 2017) at 203: “l’investisseur est censé connaître 
l’ampleur des risques liés à son investissement”. 
1014 Wenhua Shan, Penelope Simons & Dalvinder Singh, eds, Redefining sovereignty in international economic law, 
Studies in international trade law v. 7 (Oxford ; Portland, Or: Hart, 2008) at 241. 
1015 Azurix Corp. v The Argentine Republic, supra note 595 at para 408. 
1016 Calamita, supra note 431 at 184. 
1017 Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Sequel, UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/5, by UNCTAD, UNCTAD Series on Issues 
in International Investment Arbitrations II UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/5 (New York, Geneva: United Nations, 2012) 
at 17. 
1018 Bradlow, supra note 33 at 362. 
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Additionally, human rights law is irregularly considered as relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties1019. However, this should not be opened to debate 
anymore1020. In other words, it should be established that human rights law forms part of the 
applicable law in a dispute and parties should be able to act upon such elements. For instance, 
“consistent treatment of water contracts could emerge from the awards of international investment 
tribunals”1021. The outcome of the proceedings would be more predictable.  
 
Furthermore, legal certainty would be further strengthened by clear BIT provisions1022. 
Shinde argues that “unless any specific provision is included in the treaty […], the remedies can 
neither be uniform, nor effective”1023. Therefore, Lo suggests that “[f]or future BITs, incorporating 
human rights protection should be made as a standard practice. For existing BITs, a proper way is 
to renegotiate the treaties so as to explicitly include human rights”1024. This practice must be 
encouraged because the current situation leaves arbitrators to deal with human rights claims in a 
conflicting manner as both the jurisprudence and the BIT provisions are inconsistent1025.  
 
If arbitrators were consistent in the manner in which they deal with environmental and 
human rights, it would bolster consistency and predictability for the parties. This is a role that 
arbitrators should take up, especially because the arbitration awards are often enforced in 
practice1026. Investment tribunals are not completely ignoring other decisions1027 but this practice 
should be further strengthened. 
 
1019 ICSID, supra note 314 Article 42(1). 
1020 Lo, supra note 331 at 23: “It should be clear that human rights law can be operationally linked with BITs 
through treaty application and interpretation so as to have the human rights law to guide the operation of BITs”. 
1021 Truswell, supra note 242 at 584. 
1022 Paunio, supra note 182 at 53: “clear and unambiguous legal rules are for instance said to produce the legal 
certainty and predictability required for a well-functioning market". 
1023 Shinde, supra note 264 at 57. 
1024 Lo, supra note 331 at 24. 
1025 Shinde, supra note 264 at 57. 
1026 ICSID, supra note 314 Article 54(1): “each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this 
Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award with its territories as if it were a 
final judgement of a court in that State”. 
1027 Zarra, supra note 281 at 163: “international investment tribunals do not behave as if they are isolated from all 
other arbitration panels and that, therefore, a certain degree of horizontal consistency exists between investment 
decisions”. 
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Recently, an arbitral tribunal re-emphasized that it had “a duty to contribute to the harmonious 
development of international investment law, with a view to meeting the legitimate expectations 
of the community of States and investors towards legal certainty and the rule of law”1028. 
 
It is clear that an absence of consistency renders the outcome of arbitration proceedings 
unpredictable “and thereby ultimately undermine the legitimacy of investor-state dispute 
settlement procedures”1029. “It is obviously the sensibility of every single arbitrator that should 
drive them to grant a coherent approach to decision making”1030. This is important considering that 
human rights could be badly impacted by an absence of coherence in ISDS awards.  
 
 
Sub-section 2: A difficult protection of environmental and human rights  
 
 Insufficient legal certainty in investment arbitration jurisprudence renders the protection of 
human rights difficult.   
The position of arbitral tribunals finding IHRL irrelevant to ISDS1031 is unfortunate in cases where 
investors increased water prices, rendering impossible the access to water for local populations. 
The right to water was not granted protection by arbitrators, whereas there is “an increasing and 
vocal global consensus points to the right to water as a fundamental human right specifically, if 
not already part of customary international law”1032. Such position from arbitrators is controversial 
considering that there is a global water crisis and that, at least, 1.1 billion people in the world lack 
access to sufficient and sufficiently clean drinking water1033. Investors’ interests are confronted 
with basic water rights and “it is likely that the interaction between international investment law 
 
1028 Churchill Mining PLC and Planet Mining Pty Ltd v Republic of Indonesia (Award), [2016] ARB/12/14 and 
12/40 at para 253. 
1029  Karl, supra note 108 at 237. 
1030 Zarra, supra note 281 at 183. 
1031 Biloune and Marine Drive Complex Ltd v Ghana Investments Centre and the Government of Ghana (Award on 
Jurisdiction and Liability), supra note 819; Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, supra 
note 488; Border Timbers Limited, Border Timbers International (Private) Limited, and Hangani Development Co. 
(Private) Limited v Republic of Zimbabwe (Procedural Order No. 2), supra note 505; Bernhard Von Pezold and ors. 
v Republic of Zimbabwe, supra note 508; See Thesis note 122 Part 2, Chapter 2. 
1032 Farrugia, supra note 329 at 282. 
1033 Ibid at 266; WHO Global Water, Sanitation and Hygiene: Annual Report, WHO/CED/PHE/WSH/19.147 (2018) 
at VI. 
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and the provision of water services will continue to generate controversy, especially as a human 
right to water becomes more broadly recognised”1034. 
Arbitrators must intervene because “[w]ater is a biological necessity, scarce environmental 
resources, valuable commodity”1035.  
Consequently, it is time to guarantee a human right to water to all in an internationally binding 
agreement that apply to arbitration1036. If there is a clear internationally recognised human right to 
water, then “States would be under an obligation to afford water access to their citizens”1037 and it 
would facilitate the work of investment arbitrators to consider it. 
 
On the contrary, the human right to water “has been asserted in a number of investor-state 
disputes both as general ‘context’ to be taken into account in the interpretation of the investment 
treaty’s terms, and more directly as an affirmative defence to the state’s performance of its 
investment treaty obligations”1038. Additionally, there are several cases where human rights have 
been protected  by arbitral tribunals, such as in Urbaser1039, Philip Morris1040 or David Aven1041. 
The case law is obviously inconsistent.  
 
The silence of arbitrators in cases where human rights are infringed, does not strengthen 
their protection. It is understood that arbitrators do not have the role of criminally sanctioning 
investors violating human rights. They may nonetheless order the termination of a practice that is 
non-human rights friendly and impose IHRL obligations on the investor1042. In addition, “fear of 
costly claims for breach of investment treaties may curb states’ appetite for pro-climate legislation 
 
1034 Truswell, supra note 242 at 585. 
1035 Ibid at 571, 576: “access to affordable potable water helps to prevent disease by ensuring hydration and 
improving hygiene”. 
1036 Neuberger, supra note 1 at 184: “if fundamental rights were to become part of arbitration’s mandatory law, it 
would reinforce the idea that fundamental rights really are universal”. 
1037 Truswell, supra note 242 at 572. 
1038 Calamita, supra note 431 at 179. 
1039 Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The Argentine Republic, supra note 
626. 
1040 Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of 
Uruguay, supra note 509. 
1041 David R. Aven and Others v. Republic of Costa Rica, supra note 423. 
1042 Burova, supra note 622; Burlington Resources Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador (Decision on Ecuador’s 
Counterclaims), supra note 630. 
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and policies”1043 as well as human rights regulations1044. The fact that investment arbitration 
usually seeks to preserve private business interests, “governments typically consider ISDS as a 
factor against pursuing a pro-human rights policy that will negatively impact corporate 
concerns”1045.   
 
The lack of coherence of investment arbitration in admitting third parties’ intervention 
where human rights are relevant means that, in certain cases local populations’ concerns have a 
chance to be heard and considered by arbitrators and in other cases not. Sometimes, amicus curiae 
status is “the sole possibility for affected communities to be heard” by a tribunal1046. The fact that 
human rights are ignored by the tribunal is a serious problem and infringes the rule the law1047.  
 
 It is necessary for arbitrators, investors and host states to work together to encompass 
human rights and environmental questions in the investment field. Investors need to work closer 
with host state and domestic movements because “[f]ailure to do so risks the possibility that foreign 
investors will impose their vision of human rights on the domestic communities most directly 
affected”1048. 
In addition, “States and arbitral tribunals will also have to take human rights protection into 
account so as to have healthier and human rights friendlier development of BITs”1049. Legal 
certainty in investment arbitration jurisprudence could benefit local population’s economic, social, 
and cultural rights.  
The United Nations’ Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights encourages States to adopt 
policies that enable them to fulfill their human rights obligations when they conclude investment 
treaties1050. Consequently, qualified investment protection standards would render host states 
capable of guaranteeing human rights1051.  
 
1043 Lawrence & Smith, supra note 397; Bradlow, supra note 33 at 364. 
1044 Stephan W Schill, “System Building in Investment Treaty Arbitration and Lawmaking” (2001) 12 German Law 
Journal 1083 at 1085. 
1045 Bradlow, supra note 33 at 386. 
1046 Bernhard Von Pezold and ors. v Republic of Zimbabwe, supra note 508 at para 24. 
1047 See Thesis note 122 Part 1, Chapter 1, Section 2. 
1048 Bradlow, supra note 33 at 389. 
1049 Lo, supra note 331 at 24. 
1050 Human rights, Trade and Investment: Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, UNCESCR, 55th 
Sess, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/9 (2003) at para 35; note 333 Principle 9. 
1051 Cotula, supra note 849 at 152. 
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 Another consequence of insufficient legal certainty is the lack of coherence with other 
international tribunals. Discrepancies among international mechanisms of dispute resolutions 
undermine the international rule of law.  
 
Sub-section 3: Problems of uniformity in the jurisprudence of international tribunals 
regarding human rights 
 
 The position espoused by investment arbitration tribunals and other international courts are 
contradictory. In the former, the protection of investments is prevailing at the detriment of the host 
state’s populations whereas in the latter, human rights are highly guaranteed. Indeed, international 
courts emphasise human rights’ protection in cases of investments1052. The legal certainty problem 
of ISDS renders coherence and consistency difficult at an international level. 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights said that the American Convention on Human Rights 
must be abided by when enforcing a BIT. In the case of Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. 
Paraguay, the Court held that:   
 
The enforcement of bilateral commercial treaties negates vindication of non-
compliance with state obligations under the American Convention; on the contrary, 
their enforcement should always be compatible with the American Convention, which 
is a multilateral treaty on human rights that stands in a class of its own and that 
generates rights for individual human beings and does not depend entirely on 
reciprocity among States1053. 
 
It is clear that the court requires that BIT’s application respect human rights law.1054 The 
absence of multilateral rules in international investments law and arbitration gives rise to 
gaps, overlaps and inconsistencies between investments agreements and international law 
 
1052 Pellet, supra note 939 at 777: “Une enquête empirique montre que les Cours de droits de l’homme tiennent sans 
doute davantage compte que les tribunaux transnationaux des intérêts supérieurs de l’État et de la marge 
d’appréciation dont les autorités publiques bénéficient pour les faire prévaloir”. 
1053 Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v Paraguay (Merits, Reparations and Costs), [2006] Inter-Am Ct HR (ser 
C) No 146 at para 140. 
1054 Ibid. 
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instruments and “IIA reform therefore should seek coherence in these various 
relationships”1055. 
 
 This lack of uniformity regarding human rights considerations by international legal bodies 
must be mitigated because in some situations international courts have influenced investment 
arbitrators. Sometimes, tribunals considered international human rights law and other courts’ 
rulings such as ECtHR to construe the meaning and apply principles for protecting investors’ 
rights1056.  They have made references to human rights law jurisprudence1057 in order to interpret 
“investment protection standards, or in addressing States defenses based on IHRL”1058. The rulings 
provide arbitrators with some answers on how to deal with environmental and human rights 
questions and it promotes consistent interpretation across international bodies1059. 
 
Other tribunals have paid attention to the decisions rendered in similar cases: “[a]lthough not 
bound by previous decisions of other international tribunals, the Tribunal has given them due 
consideration with the aim of enhancing consistent interpretation of comparable treaty language 
as applied to similar fact patterns”1060. Therefore, “[t]he risk of total incoherence in the 
interpretation and application of the vast network of investment treaties is ameliorated somewhat 
by adjudicative dialogue whereby different arbitral tribunals and adjudicative bodies, aware of one 
another’s activities, exchange ideas and views”1061.  Similarly, in Fireman’s Fund v. Mexico, the 
tribunal expressed its willingness to consider other arbitral awards in order to understand the what 
customary international law expropriation actually means1062.  
 
1055 Reforming international investment governance 2015, note 263 at 128. 
1056 UNCTAD Report 2009, note 367 at 6; Tecmed, supra note 386 at paras 121–122; Azurix Corp. v The Argentine 
Republic, supra note 595 at para 312. 
1057 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A.  v The Argentine Republic 
(Decision on Liability), supra note 540 at paras 252, 256, 262; SAUR International S.A. c. République Argentine 
(Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability), supra note 750 at paras 328–332. 
1058 Cotula, supra note 849 at 153. 
1059 Kube & Petersmann, supra note 17 at 71: “there is need for promoting mutually consistent interpretations 
through judicial comity among diverse national, regional, worldwide courts and alternative dispute settlement 
proceedings”. 
1060 EDF International S.A., SAUR International S.A. and León Participaciones Argentinas S.A. v. Argentine 
Republic, supra note 600 at para 897. 
1061 Calamita, supra note 431 at 183; Gabriel Kaufmann-Kohler, “Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse?” 
(2007) 23 Arbitration International 357. 




These examples show that arbitrators acknowledge the benefits of developing a coherent 
jurisprudence and are willing to consider arbitral awards from other tribunals. It is unfortunate that 
they are more confident with the practice regarding investors’ rights interpretation, rather than 
socio-economic rights. When they have done so,  “references to IHRL have tended to be brief and 
not to significantly affect arbitration outcomes, particularly where States raised human rights 
arguments as defenses for alleged BIT violations”1063. 
 
A trend must develop among those adjudicators to establish a consistent jurisprudence to 
protect local population’s human rights. In practice, “tribunals could take advantage of existing 
jurisprudence to allow host States to assert human rights defenses, or to oblige investors to better 
understand the human rights obligations of host States before undertaking an investment”1064. 
Better legal certainty would not only improve human rights’ importance in ISDS but also bolster 
the rule of law. 
 
1063 Cotula, supra note 849 at 153. 
1064 Bradlow, supra note 33 at 367; Simma, supra note 10 at 575. 
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Section 3: The protection of the rule of law by international investment 
arbitration 
 
The rule of law must be obeyed by any actor in international and domestic law, be they 
institutions, corporations or individuals, public or private1065. In other words, investors are under 
a duty to comply with the rule of law and its core feature1066. The lack of legal certainty in 
investment arbitration jurisprudence involving human rights impacts the rule of law and creates 
injustice1067. There is no perfect system of dispute resolution1068 but this section will also discuss 
possibilities of improvements in this field.   
 
First of all, legal certainty is far from being achieved in ISDS1069 and this situation does 
not ensure the protection of human rights as it fails to tackle investors’ misconduct. This situation 
“is likely to reinforce the existing skepticism towards the rule of law, and further entrench the 
existing perception of international treaties as a protective mechanism for a select group of 
actors”1070. The ISDS regime is challenging two important rule of law components, namely human 
rights guarantee and legal certainty1071. Nevertheless, “the public nature of international 
investment arbitration requires, among other things, that a certain amount of predictability of 
decisions is granted by decision makers”1072 especially because of the repercussions of an awards 
on the public at large. 
 
Therefore, “arbitration can be said to be at odds with democracy and the rule of law”1073. ISDS 
cannot remain hermetic to environmental and human rights law anymore; “even if it is undeniable 
 
1065 Strengthening and Coordinating United Nations Rule of Law Activities 2014, Secretary General, supra note 43 
at 13: The Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights “constitute the authoritative global framework for 
ensuring that the private sector not only benefits from, but also adheres to, the rule of law”. 
1066 McCorquodale, supra note 2 at 41: “With human rights as part of the international rule of law, businesses will 
continue to be affected by it”. 
1067 R v. Ferguson, supra note 201 at para 72; Bingham of Cornhill, supra note 47. 
1068 Franck, supra note 40 at 1610. 
1069 Ibid at 1521–1523, 1584. 
1070 Sattorova, supra note 262 at 165. 
1071 Maxeiner, supra note 356 at 28, 30: “Legal certainty is a central tenet of the rule of law as understood around the 
world”; Zolo, supra note 46 at 24–25. 
1072 Zarra, supra note 281 at 140. 
1073 Hachez & Wouters, supra note 8 at 434. 
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that international investment law has developed a certain degree of specificity and coherence, it is 
not possible today to consider it as an autonomous system of law (i.e. a self-contained regime)”1074. 
Improvement of human rights protection on a regular basis would promote the implementation of 
the rule of law.  
 
Strengthening the rule of law in investment arbitration would benefit the users of the system 
as there is “empirical evidence showing that the rule of law does contribute to a nation’s wealth 
and its rate of economic growth”1075. Three hundred years ago, Adam Smith said that business 
could develop where there is, among other things, security, stability which are features of the rule 
of law1076. Indeed, it is widely acknowledged in the business world that the rule of law is essential 
for  “securing investment, defining property rights, forming contracts, and preventing default on 
debts, and otherwise to aid in reducing the avoidable risks of investments”1077. Respect for the rule 
of law “has beneficial economic results, and is critical to developing the trust and certainty needed 
for entrepreneurship activity”1078. Lord Neuberger recently recalled that the rule of law was also 
essential for the ‘diplomatic world’1079 which also reaches the doors of investment arbitration. The 
rule of law must be abided by in order to ensure an investment-friendly environment and ‘protect 
the orderly resolution of disputes’1080.  
 
Furthermore, it must not be neglected that international investment arbitration would be an 
efficient mechanism to protect human rights. It is obvious that “international investment protection 
and human rights are not ‘separate worlds’”1081. They must work together and participate in the 
enforcement of the rule of law in a coherent and consistent manner, in line with other legal bodies. 
 
1074 Zarra, supra note 281 at 162. 
1075 Richard A Posner, “Creating a legal framework for economic development” (1998) 13:1 The World Bank 
Research Observer 1 at 3. 
1076 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (London, 1776) c III. 
1077 A Gerson, “Peace Building: The Private Sector’s Role” (2001) 95 AJIL 101 at 111; McCorquodale, supra note 2 
at 36. 
1078 McCorquodale, supra note 2 at 38. 
1079 Neuberger, supra note 1 at 181: “arbitrators resolve disputes between business people or national entities; in 
both the commercial and diplomatic worlds, the rule of law is essential”. 
1080 Ileana M Smeureanu, “Conference report on Wendy Miles’ keynote speech at the YAF/YAPP conference in 
Vienna (28 March 2015): ‘The Role of Young Arbitrators in the Rule of Law’”, (2015), online: Kluwer Arbitration 
Blog <http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2015/04/23/conference-report-on-wendy-miles-keynote-speech-
at-the-yafyapp-conference-in-vienna-28-march-2015-the-role-of-young-arbitrators-in-the-rule-of-law/>. 
1081 Simma, supra note 10 at 576. 
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It is also the role of arbitrators to protect human rights1082. To achieve this objective, investment 
arbitration “can serve as rare international legal tools that provide a private, enforceable cause of 
action. To date, investors have used claims to convince governments to abandon otherwise pro-
human rights policies”1083.  
 
There are cases where the system has proved to be efficient in terms of environment and 
human rights guarantees1084 . For instance, “the ICSID arbitration institution is a vital participant 
in the water cooperation story – one that has been adding its own ingredients to the stone soup”1085. 
Besides, “ensuring the rule of law in the exploitation of natural resources is essential to ensuring 
inclusive and sustainable economic growth and development and in respecting, protecting and 
fulfilling the human rights of persons”1086.  
 
This needs to be further implemented1087 as international law lacks mechanisms to hold 
corporations accountable for their human rights breaches1088. This is why arbitral tribunals “are 
thus uniquely positioned to arrive at novel conclusions about international law as it applies to 
corporations”1089.  It should be noticed that “[i]t is in the interests of business to uphold human 
rights and to work within the law. It is also in their interests … for there to be an international rule 
of law to enable them to operate effectively around the world”1090 
 
 
1082 Neuberger, supra note 1 at 181: “they [arbitrators] administer justice and so must act in accordance with the law 
and be seen to do so. The law includes fundamental rights”. 
1083 Bradlow, supra note 33 at 358. 
1084 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, supra note 386; Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. The Republic of El 
Salvador, supra note 541; Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The Argentine 
Republic, supra note 626; Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. 
Oriental Republic of Uruguay, supra note 509; Burlington Resources Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador (Decision on 
Ecuador’s Counterclaims), supra note 630; David R. Aven and Others v. Republic of Costa Rica, supra note 423; 
See Thesis note 122 Part 2, Chapter 3, Section 1. 
1085 Bray, supra note 524 at 475. 
1086 Secretary General, supra note 43 at 12. 
1087 Smeureanu, supra note 1080: “debate on climate change, in a broader human rights context, presents an 
opportunity for young arbitrators who can explain the role of, and ‘clear the name’ of, ISDS where it has been 
damaged”. 
1088 Nolan, supra note 248 at 222; Ishakawa, supra note 248. 
1089 Attanasio & Sainati, supra note 639 at 749. 
1090 McCorquodale, supra note 2 at 27. 
 172 
In addition, developing legal certainty towards environmental and human rights through 
investment arbitration jurisprudence is easier than establishing a multilateral court or treaty that 
would tackle these issues1091.  
 
Compliance of BITS, host states, investors, and arbitrators with the rule of law will help to 
legitimize the ISDS system. Developing a consistent behaviour in admitting amicus curiae would 
tackle the question of the “mounting appeal for more transparency, participation, and the rule of 
law” – linked to the “legitimacy crisis’ of investment arbitration”1092. The World Investment 
Report proposed a reform regarding third parties’ access to ISDS as a way to bolster the rule of 
law1093.  
“After all, only if investment treaties and investor-state arbitration themselves meet the commonly 
accepted standards embodied in the rule of law will the outcome of arbitral jurisprudence be 
considered as legitimate”1094. Here, arbitrators’ role is key as they are “the main actors responsible 
for granting the functioning of investment arbitration”1095. 
 
 In this chapter, an analysis of investment arbitration jurisprudence in human rights cases 
has been proposed, showing that the decisions rendered are lacking consistency and coherence. 
The impact of insufficient legal certainty has also been discussed and it demonstrated that it is a 
serious threat to commercial activities, arbitrators’ role, human rights’ protection and more 
broadly, the rule of law. Consequently, “[l]ack of coherence is, indeed, one of the main reasons 
which are at the basis of the quest for a structural reform of investment arbitration”1096..  
Nevertheless, “international arbitration is an example of the “machinery” needed to implement the 
rule of law”1097.   
 
1091 Castellarin, supra note 298 at 216: “these pioneering treaties are far from replacing all BITs, so that it will take a 
long time before the structure of ISDS can ensure legal certainty”. 
1092 Steininger, “Leiden Journal of International Law”, supra note 345 at 34. 
1093 Reforming international investment governance 2015, note 263 at 148. 
1094 Schill, supra note 51 at 98. 
1095 Zarra, supra note 281 at 146. 
1096 Ibid at 184. 






 The ancient concept of the rule of law has traveled through ages to get through the doors 
of international investment arbitration, where it faces challenges1098. The principle emerged 
thousand years ago1099 until being enshrined in the most important documents of our times1100. The 
constituent parts1101 of the concept must be upheld in order to guarantee the rule of law.  
 
International investment arbitration, like any other mechanism to solve disputes, aims at 
ensuring the good implementation of the rule of law1102. This is not an easy task. This thesis sought 
to demonstrate that two core features of the concept, namely legal certainty and human rights, are 
still undermined by ISDS1103 . Even if human rights as a rule of law element face controversy1104, 
it is hard to imagine that the concept would be preserved without an effective protection of those 
rights.  However, ensuring legal certainty in investment arbitration so as to guarantee the protection 
of human rights and the rule of law, are difficult tasks. It is true that “[j]ustice, human rights, 
democracy and rule of law […] are ‘interpretive legal concepts’ which people share, even though 
they often disagree about the criteria for interpreting and applying these legal terms”1105. Indeed, 
there is still no international definition of the notion which renders its application difficult1106.
 
1098 Hachez & Wouters, supra note 8 at 66; Castellarin, supra note 298 at 214; Steininger, “Leiden Journal of 
International Law”, supra note 345 at 34. 
1099 See Thesis note 122 Part 1, Chapter 1, Section 1. 
1100 See Thesis ibid Part 1, Chapter 1, Section 3 ; UN Charter, supra note 42; ECHR, supra note 42; ICCPR, supra 
note 169; ICESCR, supra note 170. 
1101 Bingham of Cornhill, supra note 47; Bingham of Cornhill, supra note 3. 
1102 See Thesis note 122 Part 1, Chapter 3; McCorquodale, supra note 2 at 35. 
1103 See Thesis note 122 Part 1, Chapter 2, Chapter 3. 
1104 Bingham of Cornhill, supra note 3 at 66; Jowell, supra note 30. 
1105 Petersmann, supra note 227 at 284. 
1106 See Thesis note 122 Part 1, Chapter 1, Section 2; Vanspranghe, supra note 52 at 142; McCorquodale, supra note 
2 at 31. 
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 It has been explained that investment arbitration is confronted with problems of legal 
certainty when it comes to consider socio-economic rights breaches due to an investment1107. 
The inconsistency is noticeable at a procedural stage, where arbitrators are opposed to BIT 
containing no human rights indications or poor ones1108. They have to answer calls from local 
populations’ representatives (amicus curiae) but have not established a consistent jurisprudence 
that accept them in human rights cases1109. Finally, their decisions on host states’ justifying their 
fundamental rights policies through defenses or counterclaims, are quite uncertain1110.  
In addition, arbitral tribunals’ use of interpretation tools to incorporate international human rights 
law instruments in their decisions has been poor and particularly unpredictable1111. The relevance 
of human rights law is uncertain, even if cases are analogous1112. Those adjudicators face a body 
of law known to be vague and it is challenging to develop coherence, consistency, predictability, 
and legal certainty in their decisions1113.  
Nevertheless, the promotion and implementation of the rule of law remains essential in today’s 
world1114.  
 
Along with the issue of legal certainty, environmental and human rights protection is 
unsatisfactory. However, “human rights compliance is a priority in any decent host State’s public 
policy agenda and thus it cannot but affect the regulatory spaces of a host State vis-à-vis foreign 
investors and other States”1115.   
Not only do governments have the duty to respect human rights, corporations as well1116 and 
arbitrators must take the opportunity to ensure that. There are arbitration proceedings where host 
states or third parties try to emphasize on obligations to protect human rights. They are challenged 
by investors’ protection obligations and interests are conflicting; there is no official prevalence of 
 
1107 See Thesis note 122 Part 1, Chapter 3 and Part 2, Chapter 3. 
1108 See Thesis ibid Part 2, Chapter 1, Section 1. 
1109 See thesis ibid Part 2, Chapter 1, Section 2. 
1110 See Thesis ibid Part 2, Chapter 1, Section 3. 
1111 See Thesis ibid Part 2, Chapter 2, Section 1. 
1112 See Thesis ibid Part 2, Chapter 2, Section 2, Sub-section 2. 
1113 See Thesis ibid Part 2, Chapter 2, Section 2, Sub-section 1. 
1114 McCorquodale, supra note 2 at 32; Secretary General, supra note 43; note 43; Bingham of Cornhill, supra note 
3; Neuberger, supra note 1. 
1115 Simma, supra note 10 at 578. 
1116 Nolan, supra note 248 at 230. 
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investment law or international human rights law in these disputes1117. Regarding the human rights 
problem, a balance must be found by arbitrators between economic interests, human rights 
protection and international rule of law strengthening. However, “given the fact that there is no 
principle of binding precedent in public international law, it is submitted that the way ahead is 
through the gradual development of arbitral case law”1118. International human rights law should 
be applied in a consistent manner so as to offer predictable outcomes and bolster legal certainty.  
 
Arbitrators, in recent cases such as Urbaser1119 have understood this. It is clear that Urbaser has 
an impact on human rights considerations and the role that arbitrators can have in this battle. It put 
some light one their capacities to intervene and have an impact of local populations’ rights1120. It 
is now time to harmonize the jurisprudence in terms of human rights as well as investors’ 
obligations.  
 
Of course, the protection of fundamental rights would be better guaranteed in ISDS if BITs 
were adapted to the reality of such issues; or “if both parties to arbitration proceedings agree for 
the application of international human rights law to their dispute”1121.  
The evolution of arbitral jurisprudence shows an increasing development of socio-
economic rights considerations and it is the reason why they will “hold a central position in the 
debate on the future of investment arbitration”1122.   
 
 The ignorance of host state’s populations and human rights has led certain countries to 
withdraw from the ICSID Convention. Indeed, if governments “do not believe that investor-state 
arbitration respects their rights, as well as those of investors, they will not consent to the system 
and that system itself will run the risk of collapse”1123.   
 
1117 Cazala, supra note 340 at 320. 
1118 Hobér, supra note 197 at 64. 
1119 Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The Argentine Republic, supra note 
626. 
1120 See Thesis note 122 Chapter 3, Section 1, Sub-section 1. 
1121 Dumberry & Dumas-Aubin, supra note 394 at 370; Reiner & Schreuer, supra note 389 at 84. 
1122 Steininger, “Leiden Journal of International Law”, supra note 345 at 34. 
1123 Burke-White, supra note 347 at 432. 
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For instance, Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela have withdrawn from the ICSID system1124. Brazil is 
refusing to sign treaties involving ISDS mechanisms; South Africa and Indonesia are withdrawing 
from key BITs containing ISDS provisions1125. Other countries such as Argentina or Uruguay, 
involved in important arbitration cases, “may be rethinking its commitment to investor-state 
arbitration and the ICSID system”1126 as they are not afforded protection when they try to protect 
economic, social and cultural rights of their populations. 
 
 This has considerable impact on the legitimacy of the ISDS regime as “both the credibility 
and viability of the good governance mission of international investment law hinges on how 
investor misconduct is addressed by investment treaties and investment arbitration practice”1127. 
The calls for reforms aim at legitimizing a system that is confronted with public issues, through 
public accountability1128. Improvements must be made as there are more and more cross-cutting 
issues which demonstrate the need to coordinate various fields of international law “such as the 
application of international human rights, or also international social and environmental law”1129.  
 
In addition, BITs would better operate in host state where the “rule of law and respect for human 
rights in tandem with investor protection can thus form a sort of virtuous circle in improving 
welfare”1130. For instance, it is now acknowledged that “human rights considerations, including 
the right to water, and a sustainable development framework is crucial to foreign investment’s 
success as a key driver of economic growth and job creation”1131. Therefore, it cannot be said that 
international investment law and international human rights law are like oil and water anymore1132.  
 
 
1124 Mavluda Sattorova, “Reassertion of Control and Contracting Parties’ Domestic Law Responses to Investment 
Treaty Arbitration: Between Reform, Reticence and Resistance” in Andreas Kulick, ed, Reassertion of Control over 
the Investment Treaty Regime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016) 53 at 54; Bradlow, supra note 33 at 
385. 
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1128 Mariel Dimsey, “Article 4. Submission by a third person” in Dimitrij Euler, Markus W Gehring & Maxi Scherer, 
eds, Transparency in international investment arbitration: a guide to the UNICTRAL Rules on Transparency in 
Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) at 130. 
1129 UNCTAD Report 2009, note 367 at 3; Report of the Multi-year Expert Meeting on Investment for Development, 
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Obviously, improvements in the system need to be made regarding legal certainty and 
human rights protection. But “the current ISDS regime is almost certain to remain in place for at 
least a few more decades to come”1133. This is due to the fact that many BITs and IIAs contain 
clauses that guarantee the existence of investment arbitration for few more years. These 
improvements must occur from parties and users of the investments arbitration system1134. 
Governments must also take charge of the matter and “need to consider more proactively human 
rights impacts when they sign trade and investment agreements […] Such steps would address 
many of the governance challenges at the heart of questions relating to business and human 
rights”1135.   
 
 This discussion, enlightened with a variety of authors, has “shown that investment 
arbitration needs to be reformed to get closer to the model of the rule of law”1136. 
As the Lord Neuberger once stated, “the success of arbitration rests entirely on the rule of law”, as 
it is the case in any legal system1137. It must be added that it is also “in the interests of business to 
uphold human rights and to work within the law. It is also in their interests … for there to be an 
international rule of law to enable them to operate effectively around the world”1138. Everyone is 
concerned in the good implementation of the rule of law. Generally speaking, “the functional effect 
of investment arbitration is that it serves to strengthen the rule of law on a global scale”1139.  
 
At the end of the day: 
 
International law must balance claims for respect for the special requirements of national 
communities, which is their very raison d’être, and concern for which is one of international 
law’s central postulates, against the need for sustaining the international Rule of Law so that 
economic activity can continue to flow freely about the globe.1140 
 
 
1133 Bradlow, supra note 33 at 357. 
1134 Lawrence & Smith, supra note 397. 
1135 Robinson, supra note 200 at 25. 
1136 Castellarin, supra note 298 at 214. 
1137 Neuberger, supra note 1 at 184. 
1138 McCorquodale, supra note 2 at 27. 
1139 Schultz & Dupont, supra note 187 at 1163. 
1140 Reisman, W Michael, Economic Development, National Sovereignty and International Arbitration (Santa Fe de 
Bogotá, 2005) at 13. 
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The reconciliation of these interests with the paramount rule of law principles through international 
investment arbitration “remains a challenging task” and an “unfinished business”1141.
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